[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-42608":30,"landing-articles":73},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":37,"cwes":38,"cpes":40,"technologies":43,"references":45,"score":51,"epss_score":52,"epss_percentile":53,"is_kev":37,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":54,"attack_mappings":64,"exploits":71},9380,"CVE-2026-42608","EUVD-2026-29066","Grav has Unauthenticated Path Traversal & Arbitrary File Write in its FormFlash component\n\n# Vulnerability Report: Grav CMS Unauthenticated Path Traversal & Arbitrary File Write\n\n**[ZERO-DAY] Unauthenticated Path Traversal leading to Arbitrary Directory Creation and Configuration Injection**\n\n## Summary\n\nGrav CMS (v1.7.49.5 and latest development source) is vulnerable to a Zero-Day Path Traversal vulnerability within the FormFlash core component. By manipulating the session_id (passed as `__form-flash-id` in POST requests), an unauthenticated attacker can traverse the filesystem to create arbitrary directories and write an `index.yaml` file containing attacker-controlled data.\n\nThis vulnerability can lead to unauthorized modification of application behavior, potential data integrity issues, and service disruption in production environments.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n- Versions: Confirmed in Grav v1.7.49.5 (latest stable) and the latest development source (March 2026).\n- Class: `Grav\\Framework\\Form\\FormFlash`\n- Method: `__construct()` \u002F `getTmpDir()`\n- Parameter: `session_id` (Mapped to `__form-flash-id` in POST requests)\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\nThe FormFlash class is used to persist form data across redirects. It constructs a temporary storage path using the provided session_id. The path construction logic in the latest source:\n\n```php\n$folder = $config['folder'] ?? ($this->sessionId ? 'tmp:\u002F\u002Fforms\u002F' . $this->sessionId : '');\n$this->folder = $folder && $locator->isStream($folder) ? $locator->findResource($folder, true, true) : $folder;\n```\n\nLack of sanitization on the sessionId (the raw session identifier) allows the use of `..\u002F` sequences. When `findResource` resolves the stream, it allows escape into any writable directory within the webserver's scope (typically `user\u002Fconfig\u002F`, `cache\u002F`, `logs\u002F`, and `tmp\u002F`).\n\n## Affected Versions & Zero-Day Status\n\n- Tested Version: v1.7.49.5 (Latest Stable Release as of Nov 2025).\n- Development Branch Status: Vulnerable. The latest source code in the GitHub develop branch (March 2026) remains unpatched.\n- Affected Range: All Grav CMS versions utilizing the FormFlash component (v1.7.x and potentially older v1.6.x versions).\n- CVE Status: Zero-Day (Non-Registered). Extensive research confirmed no existing CVE addresses this specific core FormFlash session-based traversal.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. Identify any page containing a Grav Form (e.g., `\u002Fcontact`).\n2. Intercept the POST request during form submission.\n3. Modify the `__form-flash-id` parameter to include a traversal sequence targeting a writable directory (e.g., `..\u002F..\u002Fuser\u002Fconfig\u002Fproof_dir`).\n4. Submit the request.\n5. Observe that a new directory (`poc\u002F`) and file (`index.yaml`) have been created at the traversed path.\n\n## Request Example\n\n```http\nPOST \u002Fcontact HTTP\u002F1.1\nHost: target.grav.cms\nContent-Type: application\u002Fx-www-form-urlencoded\n\n__form-name-=contact&__form-flash-id=..\u002F..\u002Fuser\u002Fconfig\u002Fproof_dir&form-data[name]=Attack&form-data[message]=Payload\n```\n\n## Response \u002F Result\n\n- HTTP\u002F1.1 302 Found (Standard redirect)\n- Filesystem Modification:\n  - Directory Created: `\u002Fvar\u002Fwww\u002Fhtml\u002Fuser\u002Fconfig\u002Fproof_dir\u002Fpoc\u002F`\n  - File Created: `\u002Fvar\u002Fwww\u002Fhtml\u002Fuser\u002Fconfig\u002Fproof_dir\u002Fpoc\u002Findex.yaml`\n\n## Proof of Concept Evidence (Before\u002FAfter)\n\n### Before Exploitation\n\n- Status: Directory does not exist.\n- Evidence:\n\n```bash\n$ ls -la \u002Fvar\u002Fwww\u002Fhtml\u002Fuser\u002Fconfig\u002Fproof_dir\u002F\nls: cannot access '\u002Fvar\u002Fwww\u002Fhtml\u002Fuser\u002Fconfig\u002Fproof_dir\u002F': No such file or directory\n```\n\n### After Exploitation\n\n- Status: Arbitrary directory and `index.yaml` created.\n- Evidence:\n\n```bash\n$ ls -la \u002Fvar\u002Fwww\u002Fhtml\u002Fuser\u002Fconfig\u002Fproof_dir\u002Fpoc\u002Findex.yaml\n-rw-rw-r-- 1 www-data www-data 158 Mar 23 22:15 \u002Fvar\u002Fwww\u002Fhtml\u002Fuser\u002Fconfig\u002Fproof_dir\u002Fpoc\u002Findex.yaml\n$ cat \u002Fvar\u002Fwww\u002Fhtml\u002Fuser\u002Fconfig\u002Fproof_dir\u002Fpoc\u002Findex.yaml\nform: ''\nid: ''\nunique_id: poc\n...\ndata:\n  poc_status: confirmed\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- Clarified Cross-User Attack: By controlling the session identifier, an attacker can overwrite or interfere with other users temporary form data, breaking session isolation.\n- Configuration Injection: Writing `index.yaml` into plugin\u002Ftheme configuration subdirectories can alter application behavior or inject malicious settings.\n- Data Integrity: Unauthorized modification of configuration subfolders can lead to widespread site corruption or logical bypasses.\n- Denial of Service (DoS): Recursive directory creation enables attackers to exhaust disk space or inodes (inode exhaustion).\n\n## Attack Requirements\n\n- Authentication: None (Unauthenticated)\n- Configuration: Standard Grav installation with at least one form-enabled page (e.g., Contact, Login, Registration)\n\n## Exploitability Assessment\n\n- Complexity: Low. Requires only basic HTTP POST parameters.\n- Reliability: 100% (Deterministically reproducible in vulnerable versions).\n- Severity: Critical \u002F High. The vulnerability requires no authentication and allows filesystem manipulation and session data corruption.\n\n## Remediation\n\n1. Sanitize Session IDs: Apply `basename()` or a strict alphanumeric regex to the `session_id` in FormFlash before path construction.\n2. Filesystem Hardening: Ensure `user\u002Fconfig\u002F` and other sensitive directories have restrictive permissions preventing the webserver from creating new subdirectories.\n3. Update Grav: Monitor for patches addressing FormFlash sanitization.\n\n---\n\n## Maintainer note — fix applied (2026-04-24)\n\nFixed in Grav core on the `2.0` branch: commit [`d904efc33`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgetgrav\u002Fgrav\u002Fcommit\u002Fd904efc33) — will ship in **2.0.0-beta.2**.\n\n**What changed:** `FormFlash::__construct()` now sanitizes `session_id`, `unique_id`, and `id` through a strict `[A-Za-z0-9,_-]{1,64}` allowlist before any path is constructed from them. Invalid values collapse to `''`, which causes `save()`\u002F`delete()`\u002F`getTmpDir()` to no-op — so a `__form-flash-id=..\u002F..\u002Fuser\u002Fconfig\u002Fproof_dir` POST simply does nothing on disk.\n\n**Files:**\n\n- [`system\u002Fsrc\u002FGrav\u002FFramework\u002FForm\u002FFormFlash.php`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgetgrav\u002Fgrav\u002Fblob\u002F2.0\u002Fsystem\u002Fsrc\u002FGrav\u002FFramework\u002FForm\u002FFormFlash.php)\n- [`tests\u002Funit\u002FGrav\u002FCommon\u002FSecurity\u002FFormFlashSecurityTest.php`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgetgrav\u002Fgrav\u002Fblob\u002F2.0\u002Ftests\u002Funit\u002FGrav\u002FCommon\u002FSecurity\u002FFormFlashSecurityTest.php) — 32 test cases covering the PoC + variants.","2026-05-05T21:34:00Z",{},false,[39],"CWE-22",[41,42],"cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:2.0.0:beta1:*:*:*:*:*:*",[44],"Getgrav Grav",[46,47,48,49,50],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgetgrav\u002Fgrav\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-hmcx-ch82-3fv2","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2026-42608","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgetgrav\u002Fgrav\u002Fcommit\u002Fc66dfeb5ff679a1667678c6335eb9ff3255dfc47","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgetgrav\u002Fgrav\u002Fcommit\u002Fd904efc33e03ebb597afde8d3368b28cf0423632","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgetgrav\u002Fgrav",0,0.00603,0.48549,{"timestamp":55,"automatable":56,"tech_impact":57,"exploitation":58,"cisa_decision":59,"cisa_remediation_timeline":63},"2026-05-11T16:07:43.451071Z","yes","total","poc",{"vector":60,"decision":61,"priority":62},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:Y\u002FT:T\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T07:33:22.189506\u002F","attend","medium","3D",[65],{"name":66,"source":67,"tactics":68,"technique_id":70},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[69],"initial-access","T1190",[72],{"link":46},{"count":74,"next":75,"previous":6,"results":76},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[77,85,93],{"id":78,"title":79,"summary":80,"published_at":81,"type":82,"link":83,"image_url":84},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":86,"title":87,"summary":88,"published_at":89,"type":90,"link":91,"image_url":92},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":94,"title":95,"summary":96,"published_at":97,"type":98,"link":99,"image_url":100},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]