[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-44429":30,"landing-articles":87},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":51,"technologies":54,"references":57,"score":64,"epss_score":65,"epss_percentile":66,"is_kev":67,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":68,"attack_mappings":78,"exploits":85},16872,"CVE-2026-44429","EUVD-2026-30487","MCP Registry vulnerable to stored XSS in catalogue UI via attribute-quote breakout in publisher-controlled `websiteUrl`\n\n## Summary\n\nThe public catalogue UI served at `GET \u002F` (file `internal\u002Fapi\u002Fhandlers\u002Fv0\u002Fui_index.html`) is vulnerable to stored cross-site scripting via the `server.websiteUrl` field of any published `server.json`. Server-side validation in `internal\u002Fvalidators\u002Fvalidators.go` (`validateWebsiteURL`) only checks that the URL parses, is absolute, and uses the `https` scheme; it does not reject quote characters. Client-side, the value is interpolated into a double-quoted `href` attribute via `innerHTML`, using a homegrown `escapeHtml` helper that performs the standard `textContent` → `innerHTML` round-trip. Per the HTML serialisation algorithm, that round-trip encodes only `&`, `\u003C`, `>` and U+00A0 inside text nodes — it does **not** encode `\"` or `'`. A literal `\"` in `websiteUrl` therefore breaks out of the `href` attribute, allowing arbitrary `on*` event handlers to be appended to the same `\u003Ca>` element. The Content-Security-Policy on `\u002F` is `script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https:\u002F\u002Fcdn.tailwindcss.com`, so the injected event handlers execute.\n\nAny user able to obtain a publish token (e.g. via `POST \u002Fv0\u002Fauth\u002Fgithub-at` with their own GitHub account, or `POST \u002Fv0\u002Fauth\u002Fnone` on a deployment that has anonymous auth enabled) can plant a poisoned record visible to every visitor of the registry homepage.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- Validator: `internal\u002Fvalidators\u002Fvalidators.go` — `validateWebsiteURL` (lines 153–199)\n- Sink: `internal\u002Fapi\u002Fhandlers\u002Fv0\u002Fui_index.html` — `toggleDetails(card, item)` at line 432, the `href` attribute built around `escapeHtml(server.websiteUrl)`\n- Helper: `escapeHtml` defined at `internal\u002Fapi\u002Fhandlers\u002Fv0\u002Fui_index.html` lines 494–498\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n1. Obtain a Registry JWT for any namespace you control (a GitHub OAuth exchange against a throwaway account suffices):\n\n   ```bash\n   TOKEN=$(curl -sS -X POST https:\u002F\u002Fregistry.modelcontextprotocol.io\u002Fv0\u002Fauth\u002Fgithub-at \\\n        -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n        -d '{\"github_token\":\"\u003Cgh-pat>\"}' | jq -r .registry_token)\n   ```\n\n2. Publish a server with a poisoned `websiteUrl`. The literal `\"` is preserved end-to-end:\n\n   ```bash\n   curl -sS -X POST https:\u002F\u002Fregistry.modelcontextprotocol.io\u002Fv0\u002Fpublish \\\n     -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n     -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n     --data-binary @- \u003C\u003C'EOF'\n   {\n     \"$schema\": \"https:\u002F\u002Fstatic.modelcontextprotocol.io\u002Fschemas\u002F2025-09-29\u002Fserver.schema.json\",\n     \"name\":  \"io.github.\u003Cyour-account>\u002Fxss-poc\",\n     \"version\": \"0.0.1\",\n     \"description\": \"hover the website link\",\n     \"websiteUrl\": \"https:\u002F\u002Fexample.com\u002F\\\"onmouseover=alert(document.domain)\u002F\u002F\"\n   }\n   EOF\n   ```\n\n3. Visit `https:\u002F\u002Fregistry.modelcontextprotocol.io\u002F`, search for `xss-poc`, click the card to expand it, then hover the **Website** link in the details panel. The injected `onmouseover` fires and `alert(document.domain)` runs on the `registry.modelcontextprotocol.io` origin.\n\n## Why server-side validation does not catch this\n\nGo's `net\u002Furl.Parse` accepts literal `\"` in the path component:\n\n```\ninput=\"https:\u002F\u002Fexample.com\u002F\\\"onmouseover=alert(1)\u002F\u002F\"  IsAbs=true  Scheme=\"https\"  Path=\"\u002F\\\"onmouseover=alert(1)\u002F\u002F\"\n```\n\nNeither the Huma `format:\"uri\"` annotation nor `validateWebsiteURL`'s scheme\u002F`IsAbs` triplet rejects this string. The architecture's existing protection — `repository.url` is regex-locked to `^https?:\u002F\u002F(www\\.)?github\\.com\u002F[\\w.-]+\u002F[\\w.-]+\u002F?$` and therefore cannot contain quotes — does not extend to `websiteUrl`, which has no allowlist.\n\n## Why client-side `escapeHtml` does not catch this\n\n```js\nfunction escapeHtml(text) {\n    const div = document.createElement('div');\n    div.textContent = text;\n    return div.innerHTML;\n}\n```\n\nPer the HTML5 spec (§13.3 Serialising HTML fragments), the only characters encoded inside the text content of an element are `&`, `\u003C`, `>`, and U+00A0. `\"` and `'` are **not** encoded because in a text-content context they are not special. The helper is therefore safe in element-text contexts (where it is correctly used for `name`, `version`, `description`, etc.) but unsafe inside an attribute value, which is precisely where it is invoked for `href` on lines 432 and 426.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Stored XSS on the official MCP Registry homepage. The malicious entry sits in the public catalogue alongside legitimate ones; any user expanding the entry triggers the payload.\n- Because the page is served on the official `registry.modelcontextprotocol.io` origin, the injected script can:\n  - Read and overwrite `localStorage` (`baseUrl`, `customUrl`), pinning the user's subsequent reads to an attacker-controlled \"Custom\" base URL.\n  - Issue any same-origin or cross-origin XHR (`connect-src *` is granted).\n  - Phish for Registry JWTs by injecting fake auth flows on the trusted origin.\n- The CSP `script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https:\u002F\u002Fcdn.tailwindcss.com` does not block this because `'unsafe-inline'` permits inline event-handler attributes.\n\n## Suggested remediation (any one suffices)\n\n1. Replace the homegrown `escapeHtml` with an attribute-safe encoder that also escapes `\"`, `'`, backtick, and `=` — the OWASP HTML attribute-encoding rule.\n2. Avoid building the `href` via string templates. Use `setAttribute('href', value)` instead — `setAttribute` is not subject to HTML tokenisation, so no breakout is possible.\n3. Tighten `validateWebsiteURL` to reject any URL whose raw bytes contain `\"`, `'`, `\u003C`, `>`, ` `, `\\t`, or `\\n`, or — conservatively — store the canonical re-serialised form (`parsedURL.String()` percent-encodes such characters in the path).\n4. Drop `'unsafe-inline'` from `script-src` after auditing the inline scripts on the page.\n\nApproach (3) is the smallest server-side change and immediately neutralises the exploit for any new publishes; approaches (1) or (2) close the class of bug at the sink so future fields with similar patterns are safe by default.","2026-05-08T17:18:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":44,"availabilityImpact":46,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":44},"CHANGED","3.1",5.4,"NETWORK","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:R\u002FS:C\u002FC:L\u002FI:L\u002FA:N","LOW","REQUIRED","NONE",true,[49,50],"CWE-79","CWE-116",[52,53],"cpe:2.3:a:lfprojects:mcp_registry:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:modelcontextprotocol:registry:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[55,56],"Lfprojects Mcp Registry","Modelcontextprotocol Registry",[58,59,60,61,62,63],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmodelcontextprotocol\u002Fregistry\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-rqv2-m695-f8j4","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2026-44429","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmodelcontextprotocol\u002Fregistry\u002Fpull\u002F1249","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmodelcontextprotocol\u002Fregistry\u002Fcommit\u002F78b7bbde07948049b916d76b4769faee461ff930","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmodelcontextprotocol\u002Fregistry","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmodelcontextprotocol\u002Fregistry\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv1.7.7",0.62,0.00167,0.05944,false,{"timestamp":69,"automatable":70,"tech_impact":71,"exploitation":72,"cisa_decision":73,"cisa_remediation_timeline":77},"2026-05-15T14:19:51.887565Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":74,"decision":75,"priority":76},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T05:35:24.267953\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[79],{"name":80,"source":81,"tactics":82,"technique_id":84},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[83],"initial-access","T1190",[86],{"link":58},{"count":88,"next":89,"previous":6,"results":90},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[91,99,107],{"id":92,"title":93,"summary":94,"published_at":95,"type":96,"link":97,"image_url":98},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":100,"title":101,"summary":102,"published_at":103,"type":104,"link":105,"image_url":106},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":108,"title":109,"summary":110,"published_at":111,"type":112,"link":113,"image_url":114},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]