[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-44496":30,"landing-articles":142},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":50,"technologies":54,"references":56,"score":110,"epss_score":111,"epss_percentile":112,"is_kev":113,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":114,"attack_mappings":124,"exploits":140},356391,"CVE-2026-44496","EUVD-2026-36259","Axios: Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via Cookie Name Injection\n\n## Summary\n\nAxios versions before `0.32.0` on the `0.x` line and before `1.16.0` on the `1.x` line build a regular expression from the configured XSRF cookie name without escaping regex metacharacters. In standard browser environments, an attacker who can influence the cookie name passed to axios can cause expensive regex backtracking while axios reads `document.cookie`.\n\nThe practical impact is client-side availability degradation, such as freezing the affected browser tab while axios prepares a request. The issue does not affect ordinary Node.js HTTP adapter usage, React Native, or web workers, where axios does not read `document.cookie`.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications are affected only when attacker-controlled data can reach the XSRF cookie name configuration or a direct\u002Funsafe call to the internal cookie helper.\n\nThis does not expose credentials, modify requests, or affect response integrity. The impact is availability only.\n\n## Affected Functionality\n\nAffected code paths:\n\n- `lib\u002Fhelpers\u002Fcookies.js` `read(name)` in standard browser environments.\n- `lib\u002Fhelpers\u002FresolveConfig.js` in `1.x`, when browser XHR\u002Ffetch adapters resolve XSRF config.\n- `lib\u002Fadapters\u002Fxhr.js` in `0.x`, when the XHR adapter reads the configured XSRF cookie.\n- Direct use of `axios\u002Funsafe\u002Fhelpers\u002Fcookies.js` in `1.x`, if callers pass attacker-controlled names.\n\nUnaffected code paths:\n\n- Default static `xsrfCookieName: 'XSRF-TOKEN'` when not attacker-controlled.\n- Requests with `xsrfCookieName: null`.\n- Node HTTP adapter usage without browser `document.cookie`.\n- React Native and web workers where axios does not use standard browser cookie access.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nAffected versions interpolate the cookie name into a regex.\n\n```js\nconst match = document.cookie.match(new RegExp('(?:^|; )' + name + '=([^;]*)'));\n```\n\nBecause `name` is not escaped, regex metacharacters in the cookie name are interpreted as regex syntax. A payload such as `(.+)+$` can force catastrophic backtracking against `document.cookie`.\n\nThe fix avoids dynamic regex construction and parses `document.cookie` by splitting on `;`, trimming leading whitespace, and comparing cookie names with exact string equality.\n\n## Proof of Concept of Attack\n\n```js\nfunction vulnerableRead(name, cookie) {\n  const start = Date.now();\n\n  try {\n    cookie.match(new RegExp('(?:^|; )' + name + '=([^;]*)'));\n  } catch {}\n\n  return Date.now() - start;\n}\n\nfor (const n of [20, 22, 24, 26, 28]) {\n  const cookie = 'x='.padEnd(n, 'a') + '!';\n  console.log(`${n}: ${vulnerableRead('(.+)+$', cookie)}ms`);\n}\n```\n\nExpected result: timings grow rapidly as the cookie string length increases.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nSet `xsrfCookieName: null` if the application does not need axios to read an XSRF cookie.\n\nDo not derive `xsrfCookieName` from untrusted input. If a dynamic cookie name is unavoidable, validate it against a strict cookie-name allowlist before passing it to axios.\n\nAvoid calling `axios\u002Funsafe\u002Fhelpers\u002Fcookies.js` directly with untrusted names\n\n\u003Cdetails>\n\u003Csummary>Original Source\u003C\u002Fsummary>\n\n# Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via Cookie Name Injection\n\n## 1. Title\n\nReDoS via Unsanitized Cookie Name in Dynamic Regular Expression Construction\n\n## 2. Affected Software and Version\n\n- **Software:** Axios\n- **Version:** 1.15.0 (and potentially earlier versions)\n- **Component:** `lib\u002Fhelpers\u002Fcookies.js`\n- **Ecosystem:** npm (Node.js \u002F Browser)\n\n## 3. Vulnerability Type \u002F CWE\n\n- **Type:** Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)\n- **CWE-1333:** Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity\n- **CWE-400:** Uncontrolled Resource Consumption\n\n## 4. CVSS 3.1 Score\n\n**Score: 7.5 (High)**\n\nVector: `CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:N\u002FA:H`\n\n| Metric | Value |\n|---|---|\n| Attack Vector | Network |\n| Attack Complexity | Low |\n| Privileges Required | None |\n| User Interaction | None |\n| Scope | Unchanged |\n| Confidentiality | None |\n| Integrity | None |\n| Availability | High |\n\n## 5. Description\n\nThe `cookies.read()` function in `lib\u002Fhelpers\u002Fcookies.js` constructs a regular expression dynamically using the `name` parameter without any sanitization or escaping of special regex characters. At line 33, the code passes the raw `name` value directly into `new RegExp()`:\n\n```javascript\nconst match = document.cookie.match(new RegExp('(?:^|; )' + name + '=([^;]*)'));\n```\n\nAn attacker who can control or influence the cookie name parameter (e.g., via XSRF cookie name configuration, prototype pollution of `xsrfCookieName`, or any code path where user input reaches `cookies.read()`) can inject a malicious regex pattern that causes catastrophic backtracking, leading to a Denial of Service condition.\n\nWith a crafted input of approximately 20-30 characters, the regex engine can be forced to consume several seconds to minutes of CPU time, effectively freezing the JavaScript event loop.\n\n## 6. Root Cause Analysis\n\n**File:** `lib\u002Fhelpers\u002Fcookies.js`\n**Line:** 33\n\n```javascript\nread(name) {\n  if (typeof document === 'undefined') return null;\n  const match = document.cookie.match(new RegExp('(?:^|; )' + name + '=([^;]*)'));\n  return match ? decodeURIComponent(match[1]) : null;\n},\n```\n\nThe vulnerability exists because:\n\n1. The `name` parameter is concatenated directly into a regex pattern without escaping special regex metacharacters.\n2. An attacker can inject regex constructs that create exponential backtracking scenarios.\n3. The `(?:^|; )` prefix combined with an injected pattern like `((((.*)*)*)*)*` creates nested quantifiers that cause catastrophic backtracking when the regex engine attempts to match against `document.cookie`.\n\nThe `cookies.read()` function is called from `lib\u002Fhelpers\u002FresolveConfig.js` at line 61:\n\n```javascript\nconst xsrfValue = xsrfHeaderName && xsrfCookieName && cookies.read(xsrfCookieName);\n```\n\nThe `xsrfCookieName` value comes from the Axios configuration, which can be influenced by prototype pollution or direct configuration injection.\n\n## 7. Proof of Concept\n\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F poc_redos_cookie.js\n\u002F\u002F Simulates browser environment for testing\n\n\u002F\u002F Simulate document.cookie\nglobalThis.document = {\n  cookie: 'session=abc; ' + 'a'.repeat(50)\n};\n\n\u002F\u002F Replicate the vulnerable cookies.read() logic\nfunction cookiesRead(name) {\n  const match = document.cookie.match(new RegExp('(?:^|; )' + name + '=([^;]*)'));\n  return match ? decodeURIComponent(match[1]) : null;\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F Malicious cookie name that triggers catastrophic backtracking\n\u002F\u002F The pattern creates nested quantifiers: (a]|[a]|...)*)*\nconst maliciousName20 = '([^;]+)+$' + '\\\\|'.repeat(10);\nconst maliciousName = '(([^;])+)+\\\\$';  \u002F\u002F nested quantifier pattern\n\nconsole.log('=== ReDoS via Cookie Name Injection PoC ===');\n\n\u002F\u002F Test with increasing payload sizes\nfor (const len of [15, 20, 25]) {\n  const payload = '(([^;])+)+' + 'X'.repeat(len);\n  const start = Date.now();\n  try {\n    cookiesRead(payload);\n  } catch (e) {\n    \u002F\u002F May throw on invalid regex, but valid evil patterns won't throw\n  }\n  const elapsed = Date.now() - start;\n  console.log(`Payload length ${len}: ${elapsed}ms`);\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F Demonstrating exponential growth with a simple nested quantifier\nconsole.log('\\n--- Exponential Backtracking Demo ---');\nfor (const n of [20, 22, 24, 26]) {\n  const evilName = '(' + 'a'.repeat(1) + '+)+$';\n  const testCookie = 'a'.repeat(n) + '!';  \u002F\u002F non-matching trailer forces backtracking\n  globalThis.document = { cookie: testCookie };\n  const start = Date.now();\n  try {\n    cookiesRead(evilName);\n  } catch(e) {}\n  const elapsed = Date.now() - start;\n  console.log(`Input length ${n}: ${elapsed}ms`);\n}\n```\n\n## 8. PoC Output\n\n```\n=== ReDoS via Cookie Name Injection PoC ===\nPayload length 20: 21ms (extrapolated: 30 chars = ~21,504ms)\nPayload length 25: ~1,300ms\nPayload length 30: ~323,675ms (5+ minutes)\n\n--- Exponential Backtracking Demo ---\nInput length 20: 21ms\nInput length 22: 84ms\nInput length 24: 336ms\nInput length 26: 1,344ms\n```\n\nThe exponential growth pattern is clearly visible: each additional 2 characters approximately quadruples the execution time.\n\n## 9. Impact\n\n- **Denial of Service (Client-side):** In a browser environment, an attacker who can influence the XSRF cookie name configuration (e.g., via prototype pollution or configuration injection) can freeze the browser tab, blocking all UI interaction and JavaScript execution on the page.\n- **Denial of Service (Server-side):** In SSR (Server-Side Rendering) frameworks or Node.js applications that process cookies using this code path, the event loop will be blocked, causing the server to become unresponsive to all requests.\n- **Event Loop Starvation:** Since JavaScript is single-threaded, the ReDoS will block all pending asynchronous operations, timers, and I\u002FO callbacks for the duration of the regex evaluation.\n\n## 10. Remediation \u002F Suggested Fix\n\nEscape all regex metacharacters in the `name` parameter before constructing the regular expression.\n\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F FIXED: lib\u002Fhelpers\u002Fcookies.js\n\nfunction escapeRegExp(string) {\n  return string.replace(\u002F[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]\u002Fg, '\\\\$&');\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F ...\n\nread(name) {\n  if (typeof document === 'undefined') return null;\n  const match = document.cookie.match(\n    new RegExp('(?:^|; )' + escapeRegExp(name) + '=([^;]*)')\n  );\n  return match ? decodeURIComponent(match[1]) : null;\n},\n```\n\nAlternatively, avoid dynamic regex construction entirely and use string-based parsing:\n\n```javascript\nread(name) {\n  if (typeof document === 'undefined') return null;\n  const cookies = document.cookie.split('; ');\n  for (const cookie of cookies) {\n    const eqIndex = cookie.indexOf('=');\n    if (eqIndex !== -1 && cookie.substring(0, eqIndex) === name) {\n      return decodeURIComponent(cookie.substring(eqIndex + 1));\n    }\n  }\n  return null;\n},\n```\n\n## 11. References\n\n- [CWE-1333: Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity](https:\u002F\u002Fcwe.mitre.org\u002Fdata\u002Fdefinitions\u002F1333.html)\n- [CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption](https:\u002F\u002Fcwe.mitre.org\u002Fdata\u002Fdefinitions\u002F400.html)\n- [OWASP: Regular Expression Denial of Service](https:\u002F\u002Fowasp.org\u002Fwww-community\u002Fattacks\u002FRegular_expression_Denial_of_Service_-_ReDoS)\n- [Axios GitHub Repository](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faxios\u002Faxios)\n\u003C\u002Fdetails>\n\n---","2026-06-04T14:24:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":42,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.1",7.5,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:N\u002FA:H","NONE","LOW",true,[48,49],"CWE-400","CWE-1333",[51,52,53],"cpe:2.3:a:axios:axios:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:axios:axios:0.31.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:axios:axios:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[55],"Axios 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