[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-45399":30,"landing-articles":110},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":49,"technologies":53,"references":56,"score":63,"epss_score":64,"epss_percentile":65,"is_kev":66,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":67,"attack_mappings":77,"exploits":108},8970,"CVE-2026-45399","EUVD-2026-30608","Open WebUI: Low-privilege authenticated users can enumerate and stop global background tasks, causing system-wide chat disruption\n\n### Summary\nAny authenticated user with low privileges can enumerate active background tasks across the system and stop tasks belonging to other users via the GET \u002Fapi\u002Ftasks and POST \u002Fapi\u002Ftasks\u002Fstop\u002F{task_id} methods. This allows a casual user to disrupt system-wide chat usage by continuously canceling other users' active tasks. This is a real authorization vulnerability affecting integrity and usability in multi-user deployments.\n\n\n### Details\nOpen WebUI exposes `GET \u002Fapi\u002Ftasks` and `POST \u002Fapi\u002Ftasks\u002Fstop\u002F{task_id}` to any verified user. These endpoints operate on a global task namespace and accept raw `task_id` values without checking whether the task belongs to the current caller.\n\nAs a result, a normal authenticated user can enumerate active global task IDs and stop tasks belonging to other users.\n\nRoot cause:\n\n1. Route authorization is too weak.\n\nIn `backend\u002Fopen_webui\u002Fmain.py`, both endpoints only require `get_verified_user`:\n\n```python\n@app.post('\u002Fapi\u002Ftasks\u002Fstop\u002F{task_id}')\nasync def stop_task_endpoint(request: Request, task_id: str, user=Depends(get_verified_user)):\n    result = await stop_task(request.app.state.redis, task_id)\n\n@app.get('\u002Fapi\u002Ftasks')\nasync def list_tasks_endpoint(request: Request, user=Depends(get_verified_user)):\n    return {'tasks': await list_tasks(request.app.state.redis)}\n```\n\n`get_verified_user` accepts both `user` and `admin` roles in `backend\u002Fopen_webui\u002Futils\u002Fauth.py`.\n\n2. The helper operates on a global namespace.\n\nIn `backend\u002Fopen_webui\u002Ftasks.py`, task listing is global:\n\n```python\nasync def list_tasks(redis):\n    if redis:\n        return await redis_list_tasks(redis)\n    return list(tasks.keys())\n```\n\nIn `backend\u002Fopen_webui\u002Ftasks.py`, task stopping is by raw `task_id`:\n\n```python\nasync def stop_task(redis, task_id: str):\n    if redis:\n        item_id = await redis.hget(REDIS_TASKS_KEY, task_id)\n        await redis_send_command(redis, {'action': 'stop', 'task_id': task_id})\n        await redis_cleanup_task(redis, task_id, item_id or None)\n```\n\nThere is no owner check, no `user_id` check, and no mapping from `task_id` back to the current caller before stop or cleanup.\n\nThis also appears unintended because the codebase already has a scoped route, `GET \u002Fapi\u002Ftasks\u002Fchat\u002F{chat_id}`, which checks whether the chat belongs to the current user before returning task IDs.\n\nRelevant code references:\n- `backend\u002Fopen_webui\u002Fmain.py:1975`\n- `backend\u002Fopen_webui\u002Fmain.py:1984`\n- `backend\u002Fopen_webui\u002Fmain.py:1989`\n- `backend\u002Fopen_webui\u002Ftasks.py:127`\n- `backend\u002Fopen_webui\u002Ftasks.py:145`\n- `backend\u002Fopen_webui\u002Futils\u002Fauth.py:415`\n\nSuggested remediation:\n- Store task ownership metadata such as `user_id` and `chat_id`, then enforce owner-only access for non-admin users\n- Suggested implementation locations:\n  - `backend\u002Fopen_webui\u002Fmain.py`: add authentication checks for `\u002Fapi\u002Ftasks` and `\u002Fapi\u002Ftasks\u002Fstop\u002F{task_id}`\n  - `backend\u002Fopen_webui\u002Ftasks.py`: add support for storing\u002Fquerying task ownership metadata such as `user_id` and `chat_id`, and support owner-scoped listing\u002Fstopping\n\n\n\n### PoC\nPreconditions:\n\n- Default `main` branch deployment\n- Authentication enabled\n- Two normal user accounts, or any multi-user deployment where the attacker has one authenticated non-admin account\n- At least one task actively running for another user\n\nThis does not require any weakened security settings.\n\nPoC objective:\n\n1. Show that a non-admin user can see global active task IDs that are not their own\n2. Show that the same user can stop another user's active task\n\nReproduction steps:\n\n#### Step 1. Victim starts a long-running task\n\nUsing the UI, User A starts a long response generation or another background task and leaves it running.\n\nExpected security model:\nUser B should not be able to see or control User A's task.\n\n#### Step 2. Attacker enumerates global task IDs\n\nUsing User B's authenticated token:\n\n```bash\ncurl -i -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003CUSER_B_TOKEN>\" http:\u002F\u002F\u003Copen-webui-host>\u002Fapi\u002Ftasks\n```\n\nExpected result:\n\n- only User B's own task IDs should be returned, or\n- the endpoint should be admin-only\n\nActual result:\nthe response returns the global active task list.\n\nExample response shape:\n\n```json\n{\"tasks\":[\"\u003Ctask-id-a>\",\"\u003Ctask-id-b>\"]}\n```\n\nThis exposes task IDs belonging to other users.\n\n#### Step 3. Attacker stops a foreign task\n\nPick a task ID that belongs to User A and send:\n\n```bash\ncurl -i -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003CUSER_B_TOKEN>\" http:\u002F\u002F\u003Copen-webui-host>\u002Fapi\u002Ftasks\u002Fstop\u002F\u003CFOREIGN_TASK_ID>\n```\n\nExpected result:\n\n- `403 Forbidden`, or\n- `404 Not Found` for non-owned tasks, or\n- admin-only access\n\nActual result:\nthe server accepts the request and attempts to stop the foreign task.\n\nExample response shape:\n\n```json\n{\"status\":true,\"message\":\"Task \u003CFOREIGN_TASK_ID> stopped.\"}\n```\n\n#### Step 4. Observe boundary violation\n\nUser A's running task is interrupted or disappears from the active task set even though User B does not own it.\n\nWhat actions become possible that should not be possible:\n\n- enumerate globally active task IDs across users\n- cancel another user's in-progress generation or background work\n- repeat this for every returned task ID, causing broad cross-user disruption\n\nCopy-paste PoC summary:\n\n1. Enumerate all active tasks as a normal non-admin user\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003CUSER_B_TOKEN>\" http:\u002F\u002F\u003Copen-webui-host>\u002Fapi\u002Ftasks\n```\n\n2. Stop a task that does not belong to that user\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003CUSER_B_TOKEN>\" http:\u002F\u002F\u003Copen-webui-host>\u002Fapi\u002Ftasks\u002Fstop\u002F\u003CFOREIGN_TASK_ID>\n```\n\n### Impact\nType of vulnerability:\nbroken object-level authorization affecting a global runtime control-plane endpoint.\n\nWho is impacted:\n\n- all users in a multi-user Open WebUI deployment\n- any user currently running a background task, especially chat generation tasks\n- administrators indirectly, because normal users can disrupt system-wide usage without admin privileges\n\nDirect impact:\n\n- cross-user task ID disclosure\n- cross-user task cancellation\n\nPractical impact:\n\n- interruption of long-running chat responses\n- interruption of background indexing or ingestion tasks associated with shared runtime jobs\n- one ordinary authenticated low-privilege user can continuously poll `\u002Fapi\u002Ftasks` and immediately cancel every newly created active task\n- with a simple loop or script, this becomes a practical persistent denial-of-service against chat usage for all users on the instance\n- in a multi-user deployment, normal users may be unable to complete any chat generation while the attacker continues polling and cancelling tasks\n\nWhy severity is meaningful:\n\n- privileges required: low, only an authenticated non-admin account\n- scope: cross-user\n- impact class: integrity and availability\n- exploitation complexity: low once logged in\n\nThis is not full account takeover or privilege escalation, but it enables platform-wide operational disruption from a low-privilege account. In practice, sustained exploitation can make chat functionality effectively unusable for other users on the system.\n\n## Resolution\n\nFixed in commit [e7ff4768f](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fopen-webui\u002Fopen-webui\u002Fcommit\u002Fe7ff4768f8ffe1924b4576381c9e45e8a64350e4) ([#23454](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fopen-webui\u002Fopen-webui\u002Fpull\u002F23454), \"Add ownership checks to global task endpoints\"), first released in **v0.9.0** (Apr 2026).\n\nThe fix takes a simpler approach than per-task ownership tracking, which would have required a schema change to attribute every task to a `user_id`:\n\n- `GET \u002Fapi\u002Ftasks` and `POST \u002Fapi\u002Ftasks\u002Fstop\u002F{task_id}` are restricted to admin-only via `Depends(get_admin_user)`. Cross-user enumeration and termination are no longer reachable from a non-admin account.\n- A new scoped `POST \u002Fapi\u002Ftasks\u002Fchat\u002F{chat_id}\u002Fstop` endpoint covers the legitimate non-admin use case (a user stopping their own in-progress generation), reusing the same chat-ownership check the existing `GET \u002Fapi\u002Ftasks\u002Fchat\u002F{chat_id}` already enforces.\n\nCVE-2025-63681 was a prior disclosure of the same authorization gap against v0.6.33; the fix in v0.9.0 also resolves that.\n\nUsers on `>= 0.9.0` are not affected.","2026-05-14T20:26:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":42,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":45},"UNCHANGED","3.1",7.1,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:L\u002FI:N\u002FA:H","NONE","LOW",true,[48],"CWE-862",[50,51,52],"cpe:2.3:a:openwebui:open_webui:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:open-webui:open-webui:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:open-webui:open-webui:0.8.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[54,55],"Openwebui Open Webui","Open-Webui Open-Webui",[57,58,59,60,61,62],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fopen-webui\u002Fopen-webui\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-8jjp-r2w2-4v22","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2026-45399","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fopen-webui\u002Fopen-webui\u002Fpull\u002F23454","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fopen-webui\u002Fopen-webui\u002Fcommit\u002Fe7ff4768f8ffe1924b4576381c9e45e8a64350e4","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fopen-webui\u002Fopen-webui","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fopen-webui\u002Fopen-webui\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv0.9.0",0.71,0.0027,0.18965,false,{"timestamp":68,"automatable":69,"tech_impact":70,"exploitation":71,"cisa_decision":72,"cisa_remediation_timeline":76},"2026-05-15T19:42:08.226839Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":73,"decision":74,"priority":75},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T01:32:34.841374\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[78,84,93,100],{"name":79,"source":80,"tactics":81,"technique_id":83},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[82],"initial-access","T1190",{"name":85,"source":86,"cwe_ids":87,"tactics":88,"capec_ids":90,"technique_id":92},"Exploitation for Stealth","capec",[48],[89],"stealth",[91],"CAPEC-665","T1211",{"name":94,"source":86,"cwe_ids":95,"tactics":96,"capec_ids":98,"technique_id":99},"Component Firmware",[48],[97,89],"persistence",[91],"T1542.002",{"name":101,"source":86,"cwe_ids":102,"tactics":103,"capec_ids":106,"technique_id":107},"Modify Authentication Process",[48],[104,105,97],"credential-access","defense-impairment",[91],"T1556",[109],{"link":57},{"count":111,"next":112,"previous":6,"results":113},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[114,122,130],{"id":115,"title":116,"summary":117,"published_at":118,"type":119,"link":120,"image_url":121},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":123,"title":124,"summary":125,"published_at":126,"type":127,"link":128,"image_url":129},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":131,"title":132,"summary":133,"published_at":134,"type":135,"link":136,"image_url":137},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]