[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"cve-CVE-2026-45578":3,"landing-trending":54,"landing-articles":80},{"id":4,"cve_id":5,"euvd_id":6,"summary":7,"published":8,"cvss_data":9,"is_remote":19,"cwes":20,"cpes":22,"technologies":25,"references":27,"score":31,"epss_score":32,"epss_percentile":33,"is_kev":34,"cisa_kev_date_added":35,"cisa_kev_due_date":35,"cisa_ssvc":36,"attack_mappings":46,"exploits":53},354031,"CVE-2026-45578","EUVD-2026-33310","AVideo: OS command injection in on_publish.php execAsync via unescaped m3u8 URL\n\n## Summary\n\n**Type:** Classic shell-metacharacter injection. The YPTSocket notification branch in `plugin\u002FLive\u002Fon_publish.php` builds an `execAsync()` command line by string concatenation, single-quoting each argument but never calling `escapeshellarg()`. A `'` in any of the three interpolated values (`$users_id`, `$m3u8`, `$obj->liveTransmitionHistory_id`) closes the quoted token and lets the attacker append arbitrary commands.\n**File:** `plugin\u002FLive\u002Fon_publish.php`, line 267.\n**Root cause:** the developer wrapped each variable in literal single quotes (`'$users_id'`, `'$m3u8'`, `'$obj->liveTransmitionHistory_id'`) believing this provides shell-quoting. PHP single-quoted-into-shell is not safe quoting; it is just two literal quote characters that the shell pairs greedily. Any embedded `'` closes the outer string and resumes interpretation in the shell. The rest of the AVideo codebase already calls `escapeshellarg()` (137 call sites across the project) for ffmpeg invocations, so the safe primitive is well-known to the project; it was simply omitted from this branch. The endpoint is web-reachable (no `.htaccess` rule restricts `on_publish.php`, no `REMOTE_ADDR` check), so the trigger is a direct HTTP POST without going through nginx-rtmp.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n**File:** `plugin\u002FLive\u002Fon_publish.php`, lines 256-271.\n\n```php\nif (AVideoPlugin::isEnabledByName('YPTSocket')) {\n    $array = setLiveKey($lth->getKey(), $lth->getLive_servers_id());\n    @ob_clean();\n    _ob_start();\n    $lth = new LiveTransmitionHistory($obj->liveTransmitionHistory_id);\n    $m3u8 = Live::getM3U8File($lth->getKey(), false, true);          \u002F\u002F value-carrying URL: contains the stream key verbatim\n    $users_id = $obj->row['users_id'];\n    $liveTransmitionHistory_id = $obj->liveTransmitionHistory_id;\n    if (strtoupper(substr(PHP_OS, 0, 3)) === 'WIN') {\n        include \"{$global['systemRootPath']}plugin\u002FLive\u002Fon_publish_socket_notification.php\";\n    } else {\n        $command = get_php(). \" {$global['systemRootPath']}plugin\u002FLive\u002Fon_publish_socket_notification.php '$users_id' '$m3u8' '{$obj->liveTransmitionHistory_id}'\";  \u002F\u002F \u003C-- BUG: literal quotes, no escapeshellarg\n        $pid = execAsync($command);                                  \u002F\u002F sink: shell exec\n    }\n}\n```\n\n`Live::getM3U8File($key, false, true)` (`Live.php:1337-1350` -> `Live.php:4845-4889`) returns `\"{$playerServer}{$uuid}.m3u8\"` (or `\"{$playerServer}{$uuid}\u002Findex.m3u8\"`) where `$uuid = $this->getKeyWithIndex(...)` is the stream key string read straight out of the `live_transmitions` table. There is no character normalisation between database read and command construction.\n\n**Why it's wrong:** `'$m3u8'` is not shell quoting. PHP interpolates `$m3u8` into the string between two literal `'` characters. The shell then tokenises the result. If `$m3u8` contains `'` itself, the shell sees `'…'` followed by `\u003Cattacker bytes>` followed by another `'`, which forms two adjacent quoted strings concatenated with whatever the attacker put between them. Embedded `;`, backticks, `$()`, `&&`, `|`, or `\\n` then run as shell commands. The fix is `escapeshellarg()`, which AVideo already uses 137 times in ffmpeg invocations (e.g. `getVideos.php:1069`, `videos.json.php`, `aVideoEncoder.json.php`); this branch simply forgot it.\n\n## Exploit Chain\n\n1. Attacker authenticates and arranges for one of the command variables to contain `'`. Under the current code the readily available primitive is a `canStream` user supplying a stream key via the persistence path (`saveLive.php`'s `$_REQUEST['key']` is written verbatim to `live_transmitions.key`). State: a row exists with `key = \"evilkey';id>\u002Ftmp\u002Fpwn;#\"`.\n2. Attacker POSTs directly to `https:\u002F\u002Ftarget\u002Fplugin\u002FLive\u002Fon_publish.php` (the file is web-served, no IP restriction) with body:\n   ```\n   name=evilkey';id>\u002Ftmp\u002Fpwn;#\n   p=\u003Cmd5(attacker_password)>\n   tcurl=rtmp:\u002F\u002Ftarget\u002Flive\n   addr=1.2.3.4\n   ```\n   `on_publish.php:117` runs `preg_replace(\"\u002F[&=]\u002F\", '', $_POST['name'])` — only `&`\u002F`=` are stripped, so `';id>\u002Ftmp\u002Fpwn;#` survives. Lines 143-163 confirm `$_GET['p'] === $user->getPassword()` (the attacker is themself, knows their own MD5), persist a `LiveTransmitionHistory` row with the poisoned key, and set `$obj->error = false`. State: authorisation gate passed.\n3. Line 261 calls `Live::getM3U8File($lth->getKey(), false, true)`, returning `\"https:\u002F\u002Fserver\u002Flive\u002Fevilkey';id>\u002Ftmp\u002Fpwn;#.m3u8\"`. State: `$m3u8` carries the injection payload.\n4. Line 267 builds the command string by concatenation:\n   ```\n   php \u002Fvar\u002Fwww\u002FAVideo\u002Fplugin\u002FLive\u002Fon_publish_socket_notification.php '7' 'https:\u002F\u002Fserver\u002Flive\u002Fevilkey';id>\u002Ftmp\u002Fpwn;#.m3u8' '42'\n   ```\n   Shell tokenisation sees: `php`, `…\u002Fon_publish_socket_notification.php`, `'7'`, `'https:\u002F\u002Fserver\u002Flive\u002Fevilkey'` (the attacker's `'` closed the second quote), then operator `;`, then command-2 `id>\u002Ftmp\u002Fpwn`, then `;`, then `#.m3u8' '42'` (everything after `#` is a comment). State: the shell has parsed two real commands.\n5. Line 269 `execAsync($command)` spawns the shell, which runs the secondary command `id>\u002Ftmp\u002Fpwn` as the AVideo PHP-FPM\u002FApache user. State: arbitrary OS command execution with the privileges of the web-server runtime user.\n6. Final state: the attacker reads `\u002Ftmp\u002Fpwn`, swaps the payload for a reverse shell, exfiltrates `videos\u002Fconfiguration.php` (database password and root URL), drops a webshell into the upload tree, or pivots to other plugin credentials (PayPal\u002FStripe API keys, AWS keys for the CDN plugin, OpenAI key for the AI plugin).\n\n## Security Impact\n\n**Severity:** sec-high. Pre-auth-friendly remote code execution: the only prerequisite is that the attacker can place a `'` into one of the three command-line variables, which on a streaming platform means a single low-privilege account.\n**Attacker capability:** with one `canStream` account and two HTTP requests, the attacker executes arbitrary shell commands as the AVideo runtime user. From there: read database credentials, exfiltrate user data, write a webshell into a publicly-served path, pivot to plugin credentials, persist via cron, or escalate via any local sudoers entries.\n**Preconditions:** AVideo deployment with `Live` and `YPTSocket` plugins enabled (the standard live-streaming bundle); attacker can reach `\u002Fplugin\u002FLive\u002Fon_publish.php` over the network; a value containing `'` is reachable into `users_id`, `m3u8`, or `liveTransmitionHistory_id` (the current code lets `canStream` users supply such a value via the stream-key persistence path).\n**Differential:** source-inspection-verified end-to-end. The shell-tokenising behaviour of `'…'…'…'` is reproducible offline:\n\n```sh\n$ s=\"php \u002Fa\u002Fb.php '7' 'https:\u002F\u002Fs\u002Flive\u002Fevilkey';id>\u002Ftmp\u002Fpwn;#.m3u8' '42'\"\n$ rm -f \u002Ftmp\u002Fpwn; bash -c \"$s\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull; ls -l \u002Ftmp\u002Fpwn\n-rw-r--r-- 1 user user N \u003Cdate> \u002Ftmp\u002Fpwn        # injected `id` ran, output captured\n```\n\nThe patched build (with the suggested `escapeshellarg()` fix below applied) constructs `php \u002Fa\u002Fb.php '7' 'https:\u002F\u002Fs\u002Flive\u002Fevilkey'\\''id>\u002Ftmp\u002Fpwn;#.m3u8' '42'`, which the shell parses as a single argument containing the literal characters; the second command never runs.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nUse `escapeshellarg()` on every variable interpolated into the command string. This matches established project conventions (137 other call sites for ffmpeg invocations).\n\n```diff\n--- a\u002Fplugin\u002FLive\u002Fon_publish.php\n+++ b\u002Fplugin\u002FLive\u002Fon_publish.php\n@@ -264,7 +264,11 @@\n         if (strtoupper(substr(PHP_OS, 0, 3)) === 'WIN') {\n             include \"{$global['systemRootPath']}plugin\u002FLive\u002Fon_publish_socket_notification.php\";\n         } else {\n-            $command = get_php(). \" {$global['systemRootPath']}plugin\u002FLive\u002Fon_publish_socket_notification.php '$users_id' '$m3u8' '{$obj->liveTransmitionHistory_id}'\";\n+            $command = get_php()\n+                . ' ' . escapeshellarg($global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin\u002FLive\u002Fon_publish_socket_notification.php')\n+                . ' ' . escapeshellarg((string) $users_id)\n+                . ' ' . escapeshellarg((string) $m3u8)\n+                . ' ' . escapeshellarg((string) $obj->liveTransmitionHistory_id);\n             _error_log(\"NGINX Live::on_publish YPTSocket start  ($command)\");\n             $pid = execAsync($command);\n         }\n```\n\nDefence-in-depth: `on_publish.php` is the nginx-rtmp webhook and should not be reachable from the public Internet. Add an `.htaccess`\u002Fnginx `location` rule restricting the file to `127.0.0.1` and any configured RTMP server IPs. That blocks the trigger path independently of the sanitisation work.","2026-05-15T18:32:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":10},{"scope":11,"version":12,"baseScore":13,"attackVector":14,"baseSeverity":15,"vectorString":16,"integrityImpact":15,"userInteraction":17,"attackComplexity":18,"availabilityImpact":15,"privilegesRequired":18,"confidentialityImpact":15},"UNCHANGED","3.1",8.8,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H","NONE","LOW",true,[21],"CWE-78",[23,24],"cpe:2.3:a:wwbn:avideo:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:wwbn:avideo:29.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[26],"Wwbn Avideo",[28,29,30],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FWWBN\u002FAVideo\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-xw67-cg5f-4m2r","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2026-45578","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FWWBN\u002FAVideo",0.64,0.00318,0.24465,false,null,{"timestamp":37,"automatable":38,"tech_impact":39,"exploitation":40,"cisa_decision":41,"cisa_remediation_timeline":45},"2026-05-29T14:01:37.225187Z","no","total","none",{"vector":42,"decision":43,"priority":44},"CISAv1\u002FE:N\u002FA:N\u002FT:T\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T06:04:20.858302\u002F","track_star","medium","14D",[47],{"name":48,"source":49,"tactics":50,"technique_id":52},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[51],"initial-access","T1190",[],{"count":55,"next":56,"previous":35,"results":57},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[58,67,70],{"id":59,"title":60,"summary":61,"published_at":62,"severity":63,"vendor":64,"products":65},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[66],"brotli",{"id":55,"title":60,"summary":68,"published_at":62,"severity":63,"vendor":64,"products":69},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[66],{"id":71,"title":72,"summary":73,"published_at":74,"severity":63,"vendor":75,"products":76},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[77,78,79],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"count":81,"next":82,"previous":35,"results":83},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[84,92,100],{"id":85,"title":86,"summary":87,"published_at":88,"type":89,"link":90,"image_url":91},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":93,"title":94,"summary":95,"published_at":96,"type":97,"link":98,"image_url":99},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":101,"title":102,"summary":103,"published_at":104,"type":105,"link":106,"image_url":107},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]