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CVE-2026-46412

NVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2026-45992 · Published May 19, 2026

Malicious code in @beproduct/nestjs-auth (0.1.2 through 0.1.19) — Mini Shai-Hulud worm

Summary

Between 2026-05-11 20:19 UTC and 22:56 UTC, an attacker used a compromised npm publish token to publish 18 malicious versions of @beproduct/nestjs-auth (0.1.2 through 0.1.19). The packages contained payloads from the Mini Shai-Hulud npm supply-chain worm campaign described by Aikido Security.

npm Security removed the malicious versions from the registry shortly after publication, but anyone who ran npm install @beproduct/nestjs-auth resolving to any version in the affected range during that window executed the malicious postinstall script and is potentially compromised.

Version 0.1.20 is a clean republish from the original 0.1.1 source tree.

Impact

The postinstall payload attempted to harvest:

  • npm tokens (from ~/.npmrc)
  • GitHub personal access tokens, OAuth tokens (gho_*), and Actions OIDC tokens
  • AWS credentials (from environment variables and ~/.aws/credentials)
  • HashiCorp Vault tokens
  • Other secrets present in environment variables

Exfiltration target: https://filev2.getsession.org. The worm also wrote persistence artefacts (tanstack_runner.js, router_init.js, setup.mjs, plus IDE-hook configurations in .claude/ and .vscode/) into the developer's working tree where the malicious install ran.

Indicators of compromise

Type Value
File name (payload) tanstack_runner.js, router_init.js, router_runtime.js
SHA-256 (tanstack_runner.js) 2ec78d556d696e208927cc503d48e4b5eb56b31abc2870c2ed2e98d6be27fc96
SHA-256 (router_init.js) ab4fcadaec49c03278063dd269ea5eef82d24f2124a8e15d7b90f2fa8601266c
Exfil endpoint filev2.getsession.org
Cloud metadata probe 169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
npm token endpoint registry.npmjs.org/-/npm/v1/tokens
Vault probe vault.svc.cluster.local:8200
IDE hook pattern .claude/settings.json SessionStart hook + .vscode/tasks.json runOn: "folderOpen" running node .claude/setup.mjs or node .vscode/setup.mjs

Mitigation

If you installed any version in the range >=0.1.2 <=0.1.19:

  1. Remove the package and clean the npm cache:
    npm uninstall @beproduct/nestjs-auth
    npm cache clean --force
    
  2. Install the clean version:
    npm install @beproduct/nestjs-auth@0.1.20
    
  3. Rotate every credential present in the install environment, including:
    • All npm publish tokens (https://www.npmjs.com/settings/<you>/tokens)
    • All GitHub PATs and OAuth tokens (https://github.com/settings/applications + https://github.com/settings/tokens)
    • AWS access keys
    • HashiCorp Vault tokens
    • Any other secret that was in env vars or config files at install time
  4. Scan affected hosts for the indicators of compromise above. If any are found, treat the host as compromised and reimage.
  5. Check committed repository history for unexpected additions in .claude/ or .vscode/ directories — the worm is known to commit setup.mjs + hook configs to PR branches via automated agent runtimes.

Timeline (UTC)

Time Event
2026-05-11 20:19:43 First malicious version (0.1.2) published
2026-05-11 22:56:39 Final malicious version (0.1.19) published — 18 versions in 2h37m
2026-05-12 ~14:12 npm Security removes the malicious versions from the registry
2026-05-13 BeProduct discovers the incident via Aikido's public disclosure
2026-05-14 Compromised npm publish token revoked; BeProduct GitHub OAuth credentials rotated
2026-05-14 Clean release 0.1.20 published; this advisory filed

Root cause

The compromised npm publish token was harvested by a Mini-Shai-Hulud-infected transitive dependency in an automated GitHub coding-agent runtime that had read access to the NPM_TOKEN GitHub Actions secret for an unrelated repository under the same npm publisher account. The publish itself was performed by the attacker against the public npm registry; the source repository for this package was not modified by the attacker.

References

Technologies

Beproduct Nestjs-Auth

Weaknesses

CWE-506

CVSS scores

  • v3.110.0CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

Where this vulnerability fits in an attack

Initial Access

References

Potentially impacted assets

See if this affects your attack surface

Latest trending attack

Criticalyesterday

Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Two situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy or WAF. When the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag "paas: platform.sh" or "cdn: fastly" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Contact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly / Plateform.sh) Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.

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