[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-46690":30,"landing-articles":86},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":53,"technologies":57,"references":60,"score":64,"epss_score":65,"epss_percentile":66,"is_kev":47,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":67,"attack_mappings":77,"exploits":84},356845,"CVE-2026-46690","EUVD-2026-36469","unbounded-spsc: Sender::send pointer-as-value transmute causes OOB read and fake-Arc drop under TX\u002FRX race\n\n## Summary\n\n`Sender::send` in `src\u002Flib.rs` contains an `unsafe` block in the `DISCONNECTED` arm that transmutes a **raw pointer** (`*mut Producer\u003CT>`) into the bytes of a **value-level** `Consumer\u003CT>`. The author's intent, visible in the surrounding comment at lines 386-390, was a value transmute. The shipped code is one level of indirection off.\n\nThe resulting `Consumer\u003CT>` has its internal `Arc::ptr` set to the address of the `producer` field on the `Sender`, not the real `ArcInner\u003CBuffer\u003CT>>`. Every subsequent `consumer.try_pop()` walks `Buffer\u003CT>` fields at offsets that lie inside the `Sender\u003CT>` struct (over `send_new`, `inner`) and adjacent memory, an out-of-bounds read. When the fake `Consumer\u003CT>` is dropped at the end of the `unsafe` block, its `Drop` calls `Arc::drop_in_place` on a non-`ArcInner` address: it decrements bytes that the type system treats as `strong_count: AtomicUsize` but that are actually the real `Arc::ptr` value of the `Sender`, and at zero count it calls `dealloc(Layout::for_value(...))` on an address the allocator never returned.\n\nReachable from 100% safe Rust through the canonical channel pattern: a `tx.send(msg)` that races with `rx.drop()`. This is consistent with the SIGSEGV that issue #3 reports in your own test suite.\n\n## Affected code (0.2.0, master at `23a9ce7`)\n\n```rust\n\u002F\u002F src\u002Flib.rs:384-401\nDISCONNECTED => {\n    self.inner.counter.store (DISCONNECTED, Ordering::SeqCst);\n    \u002F\u002F We want to guarantee if a message was not received that we get it\n    \u002F\u002F back; since spsc::{Producer,Consumer} have the same\n    \u002F\u002F internal representation (as a singleton struct containing Arc\n    \u002F\u002F \u003CBuffer \u003CT>>), we can safely transmute the producer in order to\n    \u002F\u002F pop the message back if it was orphaned.\n    unsafe {\n      let consumer : spsc::Consumer \u003CT>\n        = std::mem::transmute (self.producer.get());     \u002F\u002F \u003C-- POINTER, not value\n      let first    = consumer.try_pop();\n      let second   = consumer.try_pop();\n      assert!(second.is_none());                          \u002F\u002F \u003C-- line 396; smoking-gun assert\n      if let Some(t) = first {\n        return Err (SendError (t))\n      }\n    }\n},\nself.producer is UnsafeCell\u003Cspsc::Producer\u003CT>> (line 29). UnsafeCell::\u003CX>::get(&self) returns *mut X, a raw pointer, 8 bytes on 64-bit. The signature of transmute is transmute::\u003CSrc, Dst>(src: Src) -> Dst, so the call expands to transmute::\u003C*mut spsc::Producer\u003CT>, spsc::Consumer\u003CT>>(self.producer.get()). 8 bytes of pointer are reinterpreted as the bytes of a Consumer\u003CT>.\n\nIn bounded-spsc-queue-0.4.0, both Producer\u003CT> and Consumer\u003CT> are newtypes around Arc\u003CBuffer\u003CT>>, one pointer wide. The destination value therefore has Arc::ptr == &mut Producer\u003CT> as *const ArcInner\u003CBuffer\u003CT>>. To be a valid Arc\u003CBuffer\u003CT>>, that pointer must point to ArcInner { strong: AtomicUsize, weak: AtomicUsize, data: Buffer\u003CT> }, but it actually points to the start of Sender\u003CT> (the producer field). The first 8 bytes there hold the real Arc::ptr. The fake Arc reads those bytes as strong_count. The fake try_pop() then reads Buffer\u003CT> head\u002Ftail\u002Fdata slots starting at offset 16 inside the Sender\u003CT>, that is, inside the send_new and inner fields.\n\nThe author's intent (per the comment at lines 386-390) was a value-level transmute:\n\nlet producer_val: spsc::Producer\u003CT> = std::ptr::read(self.producer.get());\nlet consumer    : spsc::Consumer\u003CT> = std::mem::transmute(producer_val);\nwhich is layout-sound iff Producer\u003CT> and Consumer\u003CT> have identical layouts (they do, both are single-Arc newtypes). The shipped code is one indirection off.\n\nReachability\nThe branch is not reachable single-threaded. Receiver::drop (line 332) stores connected = false before setting counter = DISCONNECTED; Sender::send (line 359) early-returns on connected == false. The trigger is a TOCTOU race:\n\nSender's self.inner.connected.load(SeqCst) reads true.\nReceiver-drop runs: stores connected = false and counter.compare_exchange(_, DISCONNECTED, SeqCst, SeqCst).\nSender's self.inner.counter.fetch_add(1, SeqCst) (line 379) sees DISCONNECTED and enters the unsafe block.\nUnder heavy contention this reproduces ~3\u002F10 trials in release mode.\n\nProof of concept (race shape)\n\u002F\u002F Cargo.toml: unbounded-spsc = \"0.2\"\nuse std::thread;\nuse unbounded_spsc::channel;\n\nfn main() {\n    for trial in 0..500 {\n        let (tx, rx) = channel::\u003CBox\u003Cu64>>();\n        let started = std::sync::Arc::new(\n            std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool::new(false));\n        let s = started.clone();\n        let h = thread::spawn(move || {\n            s.store(true, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);\n            for _ in 0..10_000 {\n                let _ = tx.send(Box::new(0xDEAD_BEEF));\n            }\n        });\n        while !started.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst) {\n            std::hint::spin_loop();\n        }\n        drop(rx);\n        let _ = h.join();\n        eprintln!(\"trial {trial} ok\");\n    }\n}\nObserved:\n\nRelease-mode (no sanitizer): Segmentation fault (core dumped) reliably within a few trials. The non-segfaulting trials are masked by the separate send_new.send(new_consumer).unwrap() panic, see Secondary defect below.\n-Zsanitizer=address -Zbuild-std (nightly): ASan reports stack-buffer-overflow \u002F stack-use-after-scope from the fake-Consumer's try_pop walking off the Sender frame.\nThis matches the SIGSEGV reported in your own issue #3.\n\nSmoking-gun upstream evidence\nsrc\u002Flib.rs:975 in the project's test suite carries a TODO:\n\n\u002F\u002F TODO: failures\n\u002F\u002F - failed with assertion on line 394 in send fn\n\u002F\u002F   assert!(second.is_none())\nThat is the assertion site of the transmute block (line 396 in 0.2.0 \u002F master). You have observed try_pop() returning a non-None value where logically there should be none, which is exactly what reading random bytes from the Sender's send_new \u002F inner fields produces, and the symptom has been marked as a flaky test rather than recognised as UB.\n\nImpact\nReachable from 100% safe Rust. Concrete UB primitives:\n\nOOB read of bytes adjacent to the Sender\u003CT> struct via fake Consumer\u003CT>::try_pop(). The popped T is returned through Err(SendError(t)) to safe-code, an allocator-layout-controlled leak of process memory.\nOOB write via fake Arc::drop AtomicUsize::fetch_sub on bytes that are actually the real Arc::ptr value of the Sender.\nAllocator corruption via fake Arc::drop calling dealloc(Layout::for_value(...)) on a non-allocated address. The Sender struct holds the real Arc\u003CInner> immediately after the producer field; the deallocator call therefore uses a layout the allocator never allocated, which on glibc is a confirmed double-free \u002F arbitrary-bucket-poisoning primitive, and on hardened allocators (jemalloc-secure, mimalloc-secure) is an immediate abort.\nSecondary defect (same call path, bonus)\nSender::send line 369:\n\nself.send_new.send(new_consumer).unwrap();\nWhen the Sender's message queue is full, a fresh bounded_spsc_queue::Channel is allocated and the new Consumer\u003CT> is shipped over an std::sync::mpsc side-channel to the Receiver. If the Receiver has already been dropped, receive_new is gone and this unwrap() panics. The panic surfaces in your own test suite, issue #2 (tests::port_gone_concurrent panicked at src\u002Flib.rs:369) and the in-source TODO at lines 365-368 already note the question \"Are we sure that this is safe to unwrap or should we handle the result explicitly ?\".\n\nThe fix is to return Err(SendError(t)) instead of unwrapping, same shape as the channel-closed result the function already returns on the connected-false path. This is not a memory-safety defect, only a panic, but it lives on the same TX\u002FRX-race code path and a single coordinated patch can address both. Filing it here so we cover the full call site in one cycle.\n\nSuggested patch (primary defect)\nReplace the pointer-as-value transmute with a value-level read and a ManuallyDrop to suppress the alias's Producer::drop on subsequent exit:\n\nunsafe {\n    use core::mem::ManuallyDrop;\n\n    \u002F\u002F Sound value-level transmute: Producer\u003CT> and Consumer\u003CT> are both\n    \u002F\u002F newtypes around Arc\u003CBuffer\u003CT>>, so the value layouts match.\n    \u002F\u002F ptr::read takes ownership of the Producer's bytes without running\n    \u002F\u002F Producer's Drop.\n    let producer_val: spsc::Producer\u003CT> = std::ptr::read(self.producer.get());\n    let consumer    : spsc::Consumer\u003CT> = std::mem::transmute(producer_val);\n\n    let first  = consumer.try_pop();\n    let second = consumer.try_pop();\n    assert!(second.is_none());\n    if let Some(t) = first {\n        return Err(SendError(t));\n    }\n\n    \u002F\u002F consumer drops here; the same memory backs `producer`, so suppress\n    \u002F\u002F the double Producer drop:\n    let _ = ManuallyDrop::new(consumer);\n}\nCleaner: restructure Sender\u003CT> to hold producer and consumer in a private enum Endpoint\u003CT> so no transmute is required, or use the bounded_spsc_queue::Producer\u003CT>::reclaim() escape hatch if available.\n\nSuggested patch (secondary defect)\nif let Err(std::sync::mpsc::SendError(_)) = self.send_new.send(new_consumer) {\n    \u002F\u002F Receiver has been dropped: take the message back as the public\n    \u002F\u002F SendError, the same way the connected==false early-return does.\n    return Err(SendError(t));\n}\nRegression test (release-mode, race shape)\n#[test]\nfn race_disconnect_does_not_corrupt_sender_or_abort() {\n    for _ in 0..200 {\n        let (tx, rx) = unbounded_spsc::channel::\u003CBox\u003Cu64>>();\n        let h = std::thread::spawn(move || {\n            for _ in 0..10_000 {\n                let _ = tx.send(Box::new(0xDEAD_BEEF));\n            }\n        });\n        drop(rx);\n        h.join().unwrap();\n    }\n}\nReverse dependencies\nTwo crates on crates.io depend on unbounded-spsc, both owned by you: apis (process-calculus framework) and gooey-rs (tile-UI library, unbounded-spsc gated behind opengl\u002Ffmod features). The OpenGL\u002FFMOD callback-mailbox use is a natural rx-drop-during-tx-send scenario at scene-graph teardown. A single coordinated bump cycle is feasible.\n\nResearcher\nBerkant Koc me@berkoc.com\nPGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6","2026-05-29T19:05:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":46,"availabilityImpact":46,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.1",5.8,"LOCAL","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:L\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:L\u002FI:L\u002FA:H","LOW","NONE","HIGH",false,[49,50,51,52],"CWE-125","CWE-704","CWE-787","CWE-415",[54,55,56],"cpe:2.3:a:spearman:unbounded-spsc:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:unbounded-spsc:unbounded-spsc:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:unbounded-spsc:unbounded-spsc:0.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[58,59],"Spearman Unbounded-Spsc","Unbounded-Spsc Unbounded-Spsc",[61,62,63],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fspearman\u002Funbounded-spsc\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-6m57-8r3p-pqx6","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2026-46690","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fspearman\u002Funbounded-spsc",0.44,0.0013,0.02608,{"timestamp":68,"automatable":69,"tech_impact":70,"exploitation":71,"cisa_decision":72,"cisa_remediation_timeline":76},"2026-06-12T15:54:19.131542Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":73,"decision":74,"priority":75},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T05:36:05.807379\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[78],{"name":79,"source":80,"tactics":81,"technique_id":83},"Exploitation for Privilege Escalation","attack_vector",[82],"privilege-escalation","T1068",[85],{"link":61},{"count":87,"next":88,"previous":6,"results":89},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[90,98,106],{"id":91,"title":92,"summary":93,"published_at":94,"type":95,"link":96,"image_url":97},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":99,"title":100,"summary":101,"published_at":102,"type":103,"link":104,"image_url":105},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":107,"title":108,"summary":109,"published_at":110,"type":111,"link":112,"image_url":113},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]