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CVE-2026-54322

NVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2026-38563 · Published Jun 16, 2026

Daytona: Cross-org IDOR in organization role update/delete — any org owner can rewrite or destroy another org's roles

Summary

Daytona's organization role update and delete endpoints authorized the caller as an owner of the organization named in the request path, but resolved and mutated the target role by its identifier alone, without verifying the role belonged to that organization. An authenticated user who owns any organization (organizations are self-service) could therefore modify the permissions of, or delete, a role belonging to a different organization, given that role's identifier.

Impact

This is a cross-tenant broken access control (IDOR) issue affecting multi-tenant deployments, including the managed Daytona platform. Using a target role's identifier, an attacker with owner rights over their own organization could:

  • Overwrite the target role's name and permission set, escalating or stripping privileges for every member and API key in the victim organization that holds that role.
  • Delete the target role, removing the associated permissions from its holders.
  • Observe the victim role's current permission set returned in the update response (limited information disclosure).

Exploitation requires knowledge of the target role's identifier, which is not enumerable across organizations and is not exposed to non-members through the API.

Affected versions

All versions up to and including 0.184.0.

Patches

Fixed in 0.185.0. The role update, delete, and role-assignment lookups are now scoped to the caller's organization, so a role belonging to another organization resolves to "not found" before any read or mutation. The managed Daytona platform was updated on release of 0.185.0.

Workarounds

None. Upgrade to 0.185.0. Single-organization self-hosted deployments are not exploitable, as the issue requires a second organization to target.

Credit

Reported by @vnth4nhnt.

Technologies

Daytonaio Daytona

Weaknesses

CWE-862CWE-639

CVSS scores

  • v3.17.7CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

Where this vulnerability fits in an attack

Initial Access Persistence Stealth Defense Impairment Credential Access

References

Potentially impacted assets

See if this affects your attack surface

Latest trending attack

Criticalyesterday

Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.

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