[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-63876":30,"landing-articles":58},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":37,"cwes":38,"cpes":39,"technologies":40,"references":41,"score":47,"epss_score":48,"epss_percentile":49,"is_kev":37,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":50,"attack_mappings":56,"exploits":57},366471,"CVE-2026-63876","EUVD-2026-45761","In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nserial: zs: Convert to use a platform device\n\nPrevent a crash from happening as the first serial port is initialised:\n\n  Console: switching to mono frame buffer device 160x64\n  fb0: PMAG-AA frame buffer device at tc0\n  DECstation Z85C30 serial driver version 0.10\n  CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000002c, epc == 803ab00c, ra == 803aafe0\n  Oops[#1]:\n  CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.4.0-rc3-00031-g84a9582fd203-dirty #57\n  $ 0   : 00000000 10012c00 803aaeb0 00000000\n  $ 4   : 80e12f60 80e12f50 80e12f58 81000030\n  $ 8   : 00000000 805ff37c 00000000 33433538\n  $12   : 65732030 00000006 80c2915d 6c616972\n  $16   : 80e12f00 807b7630 00000000 00000000\n  $20   : 00000004 00000348 000001a0 807623b8\n  $24   : 00000018 00000000\n  $28   : 80c24000 80c25d60 8078b148 803aafe0\n  Hi    : 00000000\n  Lo    : 00000000\n  epc   : 803ab00c serial_base_ctrl_add+0x78\u002F0xf4\n  ra    : 803aafe0 serial_base_ctrl_add+0x4c\u002F0xf4\n  Status: 10012c03\tKERNEL EXL IE\n  Cause : 00000008 (ExcCode 02)\n  BadVA : 0000002c\n  PrId  : 00000440 (R4400SC)\n  Modules linked in:\n  Process swapper (pid: 1, threadinfo=(ptrval), task=(ptrval), tls=00000000)\n  Stack : 80760000 00000cc0 00400044 00400040 803aa02c 80d61ab8 00000000 807b7630\n          80760000 807623b8 807b7628 803aa644 80386998 00000000 80e17780 80220f68\n          80e17780 80d61ab8 80c17d80 80e17780 80e17780 8063c798 80e17780 80383fa0\n          00000010 80e17780 00000000 80386998 807a0000 00000000 00400040 8038f848\n          807623b8 80d61ab8 00000004 80e17780 00000000 803a68e4 80c25e2c 803bb884\n          ...\n  Call Trace:\n  [\u003C803ab00c>] serial_base_ctrl_add+0x78\u002F0xf4\n  [\u003C803aa644>] serial_core_register_port+0x174\u002F0x69c\n  [\u003C8077e9ac>] zs_init+0xc8\u002F0xfc\n  [\u003C800404d4>] do_one_initcall+0x40\u002F0x2ac\n  [\u003C8076cecc>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1e4\u002F0x270\n  [\u003C80605bec>] kernel_init+0x20\u002F0x108\n  [\u003C800431e8>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x14\u002F0x1c\n\n  Code: 2442aeb0  ae120024  ae0200d0 \u003C8c67002c> 50e00001  8c670000  3c06806e  3c05806e  afb30010\n\n  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---\n\n(report at the offending commit) -- where a pointer is dereferenced that\nhas been derived from a null pointer to the port's parent device.\n\nSince no device is available with legacy probing and it's not anymore a\npreferable way to discover devices anyway, switch the driver to using a\nplatform device and use it as the port's parent device.  Update resource\nhandling accordingly and only request the actual span of addresses used\nwithin the slot, which will have had its resource already requested by\ngeneric platform device code.\n\nUse platform_driver_probe() not just because SCC devices are fixed with\nsolder on board and not straightforward to remove, but foremost because\nthe associated TTY's major device number is the same as used by the dz\ndriver and the first driver to claim it will prevent the other one from\nusing it.  Either one DZ device or some SCC devices will be present in a\ngiven system but never both at a time, and therefore we want the major\ndevice number to be claimed by the first driver to actually successfully\nbind to its device and platform_driver_probe() is a way to fulfil that.\n\nAn unfortunate consequence of the switch to a platform device is we now\nhand the console over from the bootconsole much later in the bootstrap.\nThe firmware console handler appears good enough though to work so late\nand in particular with interrupts enabled.\n\nSince there is one way only remaining to reach zs_reset() now, remove\nthe port initialisation marker as no longer needed and go through the\nchannel reset unconditionally.","2026-07-19T16:17:00Z",{},false,[],[],[],[42,43,44,45,46],"https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F237dc8c08de3cb293b6607aaee8b13b3a671e267","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F4dc9f1517503c883d5ce25b7ab29d177d05edc6a","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F6a83d5e24a84e746425cd93539130e5f7381ef47","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F7cac59d08a73cb866ec51a483a6f3fe0f531947c","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002Fbb2040484f90f91b717060e1a66026cc4287bcf0",0,0.00218,0.12154,{"timestamp":6,"automatable":51,"tech_impact":52,"exploitation":53,"cisa_decision":54,"cisa_remediation_timeline":55},"no","partial","none",{},"FSU",[],[],{"count":59,"next":60,"previous":6,"results":61},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[62,70,78],{"id":63,"title":64,"summary":65,"published_at":66,"type":67,"link":68,"image_url":69},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":71,"title":72,"summary":73,"published_at":74,"type":75,"link":76,"image_url":77},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":79,"title":80,"summary":81,"published_at":82,"type":83,"link":84,"image_url":85},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]