[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-63894":30,"landing-articles":72},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":48,"technologies":49,"references":50,"score":55,"epss_score":56,"epss_percentile":57,"is_kev":46,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":58,"attack_mappings":64,"exploits":71},366445,"CVE-2026-63894","EUVD-2026-45667","In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: gadget: f_fs: serialize DMABUF cancel against request completion\n\nffs_epfile_dmabuf_io_complete() calls usb_ep_free_request() on the\ncompleted request but leaves priv->req, the back-pointer that\nffs_dmabuf_transfer() set on submission, pointing at the freed\nmemory.  A later FUNCTIONFS_DMABUF_DETACH ioctl or\nffs_epfile_release() on the close path still sees priv->req\nnon-NULL under ffs->eps_lock:\n\n    if (priv->ep && priv->req)\n            usb_ep_dequeue(priv->ep, priv->req);\n\nso usb_ep_dequeue() is called on a freed usb_request.\n\nOn dummy_hcd the dequeue path only walks a live queue and\npointer-compares, so the freed pointer reads without faulting and\nKASAN requires an explicit check at the FunctionFS call site to\nsurface the use-after-free.  On SG-capable in-tree UDCs the\ndequeue path dereferences the supplied request immediately:\n\n  * chipidea's ep_dequeue() does\n    container_of(req, struct ci_hw_req, req) and reads\n    hwreq->req.status before acquiring its own lock.\n  * cdnsp's cdnsp_gadget_ep_dequeue() reads request->status first.\n\nThe narrower option of clearing priv->req via cmpxchg() in the\ncompletion does not close the race: the completion runs without\neps_lock, so a cancel path holding eps_lock can still observe\npriv->req non-NULL, race a concurrent completion that clears and\nfrees, and pass the freed pointer to usb_ep_dequeue().  A slightly\nlonger fix that moves the free into the cleanup work is needed.\n\nSame class of lifetime race as the recent usbip-vudc timer fix [1].\n\nTake eps_lock in the sole place that mutates priv->req from the\ncallback direction by moving usb_ep_free_request() out of the\ncompletion into ffs_dmabuf_cleanup(), the existing work handler\nscheduled by ffs_dmabuf_signal_done() on\nffs->io_completion_wq.  Clear priv->req there under eps_lock\nbefore freeing, and only clear if priv->req still names our\nrequest (a subsequent ffs_dmabuf_transfer() on the same\nattachment may have queued a new one).\n\nThis keeps the existing dummy_hcd sync-dequeue invariant: the\ncompletion callback is still invoked by the UDC without\neps_lock held (dummy_hcd drops its own lock before calling the\ncallback), and the callback now takes no f_fs lock at all.\nSerialization against the cancel path happens in cleanup, which\nruns from the workqueue with no f_fs lock held on entry.\n\nThe priv ref count protects the containing ffs_dmabuf_priv:\nffs_dmabuf_transfer() takes a ref via ffs_dmabuf_get(), cleanup\ndrops it via ffs_dmabuf_put(), so priv stays live for the\ncleanup even after the cancel path's list_del + ffs_dmabuf_put.\n\nThe ffs_dmabuf_transfer() error path no longer frees usb_req\ninline: fence->req and fence->ep are set before usb_ep_queue(),\nso ffs_dmabuf_cleanup() (scheduled by the error-path\nffs_dmabuf_signal_done()) owns the free regardless of whether\nthe queue succeeded.\n\nReproduced under KASAN on both detach and close paths against\ndummy_hcd with an observability hook\n(kasan_check_byte(priv->req) immediately before usb_ep_dequeue)\nat the two FunctionFS cancel sites to surface the stale-pointer\naccess; the hook is not part of this patch.  The KASAN\nallocator \u002F free stacks in the captured splats identify the\nsame request: alloc in dummy_alloc_request, free in\ndummy_timer, fault reached from ffs_epfile_release (close) and\nfrom the FUNCTIONFS_DMABUF_DETACH ioctl (detach).  With the\npatch applied, both paths are silent under the same hook.\n\nThe bug is reached from the FunctionFS device node, which in\nreal deployments is owned by the privileged gadget daemon\n(adbd, UMS, composite gadget services, etc.); it is not\nreachable from unprivileged userspace or from a USB host on the\ncable.  FunctionFS mounts default to GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, but the\nfilesystem supports uid=, gid=, and fmode= delegation to a\nnon-root gadget daemon, so on real deployments the attacker may\nbe a less-privileged service rather than root.","2026-07-19T16:17:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":42,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":42},"UNCHANGED","3.1",7.8,"LOCAL","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:L\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H","NONE","LOW",false,[],[],[],[51,52,53,54],"https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F2796646f6d892c1eb6818c7ca41fdfa12568e8d1","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F552dae28dbeb5f7c4fafcda43962dc46569f58a0","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002Fc7d421123b98d5e9c1c84bd9957aba36f1cbb4ca","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002Fc872d8a065b3b499ce4c3ad168b5d34b68524f66",0.39,0.0017,0.06358,{"timestamp":6,"automatable":59,"tech_impact":60,"exploitation":61,"cisa_decision":62,"cisa_remediation_timeline":63},"no","partial","none",{},"FSU",[65],{"name":66,"source":67,"tactics":68,"technique_id":70},"Exploitation for Privilege Escalation","attack_vector",[69],"privilege-escalation","T1068",[],{"count":73,"next":74,"previous":6,"results":75},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[76,84,92],{"id":77,"title":78,"summary":79,"published_at":80,"type":81,"link":82,"image_url":83},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":85,"title":86,"summary":87,"published_at":88,"type":89,"link":90,"image_url":91},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":93,"title":94,"summary":95,"published_at":96,"type":97,"link":98,"image_url":99},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]