[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-90000":30,"landing-articles":70},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":48,"technologies":49,"references":50,"score":59,"epss_score":60,"epss_percentile":61,"is_kev":46,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":62,"attack_mappings":68,"exploits":69},392250,"CVE-2026-90000","EUVD-2026-80608","In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nHID: rmi: fix OOB access with undersized RMI reports\n\nThe hid-rmi driver sizes its writeReport\u002FreadReport buffer purely from\nthe report descriptor supplied by the device, with no minimum bound:\n\n\tdata->input_report_size  = hid_report_len(input_report);\n\tdata->output_report_size = hid_report_len(output_report);\n\talloc_size = data->output_report_size + data->input_report_size;\n\tdata->writeReport = devm_kzalloc(&hdev->dev, alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL);\n\tdata->readReport = data->writeReport + data->output_report_size;\n\nbut then reads and writes fixed offsets into it.  A device declaring a\n1-byte output and a 1-byte input report makes hid_report_len() return 2\nfor each, so alloc_size is 4, while rmi_set_page() -- reached\nunconditionally at probe time through rmi_input_configured() -- stores\nwriteReport[4] and rmi_hid_read_block() stores writeReport[0..5].  Since\nreadReport lives at writeReport + output_report_size, those stores also\ncorrupt the window the next reply is parsed out of.\n\nThe read path is worse: the copy length comes from readReport[1], which\nthe device fills in and can be up to 255, and the copy starts at\n&readReport[2] with no regard for input_report_size, so it runs past the\nend of the allocation into adjacent slab objects.  This does not even\nneed a lying device -- rmi_f01_probe() issues a fixed 21-byte register\nread, so any device declaring an input report smaller than 23 bytes\nreads out of bounds even when it answers truthfully.  Those bytes become\nthe register values the RMI core acts on: rmi_f01_probe() prints them to\nthe kernel log as the product id and exports them through the mode 0444\nsysfs attribute of the same name, and rmi_driver_set_irq_bits() sends\nthem back to the device as the interrupt mask, so an undersized report\ndescriptor leaks heap contents both to unprivileged userspace and to the\ndevice itself.\n\nThe write path has no bound either: rmi_hid_write_block() copies an\nunbounded len to &writeReport[4], and the largest caller a device can\ndrive at probe time is rmi_driver_set_irq_bits(), whose length is\nderived from the interrupt source counts the device declares in its Page\nDescription Table.\n\nFinally, the read loop cannot terminate on a zero-length reply: such a\nreply copies nothing and advances neither bytes_read nor bytes_needed,\nand because a reply did arrive the one second wait_event_timeout() does\nnot fire either, so a device answering 0 forever keeps the loop running\ninside the probe worker with page_mutex held.  khungtaskd does not\nnotice, because every reply wakes the task.\n\nReject reports too small for what the driver builds -- 6 output bytes\nfor the write reports and 3 input bytes for the read handshake -- at\nprobe time, clamp the write and the read copy to the report sizes the\ndevice declared, and treat a zero-length reply as an error.  A device\nrefused this way is started as an ordinary HID device, like one that\ndoes not carry the RMI report ids at all.\n\nRMI_DEVICE must not be left set in device_flags on that path, because\nrmi_input_configured() would then run the RMI setup and reach\nrmi_set_page(), which writes the writeReport buffer the refusal just\nskipped allocating.  The bit can arrive set: rmi_probe() copies\nid->driver_data into device_flags before the report checks, and a bind\nthrough the new_id sysfs attribute can supply driver_data with\nRMI_DEVICE (BIT(0)) set.  Strip the bit where driver_data is copied, so\nRMI_DEVICE keeps meaning exactly \"this probe validated the reports\"; the\nthree jumps to start that predate this patch are covered as well.\n\nThe error path also clears RMI_READ_DATA_PENDING on its way out, because\nthat flag is what the wait at the top of the loop tests: leaving it set\nwould make every later wait_event_timeout() return immediately on the\nstale reply and kill the read path for the rest of the device's life.\n\nClamping does not regress working hardware: the read loop already\nhandles\n---truncated---","2026-09-16T11:17:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":42,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":42},"UNCHANGED","3.1",8.8,"ADJACENT_NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:A\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H","NONE","LOW",false,[],[],[],[51,52,53,54,55,56,57,58],"https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F056ef8e6700b8b6ca11453a9d4bfb1b868a5cd88","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F183da103022ec11af55ba9951d2cc171fb6c836b","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F48934c2927414a37a7fadeb6091113177c0b2038","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F4956993bb3befdf791d71a4952d8d13bcfd44c7b","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002Fa8be8bbf0952bb7ff46636ead1896769c381fe55","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002Fab2958e0c94edd63315dd14dc548874cc63a4043","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002Ff4cb9c4556dcb593e66dbb855179dbd351dbb053","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002Ffba600d824597b2a894ecae72fc422c2b8c08f8c",0.44,0.00354,0.28854,{"timestamp":6,"automatable":63,"tech_impact":64,"exploitation":65,"cisa_decision":66,"cisa_remediation_timeline":67},"no","partial","none",{},"FSU",[],[],{"count":71,"next":72,"previous":6,"results":73},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[74,82,90],{"id":75,"title":76,"summary":77,"published_at":78,"type":79,"link":80,"image_url":81},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":83,"title":84,"summary":85,"published_at":86,"type":87,"link":88,"image_url":89},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":91,"title":92,"summary":93,"published_at":94,"type":95,"link":96,"image_url":97},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]