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CVE-2026-90184

NVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2026-81777 · Published Sep 17, 2026

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: null_blk: serialize configfs attribute updates with device setup The attribute store methods generated with NULLB_DEVICE_ATTR() refuse to change the configuration of a live device by testing NULLB_DEV_FL_CONFIGURED, but that flag is only set by nullb_device_power_store() after null_add_dev() has returned, and the store methods take no lock at all. configfs only serializes writes to the same open file (buffer->mutex), so a write to any attribute can run concurrently with null_add_dev() and change the device configuration while it is being used. null_add_dev() reads the configuration several times, e.g. dev->zoned is read once to set up the queue limits and once to initialize the zone resources: CPU0: echo 1 > nullb0/power CPU1: echo 1 > nullb0/zoned nullb_device_power_store() mutex_lock(&lock) null_add_dev() if (dev->zoned) -> false /* no BLK_FEAT_ZONED */ nullb_device_zoned_store() test_bit(FL_CONFIGURED) -> 0 dev->zoned = true blk_mq_alloc_disk() /* queue is not zoned */ if (nullb->dev->zoned) -> true null_register_zoned_dev() blk_revalidate_disk_zones() blk_revalidate_disk_zones() is then called for a queue that does not have BLK_FEAT_ZONED set, which triggers its WARN_ON_ONCE() and fails the device setup with -EIO: WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 322 at block/blk-zoned.c:2357 blk_revalidate_disk_zones+0x4c/0x560 Clearing dev->zoned in the same window is worse: the queue is created with BLK_FEAT_ZONED but the zone resources are never initialized, so add_disk() succeeds for a zoned disk that has no zones. And a store that lands after the last dev->zoned test leaves dev->zoned set while dev->zones is still NULL, which null_process_zoned_cmd() dereferences on the first write. Fix this by taking the global lock, which nullb_device_power_store() already holds across null_add_dev() and null_del_dev(), around both the NULLB_DEV_FL_CONFIGURED test and the update of the device configuration. The submit_queues and poll_queues apply callbacks are now called with that lock held, so remove the locking they did themselves. Since the store methods can run as soon as configfs_register_subsystem() returns, that is, before null_init() gets to mutex_init(&lock), also initialize the lock statically with DEFINE_MUTEX().

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Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.

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