[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-90301":30,"landing-articles":71},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":45,"cwes":46,"cpes":47,"technologies":48,"references":49,"score":53,"epss_score":54,"epss_percentile":55,"is_kev":56,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":57,"attack_mappings":63,"exploits":70},392655,"CVE-2026-90301","EUVD-2026-81894","In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nocfs2: o2hb: quiesce negotiate handlers and timeout work\n\nHeartbeat regions publish struct o2hb_region as the private data for the\nNEGO_TIMEOUT and NEGO_APPROVE o2net handlers as soon as make_item()\ncreates the configfs region.  The approve handler can call\no2hb_arm_timeout(), so a peer can touch the region timeout work before\ndev_store() has finished building the heartbeat runtime, or after teardown\nhas started to shut that runtime back down.\n\nThe final configfs put also has to keep reg alive until the last in-flight\no2net callback drops its handler reference. \no2net_unregister_handler_list() blocks future handler lookups, but it does\nnot wait for sc_rx_work that already passed o2net_handler_get().  That\ndrain needs to cover local listener teardown as well, where the o2net\nordered workqueue may already be inside destroy_workqueue().\n\nFix the lifetime rule in both directions.  Initialize the region delayed\nworks before publishing reg through the o2net handler table, keep new or\nstopping regions non-armable with hr_stopping, and quiesce both delayed\nworks on failed-start and teardown paths even when no heartbeat thread is\nleft to call o2hb_disarm_timeout().  Then unregister handlers before\ntearing down handler-visible region state and make the drain wait for the\nactive or destroying o2net ordered workqueue before release frees reg.\n\nThe buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order\nwithin that path:\n\nregion lifecycle:                late negotiate callback:\n1. make_item() registers the     1. o2net_process_message() gets a\n   region handlers before           heartbeat handler for reg.\n   dev_store() has built a       2. The callback runs after the lookup\n   runnable heartbeat context.      lock is dropped and dereferences reg.\n2. A failed start or rmdir       3. An approve or timeout path tries to\n   stops the heartbeat thread,      queue reg's delayed work, or release\n   quiesces existing work, and      races the callback body after handler\n   drops the final configfs ref.    unregister.\n3. region_release() must drain   4. The callback or delayed work can\n   handler-visible o2net rx work    outlive reg unless lifecycle code\n   before freeing reg.              keeps the region non-armable and\n                                    drains the active-or-destroying\n                                    o2net workqueue.\n\nValidation reproduced this kernel report:\nKASAN slab-use-after-free in __run_timers+0x22c\u002F0x5b0\nWrite of size 8\nCall trace:\n  dump_stack_lvl+0x66\u002F0xa0\n  print_report+0xce\u002F0x630\n  __run_timers+0x22c\u002F0x5b0\n  kasan_report+0xe0\u002F0x110\n  _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x27\u002F0x60\n  try_to_wake_up+0x191\u002F0xf70\n  timer_expire_remote+0xae\u002F0xf0\n  run_timer_softirq+0x19b\u002F0x1a0\n  handle_softirqs+0x156\u002F0x660\n  __irq_exit_rcu+0xc4\u002F0x160\n  irq_exit_rcu+0xe\u002F0x20\n  sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6c\u002F0x80\n  asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a\u002F0x20\n\nAllocated by task stack:\n  kasan_save_stack+0x33\u002F0x60\n  kasan_save_track+0x14\u002F0x30\n  __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa\u002F0xb0\n  o2hb_heartbeat_group_make_item+0x3c\u002F0x600","2026-09-17T17:17:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":42,"availabilityImpact":42,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":42},"UNCHANGED","3.1",8.1,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H","NONE",true,[],[],[],[50,51,52],"https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F011291b70ba4832e136b7b581825b2bc0f525bf6","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002Fb5a2907bdeced0949bcddc84b95ba7d4cb93841b","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F9d44822ba34d6035690f725f9de602744a6e1946",0.6,0.00552,0.45865,false,{"timestamp":6,"automatable":58,"tech_impact":59,"exploitation":60,"cisa_decision":61,"cisa_remediation_timeline":62},"no","partial","none",{},"FSU",[64],{"name":65,"source":66,"tactics":67,"technique_id":69},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[68],"initial-access","T1190",[],{"count":72,"next":73,"previous":6,"results":74},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[75,83,91],{"id":76,"title":77,"summary":78,"published_at":79,"type":80,"link":81,"image_url":82},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":84,"title":85,"summary":86,"published_at":87,"type":88,"link":89,"image_url":90},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":92,"title":93,"summary":94,"published_at":95,"type":96,"link":97,"image_url":98},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]