[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-98069":30,"landing-articles":76},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":45,"cwes":46,"cpes":47,"technologies":48,"references":49,"score":58,"epss_score":59,"epss_percentile":60,"is_kev":61,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":62,"attack_mappings":68,"exploits":75},396578,"CVE-2026-98069","EUVD-2026-86722","In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet\u002Frds: acquire the fastpath locks in rds_conn_shutdown()\n\nrds_conn_shutdown() quiesces the transmit and receive-refill paths by\nwaiting for RDS_IN_XMIT and RDS_RECV_REFILL to be sampled clear, and\nthen runs the transport shutdown and rds_conn_path_reset().  Sampling\nthe bits clear is not the same as owning them: the moment after the\nwait_event() returns, rds_send_xmit() can re-acquire RDS_IN_XMIT (or\nrds_ib_recv_refill() can re-acquire RDS_RECV_REFILL) and run\nconcurrently with the teardown.\n\nThe sender does recheck the connection state after taking the lock,\nbut that recheck is a classic store-buffering pattern: teardown writes\nthe state and reads the bit while the sender writes the bit and reads\nthe state.  acquire_in_xmit() is only an acquire operation, so on\nweakly ordered architectures both sides can miss each other's write,\nand the transmit path then runs while the transport zeroes its rings\n(e.g. rds_ib_ring_init()) and rds_send_path_reset() rewrites the\ntransmit state under it.\n\nOracle UEK fixed the same class of crashes - a 14-year tail of\nBUG_ON()s in rds_ib_sub_signaled(), unexpected op-codes and NULL\ndereferences in rds_ib_send_cqe_handler() during failover testing -\nby making the teardown path *acquire* the fastpath bit locks instead\nof testing them (\"rds: Make sure transmit path and connection\ntear-down does not run concurrently\").  Ownership of a single word is\ndecided by RMW atomicity, so no cross-variable ordering is needed.\n\nDo the same here: take both locks before calling the transport\nshutdown, hold them across rds_conn_path_reset(), and release them\nexplicitly with a wake-up afterwards.  Both are released with\nclear_bit_unlock(), so that the ring re-initialization done by the\ntransport shutdown and the transmit state rewritten by\nrds_send_path_reset() are ordered before either bit is seen clear by\nthe next acquire_in_xmit() or acquire_refill().\n\nThe fastpath users of these bits - rds_send_xmit() and\nrds_ib_recv_refill() - are trylock style and back off while teardown\nowns the locks, so no new lock dependency is introduced for them.\nrds_tcp_reset_callbacks() is different: since the previous patch it\nacquires RDS_IN_XMIT as well, and it blocks doing so, so its wait now\nspans the teardown instead of at most one send batch.  That waiter\nruns from rds_tcp_accept_one() on the single-threaded krdsd workqueue\nand holds rds_tcp_accept_lock and t_conn_path_lock while it waits, so\na duelling SYN accepted while its path is being torn down parks\naccept processing for the duration of the teardown - for TCP bounded\nby the (up to 5 s) drain loop in rds_tcp_conn_path_shutdown().  An IB\npath's drain in rds_ib_conn_path_shutdown() has no round cap, but no\nblocking waiter either: rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() is the only blocking\nacquirer of these bits and waits only on its own TCP path, and the\nfastpaths are trylock-and-back-off on both transports, so a long IB\ndrain lengthens only that path's own quiesce.  The\nwindow is narrow: the accept-side state check has to pass before the\nteardown moves the path to RDS_CONN_DISCONNECTING.\n\nBecause krdsd is a single global workqueue, everything else queued\nthere - accept processing for other connections and network\nnamespaces, and the flush_workqueue(rds_wq) in rds_tcp_listen_stop()\nduring namespace teardown - waits behind the parked accept worker for\nthat time.  It cannot deadlock, although the waits do point at each\nother: the teardown blocks until the bit's holder releases it, and\nthe holder may be that krdsd accept worker.  The holder finishes\nwithout needing anything the teardown owns: the sync cancels\nrds_tcp_reset_callbacks() issues target cp_send_w and cp_recv_w on\nthe path's ordered cp_wq, whose only execution slot is occupied by\nthe blocked cp_down_w itself, so they are pending at most and cancel\nwithout flushing - a reliance on cp_wq being ordered that is now\nnoted next to those cancels (on \n---truncated---","2026-09-25T11:17:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":42,"availabilityImpact":42,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":42},"UNCHANGED","3.1",8.1,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H","NONE",true,[],[],[],[50,51,52,53,54,55,56,57],"https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F1fe627e5db5c3f53a9f9f9c8a66671755d306955","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F7febb113795d5de5b690b208f4b0e64a5fad1201","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F813f3582ac7ae9f60f917937d54660e0952d5f2d","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F900e96c9749a06833801f60c393aa1d405ea226c","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F1f900f585cbb0fbe6aa00c31c9f5bb63ee614456","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F2e46248e375a516301884719f08b6015c79a6456","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F32e21bcf4b5b11454bf57c4bb3bf019b71512ace","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F7f4f21e4439df30d9aca9fb3bac38191a2f34729",0.6,0.00569,0.46864,false,{"timestamp":6,"automatable":63,"tech_impact":64,"exploitation":65,"cisa_decision":66,"cisa_remediation_timeline":67},"no","partial","none",{},"FSU",[69],{"name":70,"source":71,"tactics":72,"technique_id":74},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[73],"initial-access","T1190",[],{"count":77,"next":78,"previous":6,"results":79},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[80,88,96],{"id":81,"title":82,"summary":83,"published_at":84,"type":85,"link":86,"image_url":87},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":89,"title":90,"summary":91,"published_at":92,"type":93,"link":94,"image_url":95},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":97,"title":98,"summary":99,"published_at":100,"type":101,"link":102,"image_url":103},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]