[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-98996":30,"landing-articles":56},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":37,"cwes":38,"cpes":39,"technologies":40,"references":41,"score":45,"epss_score":46,"epss_percentile":47,"is_kev":37,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":48,"attack_mappings":54,"exploits":55},411838,"CVE-2026-98996","EUVD-2026-108790","In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfs: don't silently unmount busy mounts\n\nThe propagate_mount_busy() helper exists to decide whether a synchronous\ncan suceed. It does that by looking at the copies of the victims in the\nmounts its parent propagates to. One of those functions from propagation\nhell.\n\nIt skips a copy that has child mounts except for the case of a single\nchild mount covering the copy's root. That algorithm used to be exact.\nIt isn't anymore.\n\nOriginally only childless copies were unmounted during propagation.\nAnd 1064f874abc0 (\"mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating\nshadow\u002Fside mounts.\") ended up adding covered mounts to both sides in\none go.\n\nAlong came 99b19d16471e (\"mnt: In propgate_umount handle visiting mounts\nin any order\") and that started to unmount more than before:\n\n[1]: A copy of a mount is unmounted when each of its children is either\n     its overmount or a copy of the victim itself. In the former case\n     the overmount gets reparented. In the latter case the copy of the\n     victim will end up being unmounted.\n\nSo propagate_umount() ended up being rewritten without adjusting\npropagate_mount_busy(). And currently propagate_mount_busy() doesn't\nlook at copies of the victim that have two or more children nor a single\nchild that is not the overmount.\n\nSo any such copy in [1] is not checked for\nreferences. The result is that a synchronous unmount succeeds, pulling\nout a mount that is still in use.\n\nA container can run into this with its own mounts. The host shares a\ntree with the container and the host has a mount in that tree:\n\n  mount -t tmpfs none \u002Fmnt\n  mount --make-shared \u002Fmnt\n  mount -t tmpfs none \u002Fmnt\u002Fa\n\nThe container's \u002Fmnt is a slave copy of the host mount. The container\nnow takes a detached copy of the tree and mounts that copy beneath its\npropagated copy of \u002Fmnt\u002Fa and keeps the file descriptor to the tree\nopen:\n\n  unshare -m --propagation unchanged\n  mount --make-rslave \u002F\n  fd = open_tree(AT_FDCWD, \"\u002Fmnt\", OPEN_TREE_CLONE | AT_RECURSIVE)\n  move_mount(fd, \"\", AT_FDCWD, \"\u002Fmnt\u002Fa\", MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH)\n\n  grep \u002Fmnt \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fmountinfo\n  775 355 ... \u002Fmnt ...     master:646\n  777 775 ... \u002Fmnt\u002Fa ...   master:646\n  776 777 ... \u002Fmnt\u002Fa ...   master:647\n  778 777 ... \u002Fmnt\u002Fa\u002Fa ... master:647\n\nThe now attached tree (777) is now mounted beneath the container's copy\nof \u002Fmnt\u002Fa. That's also where the host mount sits (as seen from the host\nmount namespace). So the propagated copy (776) of the host's mount is on\ntop of its root and the copy of that (778) is inside it. Now the host\nruns:\n\n  umount \u002Fmnt\u002Fa\n\nand it succeeds. The moved tree tree and the copy inside of it are gone\nfrom the container. Now only the propagated copy is left and it got\nreparented to where it was before:\n\n  grep \u002Fmnt \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fmountinfo\n  775 355 ... \u002Fmnt ... master:646\n  776 775 ... \u002Fmnt\u002Fa ...\n\nBut the file descriptor still refers to the moved tree. So a synchronous\numount detached a mount that is still in use.\n\nTeach propagate_mount_busy() the same checks that propagate_umount()\ndoes. It now checks for a single victim mount without children\nfor which it can assume that MNT_LOCKED is cleared on every copy like\npropagate_umount() does. The copies form chains. IOW, when a copy itself\nreceives propagation from the victim's parent then the mount at the same\nmountpoint inside that copy is a copy as well. Whether a mount receives\npropagation from the victim's can simply be checked by walking its\nmasters. Walk each chain once from its top so we are sure that nested\ncopies stay linear. Check every reference once of every copy that gets\nunmounted.","2026-10-23T13:17:00Z",{},false,[],[],[],[42,43,44],"https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F6857e209015f95be7a8f19a9cd5dac345b9b9859","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002Fa210ac218c307513d43e98a08f23c2dfbeeebc2f","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002Fbf2c8dec26fb792876b5e9bde7030c45d8be3908",0,0.00167,0.05861,{"timestamp":6,"automatable":49,"tech_impact":50,"exploitation":51,"cisa_decision":52,"cisa_remediation_timeline":53},"no","partial","none",{},"FSU",[],[],{"count":57,"next":58,"previous":6,"results":59},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[60,68,76],{"id":61,"title":62,"summary":63,"published_at":64,"type":65,"link":66,"image_url":67},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":69,"title":70,"summary":71,"published_at":72,"type":73,"link":74,"image_url":75},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":77,"title":78,"summary":79,"published_at":80,"type":81,"link":82,"image_url":83},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]