[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-99000":30,"landing-articles":56},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":37,"cwes":38,"cpes":39,"technologies":40,"references":41,"score":45,"epss_score":46,"epss_percentile":47,"is_kev":37,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":48,"attack_mappings":54,"exploits":55},411705,"CVE-2026-99000","EUVD-2026-108794","In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm\u002Fxe: Fix shrinker accounting double-subtraction on nested external pins\n\nxe_bo_pin_external() and xe_bo_unpin_external() support nested pins,\nsince the underlying ttm_bo_pin()\u002Fttm_bo_unpin() maintain a pin_count\nrefcount rather than a boolean. However, the shrinker accounting calls\nxe_ttm_tt_account_subtract() and xe_ttm_tt_account_add() are invoked\nunconditionally on every pin_external()\u002Funpin_external() call, instead\nof only on the transition into and out of the pinned state.\n\nAn external BO (dma-buf) can be pinned more than once while already\npinned, for example when it has multiple attachments\u002Fimporters, each\nindependently calling xe_bo_pin_external(). Each such nested pin\nsubtracts the BO's pages from the shrinker's accounting again, even\nthough the BO's pages were already removed from consideration by the\nfirst pin. Symmetrically, each nested unpin adds them back again\nbefore the BO is actually unpinned. This desynchronizes the\nshrinker's page and object counts from reality, and since they are\ndeclared as signed long but interpreted as unsigned long in\nxe_shrinker_count(), the underflow can turn into an enormous\nshrinkable\u002Fpurgeable page count, causing the shrinker to be invoked\nexcessively under memory pressure.\n\nGuard the accounting calls with the same pin-count transition checks\nalready used to guard the pinned_link list maintenance, so accounting\nis only updated on the outermost pin and the final unpin.\n\nWhile centralizing this logic into xe_bo_account_pin()\u002F\nxe_bo_account_unpin(), also close a second, related accounting gap\naffecting imported dma-bufs. For an imported bo's ttm_tt, xe's\nttm_tt_populate hook (xe_ttm_tt_populate()) early-returns without\ncalling xe_ttm_tt_account_add(), since TTM_TT_FLAG_EXTERNAL is set\nwithout TTM_TT_FLAG_EXTERNAL_MAPPABLE. However, TTM core's\nttm_tt_populate() wrapper unconditionally marks the tt as populated\non driver-hook success, so ttm_tt_is_populated() still reports true\nfor it. xe_bo_account_pin()\u002Fxe_bo_account_unpin() trusted\nttm_tt_is_populated() as a proxy for \"these pages are accounted for\nby the shrinker\", and would subtract\u002Fadd pages for such a tt that\nwere never added in the first place, again underflowing the\nshrinker's counts. This is reachable today via xe_bo_pin_external(),\nand would have become newly reachable via the fb-pin path once this\npatch routes __xe_pin_fb_vma() through xe_bo_pin_account() below, so\nfix it here rather than in a later patch, to avoid a commit in this\nseries that introduces the regression before fixing it. Skip the\naccounting for imported bos, using the same EXTERNAL &&\n!EXTERNAL_MAPPABLE test xe_ttm_tt_populate()\u002Fxe_ttm_tt_unpopulate()\nuse to decide whether to act, via a new xe_ttm_bo_is_imported()\nhelper (hoisted up from its only prior use site).\n\nv2:\n- Fix the critical issue caught by Sashiko AI review: the pin-count\n  transition check introduced here was still bypassed by the fb-pin\n  path (__xe_pin_fb_vma()\u002F__xe_unpin_fb_vma()), which could leave a\n  stale pinned_link entry and a permanent shrinker accounting leak\n  when the fb-unpin performed the true last unpin. Addressed in a\n  separate follow-up patch in this series rather than folded in here,\n  since it is a distinct bug with its own Fixes: tag.\n- Drop the unneeded local \"last_unpin\" variable in\n  xe_bo_unpin_external(), restoring the original inline\n  bo->ttm.pin_count == 1 check; it was a no-op rename not used by any\n  of the new accounting helpers, and was going to be deleted again by\n  the follow-up patch anyway.\n\nv3:\n- Exclude imported dma-bufs from the pin\u002Funpin shrinker accounting,\n  fixing another underflow caught by Sashiko AI review.\n- Add a short comment on the backup-object pin site noting it's\n  already populated\u002Faccounted at pin time, addressing (as a\n  false-positive clarification, no code fix needed) a separate\n  Medium-severity accounting-leak concern also caught by Sashiko AI\n  \n---truncated---","2026-10-23T13:17:00Z",{},false,[],[],[],[42,43,44],"https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F83d5acca1f4f6132038ea88c72c5844f62e42d44","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F993c952e6832ad0aa4be82e11f0760b1f532090a","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002Fab39bc55cf08208b8511b1c09926b1b646a8befc",0,0.00177,0.0714,{"timestamp":6,"automatable":49,"tech_impact":50,"exploitation":51,"cisa_decision":52,"cisa_remediation_timeline":53},"no","partial","none",{},"FSU",[],[],{"count":57,"next":58,"previous":6,"results":59},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[60,68,76],{"id":61,"title":62,"summary":63,"published_at":64,"type":65,"link":66,"image_url":67},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":69,"title":70,"summary":71,"published_at":72,"type":73,"link":74,"image_url":75},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":77,"title":78,"summary":79,"published_at":80,"type":81,"link":82,"image_url":83},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]