[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-99081":30,"landing-articles":68},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":48,"technologies":49,"references":50,"score":56,"epss_score":57,"epss_percentile":58,"is_kev":59,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":60,"attack_mappings":66,"exploits":67},411858,"CVE-2026-99081","EUVD-2026-108747","In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbnxt_en: fix DMA mapping length for padded small packets\n\nStefan Fleischmann reported Intel IOMMU DMA Read faults on BCM57412\nNetXtreme-E NICs when transmitting packets on VLAN\u002Fmacvlan interfaces:\n\n  DMAR: [DMA Read NO_PASID] Request device [18:00.0] fault addr 0xfc499000\n        [fault reason 0x06] PTE Read access is not set\n  bnxt_en 0000:18:00.0 eno1np0: Abandoning msg {0xb4 0x41a} len: 0 due to firmware status: 0x2000001\n  ...\n  NETDEV WATCHDOG: eno1np0 (bnxt_en): transmit queue 0 timed out\n\nThe fault address (0xfc499000) is on an exact 4KB page boundary,\npointing to a DMA read buffer overrun.\n\nIn bnxt_start_xmit(), packets smaller than BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE (52 bytes),\nsuch as 42-byte untagged ARP frames, are padded:\n\n    if (length \u003C BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE) {\n        pad = BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE - length;\n        if (skb_pad(skb, pad))\n            goto tx_kick_pending;\n        length = BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE;\n    }\n\n    mapping = dma_map_single(&pdev->dev, skb->data, len, DMA_TO_DEVICE);\n    ...\n    dma_unmap_len_set(tx_buf, len, len);\n\nHowever, 'len' was initialized earlier to skb_headlen(skb) (e.g. 42 bytes)\nand is left unadjusted after padding. Consequently, dma_map_single() and\ndma_unmap_len_set() map and track only 42 bytes.\n\nLater, the hardware TX buffer descriptor is programmed with the padded length:\n\n    txbd->tx_bd_len_flags_type =\n        cpu_to_le32(((len + pad) \u003C\u003C TX_BD_LEN_SHIFT) | flags |\n                    TX_BD_FLAGS_PACKET_END);\n\nThe NIC DMA engine is thus instructed to read 52 bytes from a region where\nonly 42 bytes were DMA-mapped. If skb->data ends near the boundary of a 4KB\npage (within 'pad' bytes of the next page), the hardware DMA read overruns\ninto the unmapped adjacent page, triggering an IOMMU fault.\n\nThis issue was exposed after commit 447cbe95ebb9 (\"vlan: fix skb_under_panic\nand races when toggling HW VLAN offload\") because reserving extra VLAN\nheadroom rounded LL_RESERVED_SPACE from 48 up to 64 bytes, shifting skb->data\noffsets and potentially causing small frames to land right against page\nboundaries.\n\nFix this by using skb_put_padto(skb, BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE) in\nbnxt_start_xmit(), before skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags is sampled,\nbecause padding might linearize the skb.\nThis ensures skb->len and skb_headlen(skb) reflect the padded size so\nthat dma_map_single() maps the full buffer and the descriptor length is\nconsistent. This also removes the temporary 'pad' variable and masking logic.\n\nThe padding is done after the SW USO branch, otherwise\nbnxt_sw_udp_gso_xmit() would account the padding as UDP payload\nand send it in extra segments.\n\nNote that SW USO segments are still not padded: with IPv4, a segment\ncarrying less than 10 bytes of UDP payload (small gso_size, or a short\nlast segment) is sent as a frame shorter than BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE.\nThis is a separate issue, left for a followup patch.","2026-10-23T13:17:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":42,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.1",7.5,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:N\u002FA:H","NONE","LOW",true,[],[],[],[51,52,53,54,55],"https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F2956aca14dd2977cd08bd2ccafae3beb8b84b268","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F5213f65a9667d3dd85db2e6df8f2e0516290db34","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002Fa51d233ccd4889aadb71dace863525cc2b00271e","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002Fcf8530a25ae92c4493e2f22981ecb46f0b66f4c8","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002Ffbd977e513971ccb4f0762a7f59eac500e474f89",0.57,0.00461,0.39687,false,{"timestamp":6,"automatable":61,"tech_impact":62,"exploitation":63,"cisa_decision":64,"cisa_remediation_timeline":65},"no","partial","none",{},"FSU",[],[],{"count":69,"next":70,"previous":6,"results":71},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[72,80,88],{"id":73,"title":74,"summary":75,"published_at":76,"type":77,"link":78,"image_url":79},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":81,"title":82,"summary":83,"published_at":84,"type":85,"link":86,"image_url":87},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":89,"title":90,"summary":91,"published_at":92,"type":93,"link":94,"image_url":95},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]